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Th e countries of the South Paciﬁ c have struggled 
to generate sustainable economic growth since their 
independence. Interventionist policies have failed 
in the past here, as they have in all other regions. 
Business and government leaders in this region are 
now beginning to acknowledge — as has happened 
in many other developing country regions over the 
past two decades — that major reforms are needed 
to put their economies onto a higher growth path. 
Th is study examines the growth record of key Paciﬁ c 
island economies and indentiﬁ es the reasons for their 
relatively poor performance. It then looks at the process 
of globalization that is aﬀ ecting those and indeed all 
economies increasingly; and the role the WTO has 
played in that process.
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Foreword 
It is almost impossible for a meeting to be held in the world to 
discuss international economic issues without it being disrupted by 
violent demonstrations. Papua New Guineans are not immune to 
the distrust and bewilderment that surround these issues which 
affect all of us. As is so often the case when we don’t understand 
something we hit out blindly at it. The World Bank, the IMF, WTO 
and APEC are all institutions that come under this mantle. They are 
blamed for almost everything that is supposed to be wrong with our 
lives. 
It is fashionable to blame these institutions and the easy part is that 
those who do blame them can do so by merely calling their names 
rather than having to justify their stands or provide any evidence for 
what they are saying. This study is aimed at providing a reasoned 
argument about the effects of WTO and APEC, primarily how they 
affect PNG but also about how they affect other small Pacific 
nations. 
 PNG is a trading nation and will be one for a long time to 
come. We rely on exports for our income and our growth and we 
need to create the best possible conditions in which our exporters 
can sell to the rest of the world. There is nothing wrong with being a 
trading nation and many of the world’s richest nations got there 
because they were good traders. PNG needs to stimulate all of its 
exports and to create conditions that will encourage new ones. It 
cannot afford to retain barriers that make the cost of exports higher. 
The INA has long been concerned about this subject. Its concern has 
been whether PNG will be able to carry out the necessary 
adjustments and how it will be able to absorb business and workers 
who are replaced by the changes. This worry comes because of the 
smallness and disparity of the PNG economy and the lack of 
obvious alternative investments to absorb the displaced capital and 
labour. 
There are many reasons why there has not been enough investment 
in PNG and tariff protection has only been one of them. It has 
embraced the WTO and APEC agenda enthusiastically, some would 
say too quickly and too willingly. This study makes the very 
iv
  
important point that the expected improvements for a more liberal 
trade policy will only work if the rest of the economy is freed up 
and resources are encouraged into new ventures because investors 
see that there are markets available and profits to be made. 
The best wage, price and employment policies will only emerge as a 
result of good and liberal economic policies. Governments are not 
good at setting wages or prices because they don’t have the 
pressures of competition and they tend to reflect the prejudices of a 
small group of people. Protection looks after small interest groups 
and has tended to encourage corruption as those interest groups try 
to protect their privileged positions. Competition, or even the threat 
of competition, forces firms and traders to seek the cheapest 
methods of production and makes them pass on these benefits to the 
rest of the economy.  
The study has paid particular attention to PNG’s sugar industry 
because it is a classic example of the problems that a small economy 
faces when it encourages, through protection from import 
competition and other measures, a large investment in a remote 
area. There are around 10,000 people in some way dependant on 
Ramu for their livelihood, either as employees, outgrowers, 
suppliers or their families. Ramu has provided infrastructure to a 
remote area and it will be hard to replace. Nevertheless, the authors 
believe that PNG would be better off keeping to the proposed 
reduction on tariffs even if that forced the closure of Ramu. They 
argue that the substantial adjustment costs to those 10,000 people 
would not outweigh the benefits that the rest of the population will 
gain (a) directly from cheaper sugar prices for food processors and 
final consumers and, more importantly, (b) indirectly from the faster 
growth in the rest of the economy that the reforms will stimulate. 
The authors acknowledge that in extreme cases such as Ramu the 
government may need to design temporary adjustment assistance 
schemes. Costly and unfair though such schemes are (because if 
adjusters in other industries/regions were to be compensated there 
would be a budget blowout), sometimes they are necessary 
politically when the alternative would be to exempt such groups 
from reform. 
Initially we tried to find someone from the Pacific or South East Asia 
to do the study. For a variety of reasons we were unsuccessful. We 
v  
then approached Professor Kym Anderson from Adelaide 
University who agreed to take on the assignment with Malcolm 
Bosworth. Both are strong supporters of the multilateral trading 
system, having each spend several years working at the 
GATT/WTO Secretariat. They see the gains from trade as far 
outweighing the short term costs that will be felt as adjustments are 
made to allow greater gains from trade to flow. This paper sets out 
their reasoning for this stance. 
The INA is grateful to AusAID and Ramu Sugar Ltd for the 
sponsorship of this study. Ramu has been given the opportunity to 
comment on the first draft of the study and the authors have taken 
these into account when finalising the report. We also thank Kym 
Anderson and Malcolm Bosworth for their contributions as well as 
all those people who gave their time to be interviewed and who 
attended the public seminar on the subject. 
 
Michael Manning, Director 
Institute of National Affairs 
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Preface 
The terms of reference of this study, which was commissioned by 
PNG’s Institute of National Affairs, require it to: 
• identify the costs and benefits to PNG of compliance with WTO 
and APEC; 
• identify industries that may be affected and profile them in terms 
of employment, original capital investment, (if possible) written 
down capital values, government commitments including equity, 
protection, tax incentives; 
• make suggestions about how PNG can best adjust/adapt to 
compliance with WTO and APEC conditions; 
• identify short and long term measures that PNG and other 
(larger) member states can take to minimize the short-term costs 
of compliance (which should look at removing structural 
rigidities over a planned time scale, interventions that might 
make PNG industry more competitive such as additional 
research funding, identification of alternative investment 
opportunities and possible structural adjustment assistance 
measures); 
• identify any other measures that PNG should be taking to 
improve its competitive position in both the short and long term; 
and 
• identify any other likely problems from compliance with WTO 
and APEC. 
The report was prepared following a one-week visit to PNG by 
Malcolm Bosworth, from 6 June 2000. Discussions were held with 
PNG officials from relevant ministries as well as representatives of 
key business groups and industries (Appendix 1). A public seminar 
on ‘WTO and APEC’ was organized by the Institute of National 
Affairs and held in Port Moresby on 9 June 2000 (Appendix 2). The 
seminar raised several important issues relating to PNG's WTO and 
APEC involvement. The presentations outlined the Government’s 
views, including the Investment Promotion Authority, as well as 
those of manufacturers and non-government organizations. The 
seminar provided a useful dialogue with the audience on PNG’s 
membership of the WTO and APEC. It demonstrated that there was 
general support from policymakers and industry representatives for 
PNG to actively participate in the WTO and APEC. However, there 
was also widespread community anxiety and concerns about the 
possible adverse impact that globalization and other WTO/APEC 
initiatives may have on PNG and regional island economies. 
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Executive summary 
The countries of the South Pacific have struggled to 
generate sustainable economic growth since their 
independence. Interventionist policies have failed in the 
past here, as they have in all other regions. Business and 
government leaders in this region are now beginning to 
acknowledge — as has happened in many other 
developing country regions over the past two decades — 
that major reforms are needed to put their economies onto 
a higher growth path. 
In most other regions many developing countries have 
already abandoned those inward-looking policy regimes in 
preference to growth-enhancing, market-friendly policies. 
In PNG and the South Pacific, by contrast, only a tentative 
beginning is evident. 
Yet delaying the implementation of trade and investment 
policy reforms is becoming ever-more costly. This is 
because in the past decade or so the world has changed in 
very fundamental ways. The changes affect all economies, 
but especially those with policy regimes least suited to this 
fundamentally new environment.  
The birth of APEC in 1989, and more so the coming into 
being of the World Trade Organization in 1995 following 
the Uruguay Round, have contributed to the new global 
environment. But they are less a cause of those 
fundamental changes than a response to them. It is the 
information technology revolution that is the main driver 
of the new wave of globalization.  
The abilities of national economies to adjust and take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by globalization 
differ greatly, but not so much because of different levels of 
economic development. Rather, it is correlated with 
differences in the degree of openness of their economies, 
Major market 
reforms
needed to raise 
regional
economic
growth … 
… building on 
tentative
beginnings
Delaying policy 
reforms
becoming
more costly … 
… because 
globalization
with its many 
benefits is here 
to stay due to 
the information 
revolution
Open
economies are 
best placed to 
benefit from 
globalization…
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together with having appropriate institutions for good 
governance. 
A positive feature of globalization is that countries with 
good economic governance will be rewarded more in the 
future than they would have been in the past for their 
sensible policy stance. But the converse is also true. That is, 
countries with poor economic governance will be 
penalized more in the future than they would have been in 
the past. The most obvious manifestation of the penalty for 
poor governance is the way in which foreign investment is 
withdrawn and/or stays away. A less obvious but 
probably more important manifestation is a reduced ability 
of domestic firms to compete internationally. 
The WTO agreements and the APEC process are crucial 
international institutional creations aimed at helping 
national governments respond to the forces of 
globalization. Key members are responding, and as a 
consequence globalization has accelerated — making it all 
the more imperative for other countries to adjust their 
policy regimes. 
Thus Pacific countries face a stark choice: either they 
embrace globalization by adjusting their policy regimes to 
this brave new world, or their economies are destined to 
grow slower. And they will grow slower not only relative 
to the rest of the world, but also in absolute terms as they 
fall further behind the technology leaders. 
For PNG, Fiji and the Solomon Islands, their WTO 
membership has the potential to assist their governments 
adjust their policy regimes in appropriate way. So too does 
the WTO accession process for those less-populous island 
economies that have already applied (Samoa, Tonga and 
Vanuatu). And by becoming a WTO Observer, the South 
Pacific Forum Secretariat could assist the other Pacific 
island economies in learning the basic rules of good 
economic governance as they relate to trade, in essence 
what GATT/WTO disciplines are about. 
… and more so 
in the future 
than in the 
past
WTO and 
APEC assist 
national
governments
respond to 
globalization
The choice is 
stark
WTO can help 
…
xii Reforming Trade Policy in PNG and the Pacific Islands
 
The APEC process provides a supplementary avenue for 
learning about good economic governance. As an APEC 
member, PNG can acquire that directly; but FICs can get it 
indirectly through their close association not only with 
PNG but also with their other neighbours who are 
members. 
A crucial challenge for Pacific island governments and 
their citizens is thus before them. On the one hand, if they 
choose not to open up and reform their economies, their 
relatively poor economic growth and poverty alleviation 
performance of the past 25 years is likely not just to 
continue but to worsen. On the other hand, if they choose 
to embrace reform, the payoff will be even higher now than 
it would have been without this new wave of globalization. 
This is because Pacific island economies are further behind 
than they were even just a few years ago, and because the 
opportunities for leapfrogging via technology transfer are 
so much greater now thanks to the information revolution. 
Like anything worthwhile in life, embracing that challenge 
will not be easy politically or socially. Vested interests in 
the current protectionist trade regimes will fight to retain 
their privileged positions. Others will resent having to 
adjust to new ways of doing things. Hence politicians with 
a short horizon will be reluctant to risk their positions by 
taking the lead, and may themselves have a vested bias in 
resisting change. Yet the ‘status quo’ option will become 
increasingly costly as globalization proceeds in the rest of 
the world. So how can Pacific island economies begin to 
respond? 
The most important priority for governments is to accept 
— and persuade their constituencies to accept — that trade, 
investment and other economic reforms are badly needed 
if private sector development and growth is to occur, since 
it is only by improving productivity that living standards 
can rise over the long term. Governments must be deeply 
committed to the process, and because that commitment 
has to be sustained it must be driven from a domestic base. 
While WTO (and APEC) membership can help reform-
… as can 
APEC
Successfully 
meeting the 
reform
challenge will 
produce larger 
pay-offs … 
… but political 
and social 
resistance to 
reforms must 
be overcome 
Pacific island 
governments
must build a 
constituency
for reform … 
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minded governments to implement market-opening 
measures, membership alone is insufficient for meaningful 
and sustainable reform. 
First, communities need to become much more acutely 
aware of the gains that could come their way if WTO-
consistent market reforms were adopted. They also need to 
be aware that the gains would come gradually rather than 
all at once, whereas the costs of adjustment as reforms are 
implemented — even though they are one-off — will have 
to be borne up front. In the case of grossly distorted 
economies, the adjustment period could stretch out over a 
decade or more. If that is not understood at the outset, the 
risk is that disappointed expectations could lead to 
pressures for policy reversals — which could be worse 
than doing nothing, because it would involve double 
adjustment costs and no gains. But the prospect of a 
prolonged and difficult adjustment period is no reason to 
abandon the reforms. Rather, it is an incentive to 
commence now before the costs escalate even further. 
Second, reforms need to be prioritized so they are 
appropriately sequenced and implemented at a pace that 
does not overwhelm the capacity of the legislature and the 
public administrators. A key to keeping the costs of 
adjustment manageable is to phase in the bigger reform 
programs over a pre-determined period that is announced 
at the outset. Thinking through the new policies before 
announcing them is crucial though, since subsequent 
changes to the new policies — or even just to the timing of 
the implementation phases — will reduce the credibility of 
the process and thereby discourage investors. 
Third, even though the benefits from market liberalization 
will far outweigh the up-front adjustment costs, the latter 
are both immediate and hit concentrated groups. Where 
such interest groups are powerful politically, reform may 
only be possible in extreme cases if those affected are given 
an explicit adjustment incentive. But otherwise the best 
way the government can facilitate adjustment — which 
because of economic growth and globalization abroad is 
… by raising 
awareness of 
the
opportunities,
but also the 
adjustment
costs
Prioritize and 
sequence 
reforms and 
phase-in the 
bigger
changes
Education and 
training are the 
best means of 
facilitating 
adjustment
xiv Reforming Trade Policy in PNG and the Pacific Islands
 
going to happen to a considerable extent even when 
policies are unchanged — is to better equip people with the 
necessary skills for meeting the challenges and seizing the 
opportunities that change brings. All the international 
evidence points to better basic education being the key 
provider of such skills, so some of the tax dividend from 
the faster economic growth that will result from reform 
might be used to improve the quantity and quality of 
education. As well, training programs for administrators 
and for trainers of administrators could enhance the 
capacity of the public service to facilitate adjustment to the 
reforms.  
And fourth, Pacific island economies need not try to 
respond to these challenges alone. They can support each 
other by sharing ideas on how to design and implement 
reforms, and seek technical and economic help from the 
WTO Secretariat, the World Bank, UNCTAD, the Forum 
Secretariat and (for PNG at least) though the APEC 
process, as well as via bilateral aid programs. 
The opportunity to embrace the reform process more 
comprehensively, and the rewards for doing so, have never 
been greater than they are now. It remains for leaders of 
Pacific islands to seize that opportunity. 
Seek
international
help for reform 
A great 
opportunity is 
there to be 
seized
 
 
1 
Introduction 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) and other (South) Pacific island 
economies have struggled to generate sustainable 
economic growth. Despite continuing to receive very large 
amounts of donor assistance per capita from bilateral and 
multilateral agencies, most economies of the region seem to 
be no closer to achieving this goal than they were a decade 
or two ago.  
However, governments and business leaders in the region 
are beginning to acknowledge that major reforms are 
needed to put their economies on a sustainable growth 
path. Fundamental market-opening and other economic 
reforms are essential, along with strengthening of their 
institutional settings and governance. Leaders now 
recognize that past interventionist policies have failed in 
this region as they have elsewhere, and that many other 
developing countries have abandoned them in the past 
decade or so in preference to growth-enhancing market-
friendly policies.  
For example, Forum Island Countries (FICs) adopted a 
plan of action in 1995 to promote their economic 
development beyond 2000. This consisted of reforms to 13 
sets of policies of the sort widely accepted from 
international experience as necessary for establishing an 
economic environment for sustained growth. It includes 
reduced trade barriers, tax reform, civil service reform, and 
corporatization and privatization of public utilities. The 
plan was endorsed at subsequent meetings of the South 
Pacific Forum Leaders’ and Economic Ministers’ meetings. 
Slow growth 
continues to 
disappoint
Views on 
accepting the 
need for 
economic
reforms are 
changing … 
… and action 
plans are being 
endorsed 
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In seeking to reform trade policies, the region has 
embraced some international trade agreements in the past. 
For example, there is a long history of regional trading 
arrangements involving Pacific island economies that 
provide them with non-reciprocated preferential access to 
developed-country markets. Exports from PNG, Fiji, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu have 
entered the European Union (EU) free of import duties and 
quantitative restrictions under the Lome Convention since 
1978. Such arrangements are being extended for a further 
transitional period of eight years from March 2000 under a 
Partnership Agreement with the ACP (Asia, Caribbean and 
Pacific) countries following expiration of Lome IV, after 
which a reciprocal free trade agreement is mooted1. 
Australia and New Zealand have provided similar access 
to exports from FICs since 1981 under the South Pacific 
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(SPARTECA). PNG has also had a bilateral agreement with 
Australia since independence that establishes a non-
reciprocal free trade area whereby its exports enter 
Australia duty free (the PNG Australia Trade and 
Commercial Relations Agreement, PATCRA). In addition, 
PNG is considering whether to seek full membership of the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), in 
which it is currently an observer, and thereby to AFTA (the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area). 
As well, members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(MSG), initially PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu and 
subsequently New Caledonia and Fiji, provide each other 
with limited tariff preferences. PNG and Fiji also have had 
a limited reciprocal trade agreement since 1996. 
                                                          
1 The EU is currently waiting on a decision following its request for a 
waiver in the WTO for these transitional arrangements. 
There have 
been regional 
trade initiatives 
such as 
SPARTECA,
Lome and 
PATCRA … 
… and the 
MSG   
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A free-trade area, currently being negotiated among FICs 
on the basis of negative lists of exempt products to be 
excluded from the preferential arrangements, is planned 
for implementation in 20012. Tariffs on goods are to be 
eliminated over a number of years (yet to be specified). The 
effects of including services trade and of extending the 
agreement to French and U.S. Pacific island territories, and 
of longer term integration with the Closer Economic 
Relations Trade Agreement between Australia and 
New Zealand (ANZCERTA), are also being examined. 
Despite these regional developments having the primary 
objective of integrating Pacific island economies into the 
world economy, their trade and investment patterns 
remain narrowly based in terms of direction and 
composition, and somewhat dependant on those 
preferential trading arrangements, especially for 
manufactured goods. Meanwhile, globalization is 
inexorably influencing the region in ways that are 
rewarding more than in the past those economies that have 
good economic governance — but also, for reasons 
discussed in the next chapter, are penalizing more than in 
the past those economies whose policies are inhibiting 
efficient resource use. 
To break out of the narrowness of current trade relations, 
some Pacific island economies are increasingly turning 
their attention outside the region to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to help jump-start and/or consolidate 
their economic reforms. Three island economies, Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, participated 
in the Uruguay Round and became founding members of 
the WTO by virtue of their previous status within the 
GATT3. These countries were not therefore required to 
                                                          
2 The FICs are the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Fiji, Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and 
Samoa.
3 Fiji has been a full contracting party to the GATT since November 
1993, and became a founding WTO member in January 1996.  PNG 
and the Solomon Islands, de facto GATT members because of their 
Some Pacific 
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4 Reforming Trade Policy in PNG and the Pacific Islands
 
undertake the lengthy and at times arduous accession 
process that any aspiring new WTO member must now 
undergo – a process in which three other island economies 
are currently engaged. Vanuatu and Tonga formally 
applied for WTO membership in 1995, and Samoa in 1998. 
Vanuatu’s accession is the most advanced, but is still some 
way from being completed. An initial draft of the Working 
Party Report has been circulated to members, and 
consultations on terms and conditions of accession are 
continuing. Tonga circulated to WTO members its 
Memorandum on the Foreign Trade Regime in May 1998. 
The South Pacific Forum Secretariat has also obtained 
observer status to the WTO on certain committees, such as 
the Committee on Trade and Development, and has played 
an important advisory role in support of those Pacific 
countries’ accession. 
A further opportunity to consolidate and strengthen 
unilateral reform is provided through the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) process. PNG joined APEC 
in 1994 and is the only Pacific island member. Although 
seen as a regional arrangement, its diverse membership in 
the Asia Pacific region covers 21 countries4. Most APEC 
economies also belong to the WTO5. All APEC economies 
are committed to the 1994 Bogor objectives of voluntarily 
achieving ‘free and open trade and investment’ in 
developed economies by 2010, and in all developing 
member countries by 2020. PNG is therefore committed to 
comprehensive liberalization, including of agriculture and 
                                                                                                                                                   
past protectorate status with Australia and the Unites Kingdom, 
respectively, exercised their rights during the change-over to become 
founding WTO members.  PNG became a WTO member in June 
1996, and the Solomon Islands from December 1996. 
4 APEC economies are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
China, Hong Kong China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, PNG, the Philippines, Singapore, Chinese 
Taipei, Thailand, the US and, since 1999, Peru, the Russian 
Federation and Vietnam. 
5 Of the 21 APEC economies, 17 are currently WTO members.  
China and Chinese Taipei are now expected to join the WTO by end-
2000 or in 2001.  Vietnam and Russia are a little further behind in the 
process of WTO accession. 
… and APEC 
5Introduction
 
services, on a non-discriminatory basis, fully consistent 
with the WTO. PNG submitted APEC Individual Action 
Plans (IAPs) for liberalization following the Osaka Action 
Agenda in 1996, and again in 1998. It also participated in 
the so-called Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization 
(EVSL) initiative, aimed at advancing trade liberalization in 
certain sectors. APEC economies transferred these sectoral 
initiatives to reduce tariffs in these sectors to the WTO, 
while continuing to advance liberalization of non-tariff 
measures in these sectors in a concerted unilateral fashion.  
Outline of the Study 
This study begins in Chapter 2 by examining the growth 
record of key Pacific island economies and identifying the 
reasons for their relatively poor performance. It then looks 
in Chapter 3 at the process of globalization that is affecting 
those and indeed all economies increasingly; and the role 
the WTO (assisted by APEC) has played in that process. It 
also examines their implications for the development 
strategies of countries seeking to improve their economic 
performance in this rapidly changing international 
environment. 
Taking the necessary steps to reform and open up an 
economy is never easy politically for any government. This 
is because the necessary costs of structural adjustments are 
immediate and often highly concentrated on a few groups 
whereas the gains from that adjustment — even though 
they usually far outweigh the adjustment costs — are 
diffuse and take time to show themselves. Bearing that in 
mind, Chapter 4 looks at what policy reforms are needed to 
revitalize the PNG economy and, by example, other Pacific 
island nations, including the important roles played by 
trade and investment liberalization to promote competitive 
markets and economic restructuring. Chapter 5 shows how 
the WTO can help to facilitate regional economic 
development and discusses the sensitive issue of 
compliance costs of such membership. The supplementary 
role that APEC can play is outlined in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 
6 Reforming Trade Policy in PNG and the Pacific Islands
 
concludes by pointing to the policy implications of WTO 
and APEC membership for PNG and other Pacific island 
economies and the stark choices facing them. 
While the study focuses mainly on PNG, because it is both 
a WTO and APEC member, its findings are also relevant to 
the two other island economies that are already in the 
WTO. It is also particularly timely for the region’s 
prospective WTO members (Vanuatu, Samoa and Tonga) 
and for others contemplating joining. 
 2 
Performance of Pacific Island 
Economies 
PNG and other Pacific island economies, although varying 
somewhat between countries and years, have performed 
relatively poorly for decades (final column of Table 2.1). In 
real terms per capita GDP has risen less than 1 per cent per 
year during the past twenty five years except in the 
Solomon Islands. That compares with around 4 per cent in 
Southeast Asia and in low-income countries as a group. 
PNG, the largest economy by far, has been among the 
worst performers, despite its huge mineral and petroleum 
wealth. In the 1980s its GDP grew only 1.9 per cent while 
its population was growing at above 2.2 per cent, meaning 
per capita GDP fell at 0.3 per cent per year. It recovered in 
the period 1990 to 1999, growing at 1.7 per cent per capita 
(World Bank 2000b). The latter growth occurred mainly in 
the first half of the 1990s though: GNP per head has 
declined again since the mid-1990s, when it was above 
US$1,100, to $US800 in 19996.  
                                                          
6 GNP is GDP plus foreign earnings by nationals minus domestic 
earnings by foreigners. 
Poor growth 
record of PNG 
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8 Reforming Trade Policy in PNG and the Pacific Islands
 
Table 2.1 Key economic indicators for selected Pacific Island and other 
economies, 1999
Popul-
ation
1999
Pop
ul-
ation
per
sq
km
1999
Pop’n
annual
growth 
rate
1993-98
GNP
per
head
1999
GNP,
total
1999
GNP
per
head,
PPP
basis
1999
Real
GDP
per
capita
growth 
1975-98
‘000 per cent 
per yr 
current
US$
current
US$ m 
US$ % per 
year
Pacific
islands
Papua New 
Guinea 4,710 10 2.3 800 3,746 2,260 0.2
Fiji 801 44 1.0 2,210 1,771 4,540 0.6
Kiribati 88 121 na 910 81 3,190 na
W. Samoa 170 60 0.7 1,060 181 3,920 0.3
Solomon Is. 429 15 3.3 750 320 1,950 2.6
Tonga 100 138 0.4 1,720 172 4,280 na
Vanuatu 189 16 2.7 1,170 221 2,770 -0.8
SE Asia 
Indonesia 207,000 114 1.7 580 119,500 2,440 4.1
Malaysia 23,000 69 2.5 3,400 77,300 7,960 3.9
Thailand 62,000 121 1.3 1,960 121,000 5,600 4.9
Caribbean
Antigua & 
Barbuda 67 153 0.6 8,300a 555a 9,440a 4.6
Barbados 267 620 0.4 7,890a 2,096a 12,260a 1.6
St Lucia 154 253 1.6 3,770 580 5,020 3.6
Indian Ocean 
Maldives 278 925 2.6 1,160 332 3,550 5.1
Mauritius 1,170 576 1.1 3,590 4,203 8,650 4.3
Seychelles 80 177 1.4 6,540 520 10,380 3.1
ALL LOW-
INCOME 73 2.0 410 1,790 3.4
ALL LOWER 
MIDDLE 
INCOME
48 1.1 1,200 3,960 3.7
a 1998 
• Source: World Bank (2000a,b) and, for final column, UNDP (2000). 
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The growth in per capita GNP of Pacific island economies 
has been slow even compared with the similar-sized island 
economies of the Indian Ocean and Caribbean (Table 2.1). 
All Pacific island economies now rank between 100th and 
150th in the listing of the world’s 206 economies when 
ordered by current GNP per capita (as measured using the 
World Bank Atlas method involving a three-year average 
foreign exchange rate). These data differ from the 
purchasing power parity per capita GNP data shown in the 
final column of Table 2.1. The latter usually are much 
higher for developing countries, but the rankings do not 
change markedly. In PNG’s case, its PPP level was 
US$2,260 in 1999, and its PPP ranking was 147 out of 206 
economies, compared with a ranking of 138 using the 
current dollar method7. So instead of being two-thirds of 
the lower middle-income country average as with the 
current dollar measure of GNP, it is just over half that 
group’s average as measured in PPP terms. 
All Pacific island economies are classified by the United 
Nations as developing economies, with the Solomon 
Islands, Kiribati, Samoa and Tuvalu considered least-
developed economies. PNG is classified by the World Bank 
as a lower middle-income country. Regional income levels 
vary markedly within PNG. Those in urban centres exceed 
rural levels of around US$350 per head by about tenfold. 
Similar disparities in income levels are also found in other 
Pacific island economies.  
With the possible exception of Fiji, Pacific island economies 
continually rate badly on the United Nation’s Human 
Development Index. In the latest rankings, PNG ranked 
133rd out of 174 countries (and 129th in 1999), Solomon 
Islands 121st (118th in 1999), and Vanuatu 118th (116th in 
1999). This index is a composite measure of life expectancy, 
educational levels and PPP-adjusted income. Clearly, 
PNG’s limited growth — mainly from mining — has not 
been transformed into social progress. While social 
                                                          
7 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) income is the level in US dollars 
that would equate real domestic purchasing power or living standards 
across countries at existing exchange rates. 
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indicators improved in the first dozen or so years following 
its independence in 1975, they have deteriorated badly in 
the past decade. Many of PNG’s social indicators are now 
below the average for low-income countries, including life 
expectancy, adult literacy and education (Table 2.2).  
Main characteristics of Pacific island economies 
While PNG and other Pacific economies differ in many 
respects, such as cultural and ethnic backgrounds, they 
share similar key economic characteristics as small island 
economies with slow and erratic economic growth that 
falls well short of potential. Being relatively lightly 
populated, the larger Pacific island countries are generally 
rich in natural resources per capita. For example, Fiji, 
Samoa and the Solomon Islands all have substantial timber 
and fish resources. PNG is especially fortunate in also 
having considerable oil and mineral wealth. Even the more 
densely populated Pacific countries are still much better 
endowed with land per capita than many in the Caribbean 
and Indian Ocean (column 2 of Table 2.1). 
Some of these characteristics, such as geographic isolation 
and physical smallness, cannot be changed. Arguably, 
however, these are not the only or even the main reasons 
for bad economic performance in the Pacific. Others are 
policy-induced features over which governments have 
control. Understanding the negative effects of these policy 
measures is central to any assessment of the potential 
impact that the WTO and APEC may have on PNG and 
other island economies.  
Some are 
resource rich 
Economic
smallness is a 
fact of life 
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Table 2.2 Key social indicators for selected Pacific Island and other 
economies, 1998 
Life expect-
ancy
Adult
literacy
Education,
all levels 
(average)
Human
Dev’t Index 
(HDI)
years % > 14 
years
% enrolment rank  
(out of 174)
      Pacific islands 
Papua New Guinea 58 63 37 133
Fiji 73 92 81 66
W. Samoa 72 80 65 95
Solomon Islands 72 62 46 121
Vanuatu 68 64 47 118
    South-East Asia 
Indonesia 66 86 65 109
Malaysia 72 86 65 61
Thailand 69 95 61 76
      Caribbean 
Antigua & Barbuda 76 95 78 37
Barbados 77 97 80 30
St Lucia 70 82 68 88
      Indian Ocean 
Maldives 65 96 75 89
Mauritius 72 84 63 71
Seychelles 71 84 76 53
ALL LOW-INCOME 
COUNTRIES 
63 69 56
ALL MEDIUM-
INCOME
COUNTRIES 69 88 73
• Source: UNDP (2000).
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•
Vulnerability of small economies to external 
shocks 
Pacific island economies are small by world and regional 
standards. For example, the combined GDP of the ten 
largest Pacific island economies in 1999 amounted to barely 
$US7 billion, compared to $US53 billion for New Zealand. 
There is considerable difference in the size of Pacific island 
economies, with the GDP of PNG being more than twice 
that of the next largest and much more affluent economy of 
Fiji. 
•
Due to their smallness, such economies are narrowly based 
and somewhat vulnerable to periodic economic shocks 
induced by adverse international conditions, such as sharp 
declines in their terms of trade. For example, the recent rise 
in the world price of petroleum has impacted heavily on 
these economies which are reliant on imports of petroleum 
products8. Similarly, the Solomon Islands and PNG were 
adversely affected by the decline in world log prices 
following the Asian economic crisis, and by depressed 
mineral prices, especially for gold and copper. Minor 
changes in the terms of trade can thus translate to major 
changes in external balances and in economic growth. 
Economic variability is also increased by geographical and 
climatic factors. For example, cyclones commonly hit the 
islands, damaging rural holdings and infrastructure, and 
droughts occur frequently. PNG, for example, suffered 
widespread cyclone-related damage to its copra and cocoa 
crops in 1997. This was followed by a severe drought that 
not only affected its food crops but also disrupted its major 
mining operations, including copper production at Ok Tedi 
due to the Fly River becoming too shallow to transport 
mine output. 
                                                          
8 In the case of PNG, there is some offset from rising petroleum 
prices because it also exports crude oil. 
PNG is by far 
the largest 
island
economy
The region is 
vulnerable to 
external
shocks … 
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The political disruptions in Fiji and the Solomon Islands 
have added to the economic woes of these countries in the 
past year or so, just as they did for Fiji following its coup in 
the late 1980s. Foreign investors (and even nationals) 
simply park their investable funds elsewhere when such 
events occur, and typically take a long time to bring them 
back. This withdrawal of funds raises domestic real interest 
rates, which are currently above 10% in PNG, and slows 
capital formation. 
Heavy dependence on a large informal agriculture 
sector 
These islands remain essentially agrarian economies 
supplemented by some development of other primary 
resources such as timber, fish and, in the case of especially 
PNG, oil and mineral (most notably copper and gold) 
extraction. At the heart of their agriculture is a large 
informal sector on which economic development for the 
vast majority of their population depends in a critical way. 
Policies by individual governments to develop a 
manufacturing basis have generally achieved little success 
and in all the Pacific island economies the industrial sector 
still contributes well under 10 per cent of GDP and 
employment. This is to be expected given their abundance 
of natural resources relative to produced capital in the 
region (see Appendix 4). The services sector, however, is 
capable of expanding in relative importance, including in 
wholesaling, retailing, tourism and construction. 
The dependence of these economies on the informal 
agricultural sector is demonstrated by the PNG situation 
even though, unlike neighbouring islands, it also has a 
significant mining sector. Primary production in total 
accounted for 51% of GDP in 1997, agriculture, forestry, 
and fisheries accounted for nearly two-thirds of that share 
(Chart 2.1). However, these figures substantially understate 
the contribution of agriculture when the informal sector is 
properly taken into account. Commercial agriculture in 
PNG is supplemented by significant subsistence or semi-
commercial food production, estimated to be about half of 
… not to 
mention
political
instability 
Island
economies will 
continue their 
reliance on 
primary
production 
The informal 
sector
accounts for 
much
agricultural
output … 
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total agricultural output. Some 85% of the PNG people live 
in rural areas and are highly dependant on agriculture, 
with food gardens largely meeting subsistence needs while 
cash crops for both export and domestic markets provide 
cash income. It is estimated that the informal sector 
produces almost all food in PNG: over 70% of coffee; 65% 
of cocoa and copra; and 35% of palm oil. Expanding the 
informal provision of basic services in rural areas is also 
important to the economy’s growth9. 
Although the primary sector accounts for only around a 
quarter of formal employment, making it second in 
importance to the services sector, the significance of 
agriculture is increased substantially if the informal sector 
is taken into account. The informal agricultural sector is 
thought to account for well over two-thirds of the total 
PNG workforce. 
High trade dependency 
The external sector of PNG and other neighbouring Pacific 
islands is relatively large since these economies depend 
heavily on trade. Not surprisingly, such economies 
generally have very high trade penetration ratios. Most 
raw materials and consumer products are imported. 
Similarly, because of their small markets most of their 
primary commercial production is exported for further 
processing. For example, both PNG’s imports and exports 
of goods and services represented around two-thirds of 
GDP in 1999. This dependence has increased during the 
past decade, since in 1990 the corresponding shares of GDP 
were barely two-fifths (World Bank 2000b). Such high 
trade-to-GDP ratios are to be expected of very small 
                                                          
9 This segment of the economy is not as well developed as in other 
comparable countries where basic produce markets and the 
provision of essential repair and other retail services exist on a larger 
scale.  Not least of the reasons for that is the terrain, which ensures 
the cost of providing transport and communications infrastructure is 
very high per capita.  There are also regulations restricting the 
informal provision of services in urban areas. 
… and most of 
employment 
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developing economies. They do not imply that these 
economies maintain no trade restrictions — indeed most in 
fact do. But they do underscore the relative importance of 
trade to their development. Economic growth for these 
economies is therefore even more closely linked to the 
strength of the traded sector than is the case for developing 
countries generally. 
Trade (and production) patterns of Pacific island 
economies remain narrowly based. Although the precise 
dependence varies across island nations depending largely 
on the availability of other natural resources, such as 
fishing, timber and minerals, these economies remain 
heavily dependent on agriculture for development. Exports 
reflect their narrow production base and are concentrated 
in a few commodities and markets. 
Although PNG’s oil and minerals account for nearly two-
thirds of the total value of exports, agricultural exports, 
especially of coffee and palm oil, contribute about one-
quarter of exports currently. This share has increased 
substantially from one-sixth in the mid-1990s. In value 
terms, agricultural exports have more than doubled since 
then, aided by increased export returns following the 
currency float and the substantial kina devaluation. Palm 
oil exports have grown rapidly in recent years, and have 
replaced the traditional tree crops of cocoa and copra as the 
second largest agricultural export after coffee (Table 2.3). 
PNG’s palm oil industry appears to offer considerable 
potential, with its yields already comparing favourably 
with those of other developing countries. 
PNG exports, like other island economies, remain heavily 
concentrated in a few commodities. In 1998, three 
commodities, gold, oil and coffee, represented 70% of 
exports. In the Solomon Islands, the top three exports, 
forestry, fishing and oil palm, accounted for about 90% of 
total exports.  
Exports (and 
production) are 
narrowly
based … 
… in 
commodities
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The only economy that has diversified to a limited extent 
away from the primary sector is Fiji10. Nevertheless, its 
exports are still rather narrowly based — its top three 
merchandise exports of sugar (38%), garments (22%) and 
gold (10%) account for more than two-thirds of total 
merchandise exports. Export diversification is, however, 
increased by its exporting of tourism services that are 
equivalent to about one-quarter of merchandise exports. 
However, while product diversification is to be welcomed, 
government efforts to encourage such diversity more often 
then not end up penalizing the traditional industries that 
are internationally competitive and hence on which 
economic development still depends heavily. 
Export markets of Pacific island nations remain 
concentrated geographically. Significant exports are sold to 
preferential markets, especially the EU, where preferential 
duty-free access exists under the Lome Convention. Some 
key exports depend almost exclusively on such markets. 
For example, over three-quarters of Fiji sugar exports, 
representing about one-quarter of total merchandise 
exports, are sold to the UK, at up to double the world price. 
Similarly, Fiji garment exports are primarily sold to 
Australia and New Zealand duty-free under SPARTECA, 
and to the United States under bilateral quotas. Likewise, 
exports of canned tuna from the region, especially the 
Solomon Islands, are almost exclusively going to the UK. 
PNG also exports heavily to Australia under PATCRA and 
to the EU (including canned tuna) under Lome preferential 
access. Most exports to other developed markets, such as 
Japan and the United States, also receive preferential entry 
under GSP arrangements.  
                                                          
10 However, recent political developments in Fiji culminating in the 
forced removal of the elected government has been a serious 
setback for the tourist industry and the economy generally. 
Only limited 
diversification,
such as 
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preferential
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Brittle public finances 
The relatively small size of Pacific island economies and 
the low population density and income levels tend to limit 
the range of tax instruments available to governments to 
raise revenue. Yet there are heavy demands on 
governments to fund development expenditure for 
essential infrastructure and other services, such as 
education and health. Thus, public finances of Pacific 
island economies tend to be stretched and rely heavily on 
foreign aid and excessive government borrowings from the 
central bank11. Despite periodic attempts to constrain the 
budget deficit, governments of island economies have 
generally failed to apply the necessary fiscal discipline 
needed to consolidate public finances by controlling 
unsustainable budget deficits. Fiscal imbalances are 
usually compounded by a lack of clear expenditure 
priorities by governments, with the result that scarce funds 
are often squandered on ill-conceived development 
projects (unfortunately supported at times by well-
intentioned aid donors). 
These economies have tended to have a narrow tax base 
due to their low levels of development, including the large 
informal sector located largely in remote rural areas, as 
well as their weak capacity in tax administration. 
Consequently, direct taxes on income (company and 
personal) and consumption that encounter collection and 
other administrative difficulties are supplemented by 
heavy reliance on trade taxes, including tariffs and export 
taxes. In PNG, for example, taxes on international trade, 
                                                          
11 Recent reform to the Central Bank Act to restrict government 
borrowing to K100 million in any rolling 12-month period should help 
curtail fiscal irresponsibility. However, its success will depend on 
how effectively this limit is enforced.  For example, previous 
legislative limits on new government borrowings in any year from the 
central bank of 10% of the estimated ordinary budgetary revenues, 
and of 20% on the stock of year-end debt, were generally ineffective.  
Similar legislative caps on central bank credit to government in the 
Solomon Islnads have also had only limited success. 
Narrow tax 
base
encourages
reliance on 
inefficient
trade taxes 
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predominantly import tariffs and export taxes, raised some 
28% of government tax revenue in 1998. In the Solomon 
Islands, trade taxes, especially tariffs in recent years, have 
accounted for over half of government tax revenue. 
However, trade taxes are widely recognized to be an 
inefficient means of collecting government revenue. The 
economy would benefit if they were replaced by less-
distorting taxes, such as direct income taxes once collection 
costs are brought down to reasonable levels, and/or a 
general consumption tax that applies equally to imported 
and domestically-produced goods. This means tariff and 
tax reforms are inextricably linked, since the former 
reduces government finances while the latter can enhance 
them. Papua New Guinea demonstrated this with the 
introduction on 1 July 1999 of a 10 per cent value-added tax 
(VAT) that provided the revenue for substantial across-the-
board tariff reductions. 
Pacific island economies suffer from poor budgetary 
processes. Expenditure checks and controls are inadequate. 
Budgets in practice are rarely met, being based typically on 
overly optimistic revenue projections.  
All governments face revenue constraints, and ultimately 
there is no alternative to good fiscal planning than 
ensuring that governments live ‘within their means’ and 
spend only what is sustainable. Excessive public debt to 
finance budget deficits places upward pressures on interest 
rates and ‘crowds out’ the private sector. As well, such 
deficits flow through into larger external trade deficits that 
are often associated with accelerating inflation and an 
appreciation in the country’s real exchange rate, thereby 
exposing governments to further lobbying pressure from 
domestic industries to provide more protection against 
imports. The PNG Government moved quickly on 
obtaining office in 1999 to redress fiscal imbalances, an 
essential pre-requisite for re-engaging dialogue with the 
IMF and the World Bank in support of PNG’s reform 
programme. 
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Ample evidence exists in Pacific island economies that 
governments have not used the financial resources 
available to them as effectively as they might. Such 
resources have been squandered by governments 
attempting to do things that would be best left to the 
private sector. For example, numerous island nation 
governments have been directly involved in commercial 
ventures, often jointly with private sector participants, with 
disastrous consequences in many cases. Thus, the 
Government’s proper role needs to be re-defined, and in 
this context commercialization and privatization of state-
owned enterprises can make an important contribution to 
releasing scarce budgetary funds needed for public 
investment. Most island economies are embarking on such 
programs, but with mixed success. In the case of PNG, the 
strategy developed is beginning to be put in place, so time 
will tell how successful it is. These arrangements will only 
work, however, if markets are also made competitive — 
competition improves efficiency, but increasing the degree 
of competition involves more than simply changing 
ownership. 
The quality of PNG’s infrastructure has deteriorated badly 
during the past decade. Of major concern is the 
deteriorating road transport system. This raises business 
costs and in many cases prevents the efficient distribution 
and marketing of agricultural produce. Moreover, public 
utility prices, such as electricity and communications, are 
generally seen by business to be high cost, especially in 
view of the sub-standard quality of the services provided 
by the utilities. Electricity outages are common in Port 
Moresby, for example. Other public services, such as 
education and health, also have deteriorated, including the 
physical condition of many hospitals, schools and other 
educational institutions. 
PNG’s economic growth, and recently that of the Solomon 
Islands and Fiji, has been retarded by chronic and 
worsening law and order problems. This imposes 
substantial direct costs on businesses in the form of greater 
security expenses, and seriously prevents the economy 
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from working efficiently. It also creates a hostile business 
environment and is a major constraint to attracting 
essential foreign direct investment and the overseas 
visitors needed to develop a thriving tourist industry. It 
also raises costs of employing expatriates and other foreign 
personnel needed to fill the domestic skill shortages. A 
recent survey ranked crime and theft as the most serious 
obstacles for business, with law and order problems 
perceived to have increased over the past ten years along 
with concerns about bribery (INA 1999). 
Among the hardest-hit by the law and order problem are 
agricultural industries. Because most of the informal 
agricultural sector works on cash, the serious risk of theft 
in rural areas prevents buyers from purchasing crops. 
Moreover, security concerns have also contributed in rural 
areas to bank branches closing, and to people being 
unwilling to open stores. This therefore penalizes the 
agricultural sector and reduces incentives for growers to 
expand output and to market their produce. For example, 
it has been estimated that almost one-third of PNG’s coffee 
crop in 1997 was not marketed due to law and order 
problems (Togolo 1998).  
Inward-looking trade policies 
Despite their strong trade orientation, Pacific island 
economies have tended to provide selective protection 
against imports to special industries largely in an attempt 
to promote primary processing and other manufacturing. 
Such import protection has taken many forms, but the 
most common in recent years has been via high and 
escalating tariff structures that have applied much higher 
rates to processed than unprocessed products. For 
example, prior to the introduction in PNG of the tariff 
reduction program on 1 July 1999, applied MFN tariffs 
averaged on an unweighted basis 20%, but ranged from 
free to 125%.12 Although these rates are now being phased 
                                                          
12 Import bans and quotas were previously used to encourage 
domestic manufacturing industries, such as canned beef, sugar, 
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down, and currently average 9%, much higher rates of up 
to 95% still apply to certain processed products. 
The situation is similar in the Solomon Islands and Fiji. In 
the Solomon Islands, MFN tariffs averaged 23% in 1998, 
but ranged as high as 70% on certain processed products. 
Although tariffs are lower in Fiji, averaging 12% in 1997, 
they range up to 80 %. 
Explaining the poor economic performance of PNG and 
other island economies 
The erratic economic performance of PNG and other 
Pacific island economies stems from a combination of 
factors that go well beyond the scope of this report. 
However, there is little doubt that while external shocks, 
such as adverse weather conditions and depressed world 
commodity prices, contributed to their malaise, respective 
governments are mainly to blame due to their economic 
mismanagement and costly policies. In PNG, for example, 
successive governments have not fundamentally reversed 
the poor level of economic governance and related 
institutional weaknesses. It is true that recent 
macroeconomic management in PNG has improved, but 
there is a long way to go in this and other key policy areas. 
                                                                                                                                                   
cement, vegetables, flour, batteries and canned mackerel.  However, 
these were removed, mainly by the early 1990s, and converted to 
high, sometimes prohibitive tariff rates, ranging mostly from 30% to 
80%, but with some higher rates.  The import ban on canned beef 
was converted to a tariff of 55% in 1994, for example, and the ten-
year ban on sugar was replaced with a tariff of 85% in 1997. Most-
favoured-nation (MFN) tariffs are those applying to imports from 
other WTO members that are not subject to preferential tariff rates 
that might have been agreed bilaterally or regionally. (Higher tariffs 
could in principle be applied to imports from non-WTO members.)
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Many of the problems identified, such as the worsening 
law and order, the collapse of institutions and due 
government processes, along with decaying public 
facilities such as transport, electricity, telecommunications, 
health and education, are symptomatic of fundamental 
problems with how PNG is being governed and managed 
economically and politically. Correlated to this is the 
increasing policy instability that has occurred over recent 
years. Even if policy corrections are implemented, they 
need to be followed through to the end. Economic reforms 
will only work if sustained and credible, and cannot in an 
environment of policy instability characterized by sudden 
policy reversals. There is evidence in PNG that such 
instability and uncertainty is increasingly impeding 
business and investment (INA 1999). Such retardation can 
be closely linked to political instability since frequent 
changes in governments are often associated with a loss of 
policy continuity. 
Without the basic institutions and sound governance 
needed for a vibrant private sector, other reform efforts 
will achieve limited benefits at best. The private sector 
needs secure individual property rights, especially to land, 
impartial enforcement of property and contractual rights 
(and more generally law and order) as well as appropriate 
formal and informal codes of conduct if it is to flourish and 
function efficiently. 
One of the virtues of economic reforms, such as trade and 
investment liberalization, is that they can create an 
environment that raises the demand for such institutional 
development. However, if they are not accompanied by 
fundamental institutional and governance reforms, 
dislocation and the costs of economic restructuring are 
likely to be increased and the benefits of reform 
diminished. That is, a ‘stop/start’ approach to economic 
reforms will increase dramatically the adjustment costs 
induced by policy changes, while reducing the benefits. 
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Box 2.1: Norfolk Island’s Success – Smallness and Remoteness no 
Barrier to Prosperity  
Despite Norfolk Island being small (around 35 square kilometers) 
and geographically isolated, it is not a typical Pacific island 
economy. It is more prosperous than Australia – some estimates put 
its GDP per capita in the late 1990s at 70 per cent higher than in 
Australia, compared with being 40% below in 1952 and at parity in 
1976. What then has been the key to this success? 
Its success has been due to economic flexibility. The economy has 
been able to efficiently adjust to the booms and busts of various 
activities throughout its history. 
Although tourism is currently its main industry, this was not always 
the case. Whaling was its first leading sector, accounting for 45% of 
GDP in the late 1890s. However, the industry declined due to falling 
world prices but revived again in the 1950s before being shut down 
due to the sudden decline in whale numbers. However, other 
growth industries filled the void left by whaling. Government 
expansion during the 1900s stimulated the economy; not by the 
government dominating private and public consumption, but by 
establishing basic infrastructure and integrating the economy much 
more with the world economy. 
Land reform prior to WWI paved the way for agricultural 
development. The original landholding system that restricted the 
original settlers from selling land was dismantled and a lease system 
implemented as well as unrestricted sale of freehold property.  
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Box 2.1: Norfolk Island’s Success – Smallness and Remoteness no 
Barrier to Prosperity (continued) 
The lemon industry aided by duty free access to Australia following 
its territorial status in 1914, flourished from 1915 to 1921, ending 
abruptly due to the collapse of the Sydney market. Bananas grew 
rapidly during the 1920s following an export boom created by the 
decimation of the Queensland and New South Wales banana crop in 
the mid-1920s. Exports expanded by tenfold between 1924 and 1929. 
However, banana production folded in the early 1930s following the 
return of the more competitive Australian crop. Agriculture turned 
to exporting oranges, bean seeds and passion fruit. By the late 1950s 
disease, weather, price instability and competition from Australia all 
contributed to the decline and eventual closure of the industry. 
Since the 1960s, the mainstay of the economy has been tourism. 
Export receipts from tourism grew from A$8.7 million in 1978 to 
A$41 million in 1996. 
Thus, the economy has displayed great flexibility in resource use in 
the face of a changing external environment. The island’s openness 
in supplying goods and services and in factor markets, such as land, 
enabled the clear transmission of international price signals to 
determine the allocation of resources (Threadgold 1988). Labour 
laws, other regulations, and taxes have been kept to a minimum. 
The land market has functioned effectively, and the island’s 
government has not had the luxury of running budget deficits based 
on excessive public service expenditure or revenue collections. 
Source: Duncan, Cuthbertson and Bosworth (1999).  
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Problems of isolation, small size and unfavourable climatic 
conditions are not sufficient to explain PNG’s poor 
economic performance, nor that of its Pacific neighbours. 
Such factors cannot be changed, and hence it is important 
that policies be implemented that make the best of these 
‘givens’ rather than tolerating poor economic performance 
because of them (Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank 
2000). The economic development of Norfolk Island 
provides a good example of how a small remote island 
with almost no natural resources can become wealthy with 
good policies (Box 2.1). 
Unless such wide-ranging reforms are implemented, 
economic growth in PNG and other Pacific island 
economies will continue to be erratic and disappointing. 
Such reforms must come from within the countries, and are 
in their own best interests irrespective of international 
developments. Nevertheless, implementing such reforms 
involves tremendous challenges which governments may 
be reluctant to face either because of ignorance of the 
benefits of reform or because of the short-term political 
consequences of such reforms. 
Overcoming such resistance to reforms within government 
and the community has always been an essential part of 
meeting this challenge. As the next chapter explains 
though, in recent years the stakes have risen: globalization 
has accelerated, raising not only the rewards from good 
economic governance but also the penalty for bad 
economic governance. 
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Implications of globalization for 
Pacific development strategies 
The pervasive effects of the process of globalization are 
being felt in poorer economies at least as much as in richer 
ones. But whether they are net positive or net negative 
influences for a particular country depends very much on 
the quality of economic governance in that country. What 
is globalization? What are the recent contributors to its 
recent acceleration? And what are its implications for 
Pacific island economies? 
Globalization can be defined as the decline in transactions 
costs or barriers to doing business or otherwise interacting 
with people internationally. It enhances the integration of 
markets for goods, services, technology, ideas, capital and 
labour, thereby reducing global differences in prices for 
those products and factors. Both technological and 
governmental barriers raise the costs of conducting 
business across borders. Reductions in transport costs, the 
huge decline in communication and information costs, and 
cuts in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, 
services, financial capital, and to some extent labour have 
accelerated globalization to an unprecedented speed that 
shows no sign of abating. 
The extent and pace of globalization cannot be captured in 
a single statistic, but several provide partial indications of 
its magnitude. A standard indicator is the comparison 
between trade and GDP growth globally. While 
merchandise trade has grown faster than output for 
virtually all two-decade periods since the 1700s except 
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between the two world wars, the gap has been larger in the 
1990s than in any earlier period since the mid-nineteenth 
century. More than one-fifth of global output is now 
exported, double the proportion in the 1950s.  
Annual outflows of foreign direct investment grew more 
than six-fold between 1983 and 1990, and continued to 
grow more than twice as fast as goods trade in the 1990s. 
Some two-thirds of this is in services, commercial presence 
by foreign suppliers in host markets being the main means 
of trading services globally. Intra-firm trade among 
multinational corporations (MNCs) is estimated to account 
for one-third of world trade, and another one-third is MNC 
trade with non-affiliates. During the 1990s, international 
portfolio investment has been growing equally as fast as 
foreign direct investment. In the last five years, the annual 
value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions has trebled, 
growing from US$100 billion to more than US$300 billion. 
Daily foreign exchange transactions now exceed global 
currency reserves, with international capital flows more 
than 50 times the value of international trade flows. The 
1990s also saw an explosion in the world’s capacity for 
electronic commerce. The number of telephone lines 
doubled; there was a 25-fold increase in the number of 
cellular phones; the number of personal computers 
quadrupled; and two-thirds of those PCs are expected to 
have internet access by 2001. 
The technological dimension of globalization 
There have been three major technological revolutions in 
transport and communication costs. The cost of 
transporting goods was lowered enormously by the steam 
engine, which created the railway and steamship. Steel 
hulls for ships and refrigeration further lowered the cost of 
ocean transport late last century, particularly for perishable 
goods. The telegraph helped too. The second technological 
revolution lowered substantially the cost of moving 
people. It was dominated, in the middle half of this 
century, by falling transport costs by road and air thanks to 
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mass production and associated services. Ocean freight 
rates (helped by containerization) and telephone charges 
also fell massively over this period. The third and on-going 
revolution in transport and communications is in digital 
technology. Aided by deregulation of telecom markets in 
many countries, it is lowering enormously long-distance 
communication costs and especially the cost of rapidly 
accessing and processing knowledge, information and 
ideas from anywhere in the world. A side effect of the 
Internet’s expansion is the growth in the use of the English 
language. It has been claimed that there are now more 
people using English as a second language than there are 
people for whom it is a first language. This too is lowering 
costs of communicating between countries. 
The governmental contribution to globalization 
The above developments have been reinforced by 
government decisions to liberalize trade and investment 
regimes. Following the protectionist inter-war period, this 
began with the lowering of import tariffs on manufactured 
goods traded between industrial economies. In the 1980s 
trade reform was followed by extensive liberalization of 
foreign exchange markets and of restrictions on capital 
flows, leading (with the help of new digital technologies) 
to the development of new financial instruments. At the 
same time many non-OECD countries — including China 
and ultimately the Soviet bloc began moving away from 
inward-looking to outward-oriented trade and investment 
policies. The 1980s also saw the deregulation of domestic 
markets in a growing number of countries, developing as 
well as developed, which reinforced the effects of 
deregulating transactions at national borders. 
These reforms benefit most the countries making them, but 
they also benefit their trading partners. Hence as more 
countries open up and reform, the greater is the gain to 
other countries from doing likewise. In particular, they 
expand the opportunities for developing and transition 
economies to access goods and services markets, 
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investment funds and technologies, thereby raising the 
pay-off to liberalizing economies. Those that have already 
done so have grown much faster than the rest, and have 
seen their incomes converge toward OECD income levels 
(see, e.g., Dollar 1992; Edwards 1993; Sachs and Warner 
1995; and WTO (1998, pp. 62-63 for a bibliography). They 
have also seen the welfare of their poorest citizens improve 
at least as much as that of their other citizens (Dollar and 
Kraah 2000). More generally, openness not only boosts the 
efficiency of resource use and economic growth, but simple 
open trade regimes aid good governance: they reduce the 
opportunities for discretionary policies and hence for 
corruption and arbitrariness, and they offer a way of 
conserving skilled labour for the many other challenges of 
development, such as improved education and more-
efficient administration (Winters 2000). 
The reasons for faster growth of more open economies 
have to do with the dynamics of trade liberalization, 
something which is not just an abstract idea from new 
trade and growth theory but one that is well supported 
empirically (USITC 1997). There is always the risk that the 
market-opening reforms of the post-war period and 
especially the past fifteen years could be reversed by 
governments as domestic political circumstances change. 
However, that risk has been contained by the GATT and, 
since 1995, the WTO. 
Together with the technological revolution, these policy 
reforms have brought about a more-integrated global 
trading system, a much more-integrated global capital 
market, and more integrated firms as international 
transactions that formerly took place between independent 
entities are being internalized within single firms or 
corporate alliances. The increasing mobility of the 
productive assets of firms enables them to minimize their 
corporate income tax exposure by strategically locating 
their headquarters and using transfer pricing in their intra-
firm international trade. It also encourages governments to 
compete for the presence of firms with regulatory reforms 
and investment incentives. On the one hand this could 
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leave governments with less tax revenue to supply social 
policies at a time when the demand for such policies is 
rising with income growth. On the other hand, if the 
regulatory reform is growth-enhancing and includes the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, government 
revenue could expand. 
These technological and governmental revolutions have 
contributed increasingly to the scope to subdivide the 
processes of production and distribution into parts that can 
be relocated anywhere in the world according to ever-
increasing changes in comparative advantages over time. 
That out-sourcing can be via various means including sub-
contracting, licensing, joint ventures and direct foreign 
investment by multinational corporations.  
The resulting productivity growth in industrial and service 
sectors is altering the key source of wealth of nations, 
which is moving ever-faster away from natural to human 
capital (that is, from raw materials and physical capital per 
worker to human skills and knowledge). In particular, 
wealth creation in future will depend especially on the 
ability to access and make productive use of the expanding 
stocks of knowledge and information, and to build on them 
through creative research and development. How well and 
how quickly people of different countries are able to do 
that will increasingly determine relative economic growth 
rates. But for all countries the extent and speed with which 
economic events abroad are transmitted to domestic 
markets will increase inexorably. Governments will have 
less and less capacity to isolate their economies from such 
trends as derivatives and electronic commerce have made 
clear in the cases of international financial flows and a 
widening range of traded goods and services. 
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The GATT/WTO’s contribution to globalization 
History shows that the risk of market-opening being 
reversed is much more likely in the absence than in the 
presence of international constraints on national trade 
policy actions. Following WWI, efforts to restore liberal 
trade centred on international conferences but did not lead 
to renewed trade treaties with binding commitments to 
openness based on MFN. Then when recession hit in the 
late 1920s, governments responded with beggar-my-
neighbour protectionist trade policies that drove the world 
economy into depression. The volume of world trade 
shrunk by one-quarter between 1929 and 1932, and its 
value fell by 40 per cent. And the first attempts to reverse 
that protection were discriminatory, as with the Ottawa 
Conference of 1932 that led to preferential tariffs on trade 
among members of the British Commonwealth. 
Out of the inter-war experience came the conviction that 
liberal world trade required a set of rules and binding 
commitments based on non-discriminatory principles. 
While there was not enough agreement to create an 
international trade organization, at least a General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed by 23 large 
trading countries in 1947. The GATT provided not only a 
set of multilateral rules and disciplines but also a forum to 
negotiate tariff reductions and rules changes, plus a 
mechanism to help settle trade disputes. Eight so-called 
rounds of negotiations took place in the subsequent 46 
years, the last one (the Uruguay Round) culminating in the 
‘interim’ GATT Secretariat being converted into the World 
Trade Organization.  
The GATT, and now even more so the WTO, contributes to 
but also responds to the demands of globalization in 
several crucial ways (Appendix 3). The WTO has four key 
objectives: to set and enforce rules for international trade; 
to provide a forum to negotiate and monitor trade 
liberalization; to improve policy transparency; and to 
resolve trade disputes. Apart from the transparency role, 
these were also the key objectives of its predecessor. But 
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the WTO is much more comprehensive than the GATT. For 
example, GATT’s product coverage in practice was 
confined mainly to manufactures (effectively not including 
textiles and clothing), whereas the WTO encompasses all 
goods (including sensitive farm products), services, capital 
to some extent, and ideas (intellectual property). As well, 
the new WTO has greatly strengthened trade policy review 
and dispute settlement mechanisms.  
GATT/WTO rules to govern international trade serve three 
main purposes. First, they help protect the welfare of small 
and weak nations against discriminatory trade policy 
actions of large and powerful nations. GATT Articles I 
(most-favoured-nation) and III (national treatment) 
promise that all WTO members will be given the same 
conditions of access to a particular country’s market as the 
most favoured member, and all foreign suppliers will be 
treated the same as domestic suppliers. These fairness rules 
are fundamental to instilling confidence in the world 
trading system. In particular, they lower the risks that are 
associated with a nation’s producers and consumers 
becoming more interdependent with foreigners — risks 
that otherwise could be used by a country as an excuse for 
not fully opening its borders. 
Second, large economies have the potential to exploit their 
monopoly power by taxing their trade, but we know from 
trade theory that the rest of the world and the world as a 
whole are made worse off by such trade taxes. Thus, while 
each large economy might be tempted to impose trade 
taxes, the effect of lots of them doing so simultaneously 
may well be to leave most if not all of them worse off — 
not to mention the welfare reductions that would result in 
many smaller countries. Hence, the value of agreeing not to 
raise trade barriers and instead to ‘bind’ them in a tariff 
schedule at specified ceiling levels. This rule is embodied 
in GATT Article II, whereby WTO members are expected 
to limit trade only with tariffs and are obligated to continue 
to provide market access never less favourable than that 
agreed to in their tariff schedules. Again, the greater 
certainty that this tariff-binding rule brings to the 
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international trading system adds to the preparedness of 
countries to become more interdependent and of business 
people to invest more. 
The third and perhaps most important contribution of 
multilateral rules disciplining trade policy is that they can 
help governments ward off domestic interest groups 
seeking special favours. This comes about partly via Article 
II, which outlaws the raising of bound tariffs, as well as via 
numerous other articles aimed at ensuring that non-tariff 
measures are not used as substitutes for tariffs. This benefit 
of the system is sometimes referred to as the ‘Ullyses 
effect’: it helps prevent governments from being tempted 
to ‘sin’, in this case to favour special interest groups at the 
expense of the rest of their economy.13 
While no-one would argue that the GATT rules have 
worked perfectly or have been applied without exception, 
they help ensure that the worst excesses are avoided. Also, 
they provide all countries with a means of multilaterally 
challenging any import restrictions imposed by trading 
partners that are thought to be inconsistent with WTO 
disciplines14. They therefore bring greater certainty and 
predictability to international markets, enhancing 
economic welfare in and reducing political tensions 
between nations.  
                                                          
13 Petersmann (1991, p. 83) goes so far as to say that “the primary 
regulatory function of the GATT .... [is] the welfare-increasing 
resolution of domestic conflicts of interest within GATT member 
countries among individual producers, importers, exporters and 
consumers .” Similarly, Roessler (1985, p. 298) claims that “the 
principal function of the GATT as a system of rules is to resolve 
conflicts of interest within, not among, countries. The function of the 
GATT as a negotiating forum is to enable countries to defend the 
national interest not against the national interests of other countries 
but against sectional interests within their own and other countries.”
14 For example, the decision in 1999 by the US to apply restrictions 
on lamb imports from Australia under GATT ‘safeguard’ rules is being 
challenged in the WTO by Australia and New Zealand as being 
inconsistent with these provisions. 
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One of the clearest lessons from trade theory is that an 
economy unable to influence its international terms of 
trade cannot maximize its national income and economic 
growth without allowing free trade in all goods and 
services. Consumers lose directly from the higher domestic 
prices of importables, while exporters lose indirectly 
because import barriers cause the nation’s currency to 
appreciate (there is less demand for foreign currency from 
importers) and raise the price of labour and other mobile 
resources. More-open economies also grow faster.  
Why, then, do countries restrict their trade? Numerous 
reasons have been suggested, but almost all of them are 
found wanting (Corden 1997). The most compelling 
explanation is a political economy one. It has to do with the 
national income re-distributive feature of trade policies. 
The gains are concentrated in the hands of a few that are 
prepared to support politicians that favour protection. 
However, the losses are sufficiently small per consumer 
and export firm and are distributed sufficiently widely as 
to make it not worthwhile for those losers to get together to 
provide a counter-lobby, particularly given their greater 
free-rider problem in acting collectively.  
Implications of globalization for Pacific island countries’ 
policy choices 
Greater openness of and interdependence between national 
economies provides wonderful opportunities for poorer 
economies, but it presents challenges. Globalization is 
raising the rewards to economies choosing good economic 
governance, but is also raising the cost to economies with 
poor economic governance. Just as financial capital can 
now flow into a well-managed economy more easily and 
quickly than ever before, so it can equally quickly be 
withdrawn if confidence in that economy’s governance is 
shaken. The East Asian crisis during the late 1980s, and the 
two coups in Fiji, has demonstrated this all too clearly.  
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Two aspects of good economic governance are especially 
worthy of mention in the wake of globalization: 
commitment to a liberal international trade and payments 
regime, and growth-enhancing domestic policies that are 
not sectorally biased. Together these will enable producers 
to take maximum advantage of new/prospective export 
opportunities. 
Commitment to a liberal trade and payments 
regime 
The above suggests the first priority for a poor country 
seeking to achieve sustainable economic development is to 
practice good economic governance generally. In 
particular, it should commit to a permanently open 
international trade and payments regime underpinned by 
those institutions essential for private sector development, 
such as providing secure property rights (intellectual as 
well as physical). A long-term commitment to openness is 
more crucial now than ever. Otherwise, capital flows will 
be short-term, and susceptible to sudden withdrawal 
should confidence waver. It is for this reason, and because 
of the comprehensiveness of the Uruguay Round 
agreements, that liberal trade policy commitments under 
the WTO are so important. Potential investors value them 
because WTO commitments involve (a) legal bindings and 
(b) most-favoured-nation treatment by trading partners. 
The legal bindings mean a WTO member cannot return to 
a more protectionist regime by raising tariffs above the 
bound rates listed in the member’s schedules of 
commitments. Nor does that member risk facing higher 
than MFN bound tariffs in exporting to its trading partners 
if they are WTO members.  
The security of a stable trading environment instills a 
confidence in investors that is noticeably less in non-WTO 
countries. For such countries a key ingredient in achieving 
good economic governance is to seek speedy accession to 
the WTO. Already there are almost 140 members of the 
new organization, and 30 countries are in the process of 
undergoing accession. The WTO is thus approaching the 
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status of a truly global trade organization, except for 
under-representation by two groups: the former centrally 
planned economies (CPEs) seeking to transform to market 
orientations, and some of the smallest and poorest 
economies15. Most of the CPEs not already members are 
seeking WTO accession, the most notable being China 
(whose accession would allow Chinese Taipei to join) and 
Russia. For the other group feeling marginalized, the 
world's smallest and least-developed countries, the cost of 
the accession process, and subsequently of maintaining a 
mission in Geneva that is large enough to cover the 
expanding number of items of key concern to them, is high 
when expressed in per capita terms. 
Efforts are being taken multilaterally and bilaterally to 
address these concerns of poor countries. For example, it 
has been recommended that the WTO should review the 
current accession process as it affects small states to see if 
the problems and costs faced by these economies can be 
reduced (IMF 2000). There is also a need to supplement the 
meager resources of these countries to facilitate their 
participation in trade negotiations. The WTO allows 
groups of small states to be represented collectively at 
discussions, and is seeking more funds from members to 
enhance its already substantial technical assistance 
programmes. The Forum and Commonwealth Secretariats 
could play significant roles in enhancing WTO 
representation by Pacific island economies. ACP states, 
including these economies, also benefit from the bureau 
funded in Geneva by the EU to facilitate negotiations with 
the WTO. 
                                                          
15 Of the 48 UN designated least-developed countries, 29 are WTO 
members and a further 10 countries have observer status, of which 6 
countries are currently undergoing accession.  Some 23 countries 
have Geneva-based representation. 
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To what extent are less-advanced economies opening up to 
trade? The answer is that many are opening up 
substantially — including several in Africa. Some of those 
reform programs have been adopted with reluctance as 
conditions for receiving IMF or World Bank loans, while 
others have been unconditional unilateral decisions. Until 
they are bound under the WTO, though, there is a risk of 
back-sliding in the future. Furthermore, tariffs need to be 
bound at levels close to applied rates to be taken seriously, 
unlike during the Uruguay Round when many developing 
countries, including Pacific island economies, committed to 
ceiling bindings at well above the level of applied rates.  
Growth-enhancing domestic policies that are not 
sectorally biased 
The extent to which liberalizing one’s own trade and 
payments regime and securing greater market access 
opportunities for one’s exports boosts a developing 
country’s economic growth depends importantly also on 
the domestic policy environment. Sound, predictable, 
stable macroeconomic and taxation policies that are not 
sectorally biased are essential. Uruguay Round reforms 
abroad will make agricultural and textile/clothing exports 
more profitable for many developing countries. Trade 
liberalization at home will tend to reinforce that, because 
many developing economies have traditionally protected 
manufacturing at the expense of primary production — a 
pro-urban bias.  
Those past trade and other urban policy biases discouraged 
investment in infrastructure and human capital in rural 
areas. Realizing the productive potential of the rural sector 
requires major upgrading of essential rural infrastructure 
to lower the transactions costs of doing business, plus it 
requires investment in the people involved. The crucial 
infrastructure includes rural roads, electricity, 
telecommunications and radio transmission, so that costs 
of transport, communications and information (about 
market conditions, new technologies and the like) become 
more affordable. Investments in these items probably will 
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be more expensive per capita than in urban areas, but that 
needs to be weighed against the net long-term benefits 
from expanding output faster from rural areas.  
The crucial investments in people include basic schooling 
(for both sexes) and health services, as well as agricultural 
research and extension. All the empirical evidence points 
to the social rates of return from such public investments 
being high in developing countries even when price and 
trade policies discriminate heavily against the rural sector; 
hence they are likely to be even higher as and when those 
policies are reformed. If/where those social rates of return 
are significantly above private rates, a case might be made 
for government subsidies. The case is especially strong for 
human capital investments in rural areas. Such 
investments not only raise farm incomes and so reduce the 
social and economic problems of ‘urban drift’ associated 
with farmers leaving agriculture; they also increase the 
prospects for non-farm jobs in rural areas. In both respects, 
the social tensions that are inevitably associated with rapid 
economic growth and structural change are lessened.
Investments in 
human capital 
boost growth 
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4 
Policy reforms to boost 
development of the Pacific islands 
It is widely recognized that major structural changes in 
PNG and other Pacific island economies are needed to 
improve their economic efficiency and growth 
performance. Major impediments to those structural 
adjustments are distortionary trade and investment 
policies. This is now being widely recognised, thanks to the 
now-overwhelming body of evidence supporting the idea 
of mutual interdependence between economic growth and 
openness to international trade and investment (Dollar 
1992; Edwards 1993). A particularly telling study found 
that open economies grew on average three times faster 
than closed economies (Sachs and Warner 1996). The study 
looked at the performance of eight always open and forty 
always closed economies from 1966 to 1990. Although the 
precise links are less clear, there is also strong evidence 
that openness can lead to reductions in poverty and 
income disparity (Dollar and Kraay 2000; Ben-David, 
Nordstrom and Winters 2000), and to enhanced economic 
and social development generally (Winters 2000)16. 
This is not to say that such policy reforms will make 
absolutely everybody better off. There will always be a few 
losers from structural adjustments that accompany 
economic growth, regardless of whether those adjustments 
are induced by changes in technology, tastes and 
                                                          
16 Evidence from Chile’s liberalization policies, for example, indicates 
that although income inequality worsened initially, it subsequently 
returned to pre-reform levels at vastly higher average incomes and 
lower poverty levels.   
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preferences, international terms of trade, domestic or trade 
policies. But the best way to deal with that concern is to 
ensure appropriate tax and social welfare policies are in 
place, rather than to avoid trade and investment policy 
reforms. Avoiding reform does not remove the need for 
adjustment, it simply delays incurring that one-off 
adjustment cost and in the meantime continues to impose 
on-going costs year after year (in terms of foregone 
efficiency gains) on the society. 
The income growth in many East Asian economies over 
recent decades that has been associated with a high degree 
of openness that fuelled rapid export growth and 
investment rates is well recognized. But there are also 
examples of successful liberalization efforts in small 
countries that have similar features to PNG, such as 
Mauritias, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica (Box 4.1). In 
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, for example, strong 
trade policy reforms in the early 1990s were followed by 
improved export and overall economic growth, following 
lack-lustre performance during a long period of inward-
looking policies (Findlay and Wellitz 1993; Rajapatirana 
1997). In the South Pacific, Samoa currently is undergoing 
such reforms with promising results (Box 4.2). 
An important reason as to why openness to trade and 
investment helps developing country economies grow is 
that it facilitates transfer of technology and know-how 
from developed countries. Developing countries must take 
advantage of this ‘catch up’ factor that openness provides 
if they are to maximize growth in the early stages of their 
development. Of course the technology needs to be 
appropriate given the countries’ relative factor prices and 
factor endowments, so often that would preclude the latest 
skill- and capital-intensive technologies. 
East Asia is 
not the only 
open region 
Open
developing 
economies do 
very well 
43Policy reforms to boost development of the Pacific Islands
  
Box 4.1: The Liberalization Experience of Trinidad and Tobago 
and Mauritius  
These WTO members have many economic similarities with PNG 
and other Pacific island nations. They are also small lowly 
populated island economies subject to similar climatic variations, 
limited output and market opportunities. However, while still 
heavily reliant on a few major products and concentrated export 
markets, they have successfully diversified in the face of external 
commercial pressures. Trinidad and Tobago remains a resource-
based economy heavily dependant on oil and gas, but now process 
more downstream products. Manufactured goods, led by 
petrochemicals and iron and steel, accounted for almost 40% of 
exports in 1996 compared to 5% in 1980. Similarly, Mauritius has 
diversified away from sugar, which now accounts for 25% of 
exports — down from 90% of exports in 1970 — into clothing, 
tourism and, more recently, offshore financial services. The service 
sector accounts for over one-half of GDP and one-third of total 
exports. Both countries depend heavily on a few export markets; 
about one-half of Trinidad and Tobago’s exports are to the US while 
70% of merchandise exports from Mauritius are to the EU under 
Lome preferences, mainly on clothing and sugar. 
Both economies have recently experienced strong growth 
turnarounds. Following the 1973-82 oil boom, per capita incomes in 
Trinidad and Tobago declined to pre-1973 levels, but has grown by 
3-4% annually since 1995. Mauritius recorded exceptional growth 
during the 1980s, with per capita income almost tripling from 1980-
93. Both economies have become more resilient to external shocks 
and appear better placed to handle changing economic 
circumstances. Despite their dualistic nature, leading sector growth 
has contributed to the rest of the economy. Export growth 
underpinned by strong foreign investment has been essential to 
their development. 
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Box 4.1: The Liberalization Experience of Trinidad and Tobago 
and Mauritius (continued) 
It is impossible to fully explain their improved performances, 
Nevertheless, structural economic reforms, underpinned by trade 
and investment liberalization, and improved macro-stabilization 
policies have contributed enormously along with political stability 
and good governance—growth in both cases has followed or 
coincided with market-opening policies. Improved stabilization 
policies and fundamental structural reforms in Trinidad and Tobago 
since 1994, including tariff reductions, privatization, investment 
liberalization and flexible exchange rates, have attracted substantial 
foreign investment, particularly in the energy sector. Mauritius’s 
trade and investment regime was also extensively liberalized and 
prudent macro-economic policies adopted, including exchange rate 
flexibility. Tariffs are now the main instrument of protection in both 
nations. 
Trade and tax reforms have been intertwined to remove their 
traditional dependence on trade taxes, including tariffs and export 
taxes. Trinidad and Tobago no longer depends on trade taxes for 
government revenue; tariff revenue now accounts for below 4% of 
government revenue, due to the increased importance of other 
taxes, such as VAT, income taxes and royalties. Mauritius has also 
taken steps, including the introduction of a VAT as an alternative to 
tariff revenue which previously accounted for about one-half of 
government revenue. Exports have been liberalized, and Mauritius 
no longer taxes sugar exports. 
Although regional liberalization has been important — for Trinidad 
and Tobago mainly via membership of the Caribbean Community 
and Common Market (CARICOM) and for Mauritius primarily as a 
member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) this has not been at the expense of MFN liberalization. 
Moreover, while these economies have received preferential access 
to export markets, such as the EU under Lome, they have developed 
a capacity to adapt to changing market conditions. 
Source: WTO (1995 and 1998c). 
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Box 4.2: Samoan Trade Reforms  
Samoa adopted comprehensive trade reforms in 1998 that provide 
important lessons to other pacific island economies. The tariff 
structure was simplified from eight to five different rates, and duties 
lowered generally across-the-board to a maximum rate of 20 per 
cent, down from 60 per cent. Customs administration is also being 
rationalized, including the establishment of WTO valuation 
procedures. Tariff exemptions and concessions that were 
widespread and applied on a discretionary basis were also largely 
revoked. These tariff reforms were financed by the introduction in 
1994 of a 10 per cent value-added goods and services tax (VAGST) 
at a time when the government was facing severe budgetary 
pressures 
The Government is committed to structural and sectoral reforms 
based on good governance. It intends achieving this by making 
Samoa a more enterprise-based and competitive economy by 
developing a strong and diversified private sector. These reforms 
stemmed largely out of desperation. The economy had suffered a 
number of setbacks in the 1990s resulting from exogenous climatic 
and other factors as well as large commercial losses by state-owned 
enterprises. 
The Government had adopted a comprehensive reform program 
covering tax, corporatization, tariffs, finance, macro-economic 
stabilization and monetary stability. This has meant that the gains 
and losses have tended to be widespread and individually small. 
Pressures created by informal imports from American Samoa 
eroded formal import systems and made tariff protection 
impractical. This coincided with a growing public recognition that 
high import tariffs were counter-productive. The Government also 
involved stakeholders in the discussions to generate support from 
the private sector and the general public. 
Source: Duncan, Cuthbertson and Bosworth (1999). 
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That can be an advantage for developing countries though, 
since more-advanced economies often have second-hand, 
labour-intensive machinery available for much less than 
the new price of the machinery replacing it in the high-
wage country. 
Living standards depend upon resource endowments and 
productivity levels. Trade liberalization improves 
productivity by enabling economies to focus more on what 
they can produce best according to their comparative 
advantage, given their endowments of natural resources, 
labour and capital. This is the basic economic principle 
underpinning international trade. Countries will gain from 
trade by specializing in products in which they have a 
comparative advantage (in which they produce relatively 
‘best’ in terms of comparative cost), and importing those in 
which they have a comparative disadvantage. Because it is 
relative domestic costs that determine comparative 
advantage, all nations will be better off producing some 
goods and not others by specializing and trading. They 
will benefit from importing even those goods in which they 
have an absolute advantage — that is, they are the world’s 
lowest cost producer — provided they are even more 
efficient, or have a greater absolute advantage, in 
producing other goods. All countries will have 
comparative advantages and disadvantages in some 
products, and all can therefore benefit from trade. 
Productivity improves when trade is increased. Extra 
competitive pressures on previously protected industries, 
and new technical know how from new foreign investment 
opportunities, can raise productivity and create higher 
growth. Empirical evidence suggests that such gains can be 
very significant (Stockel, Tang and McKibbin 1999; Stockel 
and Corbett 1999; Frankel and Romer 1999). 
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The policy challenge is to ensure that countries are able to 
follow their pattern of comparative advantage as it evolves 
through time. This is best assured by allowing competitive 
markets to determine production, consumption and trade. 
Given appropriate institutions and policies, markets can 
deliver efficient results and ensure that outputs and inputs 
are supplied at minimum costs. The determinants of 
comparative advantage are varied and complex, and result 
from the complicated interaction of many markets that 
change in the course of economic development at home 
and abroad (as described in Appendix 4). Competitive 
markets boost productivity and open markets are an 
efficient means of exposing domestic producers to 
competition. Without such competition, domestic 
producers may be able to survive — but they will be 
inefficient by world standards and so will the level and 
growth of national income. 
Without openness to foreign direct investment, a smaller 
volume of the financial resources needed to exploit areas of 
comparative advantage will be available domestically. That 
is, trade liberalization will develop more-efficient 
industries easier if foreign investment restrictions are also 
removed. Trade and investment reform are thus closely 
linked and are needed together if firms, and hence 
countries, are going to benefit fully from the opportunities 
provided by globalization. Although liberalizing foreign 
investment without trade reforms may attract foreign firms 
seeking to operate behind ‘tariff walls’, this may well be 
counter-productive since such investment will tend to be in 
highly protected activities that are unlikely to be 
internationally competitive and hence incapable of 
exporting without government subsidies. 
The relevance of open trade and investment policies for 
improving economic performance applies equally to all 
countries, irrespective of their size. While small states do 
present special developmental problems that need to be 
taken into account, these states must nevertheless adapt, 
indeed transform, their economies to secure the benefits of 
globalization and the increasingly open global trading 
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environment (IMF 2000). Open trade policy is best viewed 
as part of sound overall economic management and 
development strategies for small states as it is with all 
developing countries (and developed countries for that 
matter). 
Can governments do better than markets? 
Import barriers, such as tariffs, are often applied by 
governments in an attempt to promote industrialization. 
This view is sometimes premised on the belief that 
governments should actively intervene in the market to 
determine areas of comparative advantage. It presupposes, 
however, that governments are better than market forces at 
identifying efficient activities. Experience suggests that is 
almost always not the case, however. Hence, governments 
should refrain from such activities. 
This frequently asked question lies at the core of resistance 
to trade liberalization. There has been no shortage of 
attempts by governments throughout the world to 
intervene in markets to establish ‘preferred outcomes’. This 
is certainly true of PNG and some other Pacific island 
economies. Governments consistently intervene, despite 
there being no evidence to suggest they are able to 
consistently outperform the market. 
Choosing successful outcomes that would have been 
selected by the market in any event is not alone sufficient 
to justify government intervention. For governments to be 
successful, they would need to consistently pick promising 
industries for development that would have been missed 
by the private sector. Clearly, it is difficult to identify such 
activities in practice. However, what is observable are the 
number of failures selected by governments in Pacific 
island economies and elsewhere. This demonstrates that 
governments are generally inept in trying to ‘second guess’ 
markets. That should not be surprising, since governments 
generally focus on development of industries that would 
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not otherwise grow, and hence their commercial viability is 
nearly always bound to incur high risks.  
Governments often justify their intervention on their 
ability to pick winners. But it is difficult to see why 
governments are consistently in a better position to do so 
than the private sector. If governments base their decisions 
on having access to superior information, then the most 
efficient outcome is not for the government to support the 
targeted industry, but rather to correct whatever the failure 
is in the market for information, to ensure that the private 
sector can access the same information. Moreover, the 
likelihood that governments would be better than the 
private sector at picking winners is even further 
undermined in Pacific island economies where 
governments have very limited human resources. In any 
case, those limited bureaucratic resources would be best 
spent on providing the essential public goods required for 
sustainable development. 
Governments often protect new or ‘infant’ industries to 
allow them to operate initially without competition so they 
can expand and become established commercially before 
being exposed to competition. This presupposes that one 
day the industry will become competitive without 
protection. Experience suggests, however, that such 
industries requiring assistance ‘at birth’ require long-term 
government support and rarely mature into efficient 
industries that have a comparative advantage. Moreover, 
in small markets such as those in the Pacific island 
economies, where other domestic suppliers are unlikely 
and the extent to which economies of scale can be realized 
from home sales is extremely limited, arguments 
supporting infant industry protection against imports 
would appear even weaker17. 
                                                          
17 For a powerful critique of each of the standard arguments for infant 
industry protection, and suggested rankings of policy instruments that 
would be far superior to trade measures for dealing with each 
concern, see Corden (1997, Ch. 8). 
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Governments often provide protection to offset against 
trade-distorting foreign subsidies or protectionist policies 
that distort world markets. As harmful as these foreign 
subsidies might be for efficient domestic producers, 
providing counter protection only increases the economic 
costs at home and abroad of such interventions. The most 
appropriate longer-term response by countries adversely 
affected by these arrangements is to increase their own 
productivity and efficiency so as to compete with the 
subsidized product (the so-called ‘level playing field’ 
argument). This at first may appear counter-intuitive, but 
is especially relevant to small Pacific island economies that 
have scarce public funds. 
The PNG sugar industry is a case in point. The high tariff 
protection is claimed by the industry to be necessary in 
part to counteract the depressing effects on international 
sugar prices of distorting protectionist policies by other 
major sugar producers, such as the EU and US. However, 
while such policies by overseas producers should be 
removed (something the WTO membership and sugar-
exporting countries in particular seek to achieve), it is 
impossible for PNG to become better off by highly 
protecting its own sugar industry. Simply because other 
governments select bad policies is no reason for PNG to 
follow suit. On the contrary, since PNG would be a sugar 
importer in the absence of protection, it should welcome 
those low international sugar prices as that improves the 
country’s terms of trade and in particular the welfare of its 
consumers (both food processors and households). Of 
greatest importance is to use the nation’s resources most 
efficiently, and selectively assisting sugar production is 
likely to be inconsistent with this national goal. While it 
may increase employment in the sugar industry, less 
people are employed elsewhere — including in more 
internationally competitive industries — as a result. What 
determines domestic efficiency is not the level of assistance 
provided home industries relative to foreign producers, 
but its level of assistance compared with other domestic 
industries. Providing industry assistance that necessarily 
becomes selective since governments can never assist all 
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activities equally, therefore always trades-off the interests 
of one industry against another. Efforts to justify such 
selective assistance on grounds of employment generation 
or ‘multiplier effects’ are therefore misguided since all 
activities, if assisted, will generate these results. But why 
should one industry be assisted and not others? 
The PNG reform program 
Trade and investment liberalization is increasingly being 
recognized domestically as fundamental to creating a more 
flexible and efficient PNG economy. Hence the focus on 
them in this report, because that is the Pacific country 
where the WTO and APEC are likely to have their main 
policy impact. However, trade and investment reforms 
alone will do less than they might unless other essential 
reforms are made simultaneously to promote good 
governance and institutional arrangements. Governance is 
concerned with the role of the state and the institutions 
established to manage development. Good governance 
requires a predictable, open, and enlightened 
policymaking system that is accountable and functions 
within transparent rules of law that are effectively 
enforced. 
Tariff reforms 
After several delays, PNG implemented a major across-the-
board tariff reduction program on 1 July 1999 as part of its 
on-going structural adjustment program. Maximum MFN 
bound tariffs were reduced immediately from 125% to 
55%, apart from higher rates of up to 95% being 
maintained for certain sensitive products including sugar, 
tinned mackerel and plywood. Average (unweighted) 
tariffs fell to 9% and are being phased down to 5% by 2006 
when the highest tariff rate will be 40%. Once completed, 
the tariff structure will comprise just four rates: free, 15%, 
25% and 40%. The tariff reductions were financed 
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primarily by the introduction of a 10% value added tax on 
goods and services. 
This program should improve economic efficiency by 
providing a more neutral tariff structure and lower levels 
of net or effective protection (Box 4.3). It is estimated that 
effective rates of protection for manufacturing (including 
food processing) have fallen from an average in 1992 of 
160% — ranging from 90% to 105% in 1998 prior to the 
reforms — to between 67% and 80% in 1999. These are 
estimated to fall further to the 42% to 50% range at the end 
of the current tariff reduction program. This will help 
reduce the discriminatory impact that the tariff has had on 
PNG’s major agricultural export crops of coffee, oil palm 
and cocoa (WTO 1999). These activities received negative 
effective assistance and were thus being heavily penalized 
under the previous tariff structure (Table 4.1). 
One of the main obstacles to exports in PNG is the high 
level of import tariffs. That has both direct and indirect 
effects on other industries. Relatively high tariffs on 
manufactured products can directly raise input costs to 
efficient agricultural exporters who cannot pass on the cost 
increases because they are price takers in world markets. 
Much more important than that direct effect is an indirect 
one: they cause an appreciation of the exchange rate, which 
lowers the price of exports in domestic currency terms, and 
they raise the price to exporters of inter-sectorally mobile 
factors of production, most notably labour. In these ways 
PNG’s protectionist policies that provide high levels of 
assistance to industries in which PNG has no comparative 
advantage, such as sugar, cement, plywood and mackerel 
canning, are penalizing traditional competitive export 
crops of coffee, cocoa, copra and oil palm. Lowering tariffs 
will therefore remove the anti-export bias inherent in 
PNG’s tariff structure. 
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Table 4.1: Effective rates of protection for selected activities, PNG, early 
1990s
(per cent) 
Commodity/product Effective rate of protection 
A. Agriculture 
 Sugar 110
 Tea -4
 Cocoa/copra -4 to –14 
 Cocoa/balsa -2
 Coffee -1 to –22 
 Oil palm -2 to zero 
B. Fishing 
 Fishing -23
C. Livestock 
 Meat -11 to 22; negative value added 
D. Manufacturing 
 Food processing 106 to 228; negative value added 
 Coffee processing 30 
 Tobacco products 80 
 Chemicals -134
 Soaps and cosmetics 91; negative value added 
 Paint 36
 Matches 35
 Packaging 970
 Printing 67
 Clothing 53 to 62 
 Tyres 43
 Steel products 32 to 49 
 Jewellery 117
• Note: See Box 4.3 for definitions and explanations. 
• Source: REPIM Ltd (1996). 
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Efforts to use trade policy to encourage industrialization 
have generally had little success in PNG and other island 
economies, despite the government agreeing to provide 
special protection on certain products, initially in the form 
of import bans, and more recently since the mid-1990s by 
high tariffs. 
The government initially granted Ramu Sugar an import 
ban in 1984 to establish a sugar cane production and 
processing complex in the Ramu Valley (Box 4.4). The ban 
was subsequently converted to a prohibitive tariff in 1997 
that was set at 85% in 1998. Because of a non-public 
government agreement with Ramu Sugar, which is 49% 
government owned, tariff reduction commitments under 
the program have been backloaded and so tariffs will fall 
from 82% currently to 70% by 2005 and to 40% from 2006. 
Thus, sugar production will continue to receive very high 
assistance for some years. The sugar industry’s competitive 
position is weak because of an unsuitable climate, which 
lowers sugar content of cane and encourages pests, and 
from lack of economies of scale because of small 
throughput of the milling factory of some 40,000 to 50,000 
tonnes annually. Current indications are that the survival 
of Ramu sugar will need a tariff of substantially above the 
long term rate of 40% if it is to remain viable. Thus, there is 
the possibility of closure of Ramu sugar (as would be in the 
national interest if it cannot be competitive without a tariff 
of any size, let alone one as high as 40%). That would have 
major structural adjustment implications for the Ramu 
workers and the community, of course. 
These one-off adjustment costs, however, need to be 
considered in relation to the benefits that will forever flow 
afterwards to the economy. One source of benefits would 
come from downstream food processors and consumers 
having access to better-quality sugar at much lower — 
about half — existing prices. Sugar is a major input into 
foodstuffs and beverages, and hence reducing sugar 
protection will be to their benefit. Downstream sugar users, 
such as the breweries, have been critical not only of the 
high price but also of the variable quality of Ramu sugar. 
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Many processors must further treat sugar prior to using it 
for processing, an additional cost imposed on them by 
sugar protection. 
If the food processors and breweries are themselves 
protected from import competition, as Table 4.1 suggests, it 
might be argued that this more or less offsets the higher 
cost of inputs such as protected sugar. In that case, 
reducing sugar protection may add to rather than reduce 
resource misallocation since mobile resources could move 
to even more protected activities. This is not an argument 
for avoiding sugar reform though. On the contrary, it 
simply illustrates the general point that the more distorted 
an economy, the more important it is to have across-the-
board liberalization so as to ensure that resources do move 
to more-efficient activities. 
The PNG Government’s policies have been aimed at 
substituting food imports with local production, especially 
for poultry and rice in addition to sugar. These were said 
to be justified on the grounds of increasing food self 
sufficiency, regional employment (as with Ramu), and 
reducing the drain of food imports on foreign exchange. 
However, such policies not only raise food prices 
(doubling them in the case of sugar, compared with import 
prices18), but also effectively tax potential agricultural 
exporters and cause the sector’s resources to be diverted 
towards lower-value crops than would prevail under freer 
markets (Gibson 1997). In addition, these policies 
discriminate against the informal agricultural sector that 
receives little government support, including cash 
cropping of traditional food items such as bananas, sweet 
potatoes, cassava and taro. Hence, the net effect on food 
self sufficiency and foreign exchange savings/earnings 
may well be negative rather than positive, and there is no 
reason to assume that the highly protected activities would 
employ more people than the currently less protected ones. 
                                                          
18 Gibson 1993.  Although these estimates were made well before 
1997 when the sugar import ban was converted to a tariff, they are 
still relevant given the high rates, inirtially of 85% and currently 82%. 
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Higher food prices from tariffs and other forms of 
protection tax households regressively by hurting poor 
consumers the most. It has been estimated, for example, 
that the poorest one-tenth of households pay a sugar tax 
from protection equivalent to 3.2% of the value of sugar 
consumed, compared to a tax of only 0.6% paid by the 
wealthiest one-tenth of households (Gibson 1997). Thus, 
removing such inequitable taxes by dismantling trade 
barriers on staple items, such as food, will directly help 
alleviate poverty by raising the real incomes of the poorest 
households. 
Despite the significant benefits of the reform program to 
date, tariff escalation remains substantial in PNG and will 
do so even when the phased reductions are completed. The 
highest rate to be in place in 2006, 40% (on mainly 
processed products) exceeds considerably the rates on raw 
materials and other inputs of either zero or 15%. Escalating 
tariffs apply much higher effective assistance for processed 
products than for unprocessed materials. This is mainly 
justified on the grounds of encouraging downstream value 
added processing. However, encouraging such activities by 
providing high protection is counter-productive since 
those activities are only worthwhile pursuing if they add 
more value — when measured at international prices — 
than what would otherwise be produced. Moreover, that 
protection may penalize efficient agricultural producers of 
unprocessed foodstuffs that have considerable export 
potential by encouraging them to focus on inward-looking 
processed activities that cater mainly for the domestic 
market.  
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Box 4.3: Effective Rates of Protection 
The effective rate of protection (or assistance) is a standard tool used to 
measure the assistance provided individual domestic activities due to trade 
barriers applying to competing imports, such as tariffs and quotas. Whereas 
tariff levels on outputs indicate its gross or nominal assistance, the effective rate 
measures the activity’s net assistance by taking into account the benefits and 
costs of protection on both output and inputs, related to the activity’s value 
added. Thus, tariffs on outputs assist domestic producers by enabling them to 
sell in the home market at a higher price, while tariffs on inputs penalize users 
by raising their domestic (and import) price. It is given by the formula: 
Effective rate (%)  
= value added with assistance – value added without assistance x 100 
   value added without assistance                                 1 
Since value added is measured at world prices, it is possible for it to be 
negative.  This means that when valued at world prices, the cost of the activity’s 
inputs exceed its output price. These activities are only maintained by 
government assistance, and thereby receive very high levels of support. They 
are highly inefficient users of the community’s resources, which would be 
improved if the products were instead imported. 
The effective rate estimates presented in Table 4.1 for PNG provide a useful 
indicator of the likely adverse effects on economic efficiency of the tariff 
structure. These estimates pre-date the July 1999 tariff reductions. Nevertheless, 
they are still useful since the tariff reforms are likely to have tended to reduce 
absolute rather than relative effective rate levels since it is mainly the same 
industries that continue to receive the highest tariff protection. Indeed, 
disparities in effective rate levels may have widened, at least in the short term, 
on products that received favourable treatment involving the maintenance of 
high tariff protection, while benefiting immediately from zero tariffs on basic 
and intermediate inputs. 
One study on effective assistance concluded that: 
• Export products were negatively assisted; 
• Food processing was generally highly protected, with many having negative 
value added at world prices; 
• Although the livestock sector enjoyed high tariffs, it operated in a 
competitive environment that ensured that the benefits of protection were 
not used; 
• While steel products have a lower range of protection, other intermediate 
inputs such as packaging and paint exhibited high levels of protection; and 
• The range of protection on final goods was wide. 
Source: WTO (1999). 
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Box 4.4: Sugar Production in PNG 
PNG embarked on establishing a national sugar industry in 1982 
aimed at achieving sugar self-sufficiency and contributing to 
national development. To achieve this, the Government established 
a monopoly domestic sugar producer, Ramu Sugar Limited (RSL), 
initially protected by a ten-year import ban and now by a 
prohibitive tariff of above 80%. The government is the largest single 
shareholder of RSL holding a 48.8 per cent interest. A private 
company manages RSL. 
The sugar price is administratively set by the Government according 
to an agreed pricing formula whereby the price is adjusted at 6-
monthly intervals by the consumer price index, subject to a 
maximum yearly increase of 8 per cent. The initial agreement was 
for three years from 1985, but was extended. Despite the high levels 
of ‘infant industry protection’ provided by the monopoly 
arrangements, RSL has performed poorly. In its first 11 years, it 
made notable profits in only three years. No dividends were paid in 
the first 10 years. In hindsight, the original feasibility study was too 
optimistic. It concluded that a project producing around 40,000 
tonnes annually would be commercially viable at a minimum world 
price of US$0.155 cents per pound, corresponding to an import 
parity (‘into store, Lae’) price of US$0.34 per pound (in 1982 dollars). 
At that time, sugar prices were projected to rise rapidly. However, 
shortly after Ramu commenced production in the early 1980s, the 
world sugar price sank to historically low levels, and import parity 
pricing for Ramu sugar had to be abandoned. Between 1988 and 
1998, the world price of sugar varied from US$0.08 to US$0.15 per 
pound, and averaged US$0.11 per pound. The domestic market for 
sugar is currently about 35,000 tonnes annually and around 7,000 
tonnes is exported under quota to the US each year. In addition, the 
industry produces both ethanol, which is blended with petrol by 
major oil companies, and potable alcohol for export and domestic 
sales.  
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Box 4.4: Sugar Production in PNG (continued) 
It has been estimated that, while the import prohibition was in 
place, the domestic price of sugar was on average double world 
levels. The ban was replaced with a prohibitive tariff from 1997 of 
85% that was reduced to its current level of 82% in 1999. Under the 
new tariff reduction program, duties are supposed to be phased 
down in the first half of this decade, but they have been back-loaded 
and so have yet to occur. The largest tariff cut for sugar is scheduled 
to occur in 2006 when the rate will fall from 70% to 40%. Thus, the 
change from an import prohibition to a prohibitive tariff will have 
had only a small impact in reducing industry assistance up to 2005. 
Meanwhile, the domestic price of sugar remains above world levels 
to the extent of the existing tariff, that is, by 82%. 
It has been estimated using Domestic Resource Costs and other 
techniques that PNG does not have a comparative advantage in 
sugar production. This would continue to be the case under the 
most optimistic scenarios in which world sugar prices would rise 
following liberalization of the global market. The study also 
concluded that there were more efficient uses of the land than 
growing sugar cane, such as coffee and cash food crops. This largely 
reflects the less than ideal climate, soils and pests for growing sugar 
cane in PNG (the climate is essentially too tropical to obtain the 
highest sugar yields) and milling throughput of about half that 
needed to achieve economies of scale. According to RSL, its 
production costs per tonne of sugar is in the middle range mainly 
due to the factory’s small size.  
Source: Fleming and Hardaker (1997). 
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There has already been a delay in the introduction of the 
PNG tariff reform program, such that reductions are being 
phased in over six years to 2006, instead of the eight-years 
as originally intended. This is still slightly longer than the 
five-year program announced in 1995 but, given the very 
real strains of adjustment, little extra would be achieved 
from accelerating the program now. Instead, it would be 
better to focus on ensuring that the current program is 
fully implemented without further slippage. This in itself 
will be a substantial political challenge, given past 
experiences. Many of the substantive tariff reductions on 
sensitive products have been backloaded in the program. 
Pressures are likely therefore to intensify later for the 
government to delay certain tariff reductions on sensitive 
items. Policy makers should be ready and well equipped to 
refute these pressures when they arise. There will also be 
the question of continuing with further tariff reductions 
after 2006. 
Those enjoying protection currently can be expected to 
argue that the certain costs of adjustment may exceed the 
uncertain benefits from trade liberalization. They and 
others will also ask: Where would the new jobs come from? 
Two points need to be remembered on the first issue. First, 
economic growth abroad as well as at home imposes 
adjustment costs on society all the time, and will 
increasingly as globalization proceeds. Empirical evidence 
from a myriad of studies show that the adjustments 
stimulated by policy reform typically are very small 
compared with those from all the other adjustment 
pressures. And second, the adjustment costs need be paid 
only once, whereas the benefits from resources being 
relocated in activities that are more competitive 
internationally flow on forever. Similarly, arguments to 
delay trade and investment liberalization until other 
policies, such as institutional and governance weaknesses, 
are reformed are not convincing. 
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Even though more could have been produced and perhaps 
more jobs created by other industries had protection not 
been introduced, wouldn’t it be better to leave workers in 
those protected jobs now that they are established? It is 
difficult for anyone, including governments, to say 
precisely where new jobs would come from following 
comprehensive trade reforms, because too many things 
change simultaneously. Nonetheless, the experiences of 
many countries over the past two decades suggest there is 
every reason to be optimistic — especially if good 
macroeconomic policy is practiced during and beyond the 
adjustment period (Corden 1997). 
The PNG Government has commissioned a full review of 
its tax system, due to be completed by 30 September 2000. 
The Taxation Review (headed by Sir Nagora Bogan) is 
intended to provide the Government with 
recommendations on all aspects of tax policy formulation 
and implementation, including tariff arrangements. It is to 
review the process by which general import tariffs are set, 
the duty drawback scheme and related procedures, as well 
as dumping arrangements. PNG’s WTO commitments are 
relevant to this review. 
Other economic reforms 
PNG’s tariff reform program is reasonably comprehensive 
and applies across-the-board tariff reductions. However, as 
indicated above, tariffs on a small range of sensitive 
products have received special treatment by being allowed 
to remain high until late into the six-year program. 
Moreover, tariffs on some products were increased under 
the program, namely from 11% to either 30% or 40% on a 
range of foodstuffs.  
Reforming output markets alone is insufficient, and may 
even worsen resource use efficiency and compound the 
short-term adjustment costs of reform. Efficient firms will 
have difficulty competing with imports under lower tariffs 
if they remain subject to inefficient input prices. This 
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includes not only raw materials but also other inputs such 
as labour and government-supplied infrastructure services.  
For PNG, this means that decisions to slow down the tariff 
reductions on important raw material inputs, such as sugar 
and cement, will continue to penalize more efficient 
industries. Consequently, those already lowly assisted 
industries undergoing faster reductions in tariffs on their 
outputs relative to inputs would have been made worse off 
to date by the reform program. This limits the scope for 
newly efficient industries, including exporters, to expand. 
As well, there is an urgent need in PNG to reform the 
government-provision of essential business inputs, such as 
transport, telecommunications and electricity. These 
continue to be provided by state-owned monopolies at 
internationally high prices and sub-standard quality. 
Coastal shipping, for example, is protected by government 
cabotage policies that prevent foreign shippers from 
competing on domestic routes. While this protects the 
incumbent firm, it has made coastal shipping, an essential 
service input used widely in PNG, very expensive. It is 
important therefore that this market, along with other 
service inputs, be deregulated to better enable PNG 
industry to compete internationally. PNG and other small 
island economies are inherently high-cost economies 
because of their size and distance from major markets, so it 
is imperative that these costs be kept to a minimum if a 
thriving and diversified export base is to be achieved. 
PNG’s Government is committed to privatize some of its 
state-owned enterprises, which is an important beginning. 
But replacing a public monopoly with a private one need 
not, on its own, be a great improvement. What is also 
essential is to ensure that the markets those enterprises 
operate in are made contestible. One way for a small 
country to help that happen is to allow liberal access to 
foreign investment. 
Deterioration in other public services, especially the law 
and order problem, must also be corrected. The immense 
law and order problem not only affects the quality of life of 
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PNG residents, but also directly inflates business costs and 
thereby contributes substantially to PNG’s high-cost 
economy. It remains the single biggest impediment to 
business in PNG (Duncan and Lawson 1997). It was 
estimated that direct security costs of firms amounted to 
3% of total production costs and that the indirect costs of 
crime may be as high as 9% of costs. In GDP terms, these 
represent about 0.8% and 1.3% of GDP (Levantis 1997).  
Labour costs are fundamental to the international 
competitiveness of PNG industry. Under the regulated 
labour market system inherited from Australia at 
independence, real labour costs (adjusted for productivity 
levels) increased to uneconomic levels. Since the 
deregulation of the labour market in 1992 by the Minimum 
Wages Board, such costs have declined. This has resulted 
in a large increase in employment. The 1992 labour market 
reforms were apparently successful in stimulating some 
private sector employment, which grew by 17% between 
1993 and 1998 (Levantis 2000). This compares favourably 
with almost stagnant employment growth in the two 
decades following independence. However, the private 
sector is only a small part of the total PNG workforce and 
is incapable of absorbing the large number of school 
leavers each year. Hence, that employment growth figure 
is not inconsistent with the deteriorating law and order 
situation and the country’s increased macroeconomic 
instability. 
The PNG Government decided to re-establish the 
Minimum Wages Board and following the latest round of 
hearings, has offered to raise the minimum wage by more 
than Kina 5 per week. While this may seem a small rise, 
and is well below the exorbitant claims of some unions, it is 
only affordable if it is matched by increased productivity 
levels. If this also re-introduces rigidities into the labour 
market, it could contribute to unemployment and impose 
additional adjustment costs on the economy as tariff 
reforms are implemented. Again this is not a reason to 
abort the reform process, but rather a reminder of the 
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interconnectedness of the various markets for inputs and 
outputs.  
The advantages of making the reform program as 
comprehensive as possible are not only that the potential 
gains from trade liberalization are increased, but as well 
the adjustment costs could be reduced. Gains are increased 
because it lessons the chance that resources will flow out of 
one inefficient use into another that has had its protection 
level preserved. The adjustment costs can be lower rather 
than higher with comprehensive reform because the 
benefits of reform are expanded, thereby providing greater 
capacity for the economy to absorb elsewhere the 
dislocated resources. It also helps minimize the problem of 
multiple adjustments, which could occur if a partial reform 
causes resources to flow from one inefficient activity to 
another, only to have to undergo subsequent adjustment 
following further reforms. 
Structural adjustment is always occurring in any economy 
in response to changes in consumer tastes, technology, 
incomes and production techniques. Without it, economies 
would under-perform. The more flexible are an economy’s 
productive factors to continuous change, the smoother will 
be the process of adjustment. While capital is reasonably 
mobile and can generally flow into alternative uses, labour 
can be less mobile between different industries, 
occupations and regions. 
Handling the adjustment costs of reform 
In any economy, whether it be relative large economies or 
much smaller economies like those in the Pacific, a major 
obstacle to governments reforming trade policies is being 
able to withstand the political consequences inherent in the 
structural adjustment pressures induced by such policy 
changes. Governments understandably try to minimize 
those political costs by announcing that policy changes will 
be phased in gradually. In PNG’s case, the Government has 
introduced a six-year program of tariff reforms to give 
stakeholders plenty of time to respond. This also raises 
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questions of equity and fairness: should the government 
provide compensation to those adversely affected by the 
reforms? 
While the costs of structural adjustment induced from 
trade reforms impact relatively quickly and are obvious, 
the benefits of such reforms — while they go on forever — 
tend to be more diffuse throughout the community and 
less visible. But it must be remembered that where 
substantial adjustment pressures follow, so too will the 
potential economic benefits from such reforms be greatest. 
Thus, large structural adjustment pressures are the flip side 
of reaping potentially large economic gains from 
restructuring, and are thus as much a measure of the 
opportunity for economic prosperity as they are of the one-
off adjustment cost. Put simply, it is impossible to realize 
significant economic benefits from policy reforms without 
having substantial structural adjustment: with the gain 
comes some pain. Thus efforts by PNG and other 
governments to avoid the adjustment pressures of reforms 
also seriously risk reducing or at least delaying the 
economic gains from these reforms. 
The identification of areas of large structural adjustment 
needed following trade reforms is perhaps the best 
indicator available that policies have imposed efficiency 
costs on the economy and that production patterns are out 
of kilter with the country's comparative advantage. If 
government policies of providing high selective protection 
to certain industries had been successful, then removing 
such assistance would be possible with minimal 
restructuring. Thus, the lesson for governments should be 
to avoid in future being party to special deals with the 
private sector that provide high levels of selective 
assistance. Because of the implications, governments, once 
heavily committed in such projects, are often reluctant to 
admit to their mistakes and instead frequently provide 
more assistance in the hope that the industry will turn 
around and become commercially viable without 
government assistance in the longer run. But more often 
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than not this does not happen, which only compounds the 
problems. 
The best means by which governments can facilitate 
adjustment is to phase in reforms and to preannounce 
them19. Back tracking on reforms and policy instability will 
increase adjustment costs. The government must be 
committed to the program to ensure that they are fully 
implemented. In PNG, this has been a major problem with 
past reform programs. Because the costs of reform 
normally come first, it is imperative that the reform 
program does not stall mid-term. Otherwise the society 
incurs the costs but does not reap the benefits. This seems 
to have given trade and other economic reforms a bad 
name in PNG, both among the community and within 
certain segments of government. As such, there appears to 
be, in some circles at least, a general reluctance to embrace 
change as a source of economic prosperity. Reversing 
community attitudes on reform is a slow and difficult 
process, and requires the government to actively inform 
the community of precisely what reforms are to be 
introduced and when, and then to stick to that program. 
Policy reforms must be both clear and credible for the 
private sector to be able to plan ahead with confidence.  
Can the provision of adjustment assistance help? In the 
Ramu sugar case, for example, should the government 
provide financial assistance to workers and the community 
adversely affected by the reforms if Ramu sugar closes or 
contracts its operations following reduced government 
assistance? Help could come in the form of worker re-
location assistance or re-training for displaced workers. 
What appears to make Ramu sugar special is the potential 
magnitude of the adjustment involved. It employs some 
1,500 workers in the Ramu valley, and a community of 
several more thousand people currently depend on Ramu 
sugar for income. This would appear the strongest case in 
PNG for adjustment assistance, but any such scheme 
                                                          
19 However, even this is not costless to the community since it 
involves also delaying the realization of benefits by the community 
from reform. 
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would need to be carefully designed to avoid the pitfalls 
often associated with them. More often then not, specific 
adjustment schemes are based not so much on economic 
considerations, but are seen as a way of easing the short-
term adjustment pressures and therefore making the 
reforms more palatable for the community and 
governments. In this context, such schemes may play a 
useful role, but they need to be tightly scrutinized and 
applied only in extreme cases where policy changes are not 
possible otherwise20. 
The provision of structural adjustment assistance involves 
many practical problems that, if not handled properly, may 
work against reform and give it a bad name. First, it 
requires policymakers to be able to identify who needs 
compensation and what the correct level should be. There 
are also moral hazard problems. Just as selective assistance 
bestows benefits to some industries while imposing 
adjustment costs on other, lowly assisted industries, so 
selective adjustment assistance is also discriminatory, in 
favour of those that receive it. That is, the schemes 
themselves can introduce inequities in addition to 
inefficiencies. Furthermore, if not well designed such 
schemes in practice can provide an incentive not to 
adjust21. Despite their intentions, structural adjustment 
                                                          
20 In the case of the recent reform of the Australian dairy market, for 
example, the government introduced a payment scheme for farmers.  
This maintains the domestic consumer price of milk above the 
international price during the adjustment period, but the difference is 
collected as a tax to fund a one-off grant to producers to assist them 
become more efficient (e.g. by getting bigger) or to move to another 
activity.  For details of that Dairy Industry Adjustment Program, see 
www.affa.gov.au/diap
21 This stems largely from the political economy driving such 
schemes.  Governments are nearly always compelled to direct the 
assistance to factors that are not coping with the adjustment, rather 
than rewarding those that adjust successfully.  For example, worker 
re-training schemes assist those that have not been able to adjust on 
their own accord, while workers that have successfully adjusted 
receive no assistance, even though they may have incurred 
substantial costs in re-training and gaining alternative employment. 
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schemes can thereby end up hindering rather than 
facilitating adjustment and fair outcomes.  
It is generally argued that structural adjustment is best 
handled by economies having a general safety net, such as 
welfare payments, to ease the labour adjustment problems. 
These are preferred over adopting special schemes for 
individual industries. However, PNG does not have a 
general welfare system. Even so, it is difficult to argue that 
workers displaced because of a subset of policy-induced 
reforms should receive assistance that is not available to 
other workers who also incur structural dislocation due to 
other policy reforms or indeed general (non-policy-
induced) economic changes.  
Providing funds to pay for adjustment schemes to facilitate 
industry restructuring may be a possible role for major 
donor assistance. However, such schemes would need to 
be tightly controlled to ensure that the intended 
restructuring occurred.  
The most effective role for the PNG Government 
International empirical studies suggest that, although 
significant in a few situations, the adjustment costs of trade 
liberalization are generally small in relation to the benefits, 
usually as little as one-twentieth (Matusz and Tarr 1999). 
The most effective role for the PNG government is to focus 
on the fundamental problems contributing to high and 
prolonged adjustment costs, and find ways to minimize 
them.  
Without supportive institutional arrangements, adjustment 
costs will be increased and the private sector will be 
incapable of providing the necessary impetus needed to 
provide efficient and longer term growth. Also, 
governments should remove impediments to adjustment, 
such as labour market rigidities, investment restrictions 
and inappropriate and unstable macroeconomic polices, 
while ensuring that structural reforms are appropriately 
sequenced. These factors will facilitate the quickest and 
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sustained response in newly emerging competitive sectors 
of the economy. 
Economic performance and adjustment to economic 
changes is closely linked to the flexibility of the kina’s 
exchange rate. There is little doubt that had PNG 
maintained its ‘hard kina’ policy the adjustment costs of 
trade liberalization would have been much greater. 
Introducing a flexible exchange rate in 1994 enabled the 
over-valued kina to fall, thereby benefiting exporters 
through enhanced export returns and improving the 
international competitiveness of PNG’s import-competing 
industries by raising import parity prices. From 1994 to 
1998, the kina devalued by around 40% in nominal terms 
and 22% in real terms (the difference being due to PNG’s 
higher inflation rate compared to that of major trading 
partners). The benefits to the PNG economy, including to 
the agricultural sector, of maintaining a competitive 
exchange rate have been demonstrated in several studies 
(Box 4.5).  
Thus, substantial currency devaluations since 1994 have 
supplemented the effects of tariffs and boosted PNG’s 
international competitiveness against imports. This has 
provided a lower-cost opportunity to reduce tariffs 
substantially. Those industries that have retained much 
higher tariffs until 2006, however, have effectively had 
their ‘protection’ against imports increased, especially 
when the large kina devaluation also is taken into account. 
Moreover, as tariffs are lowered under the reform 
program, further currency deprecations provide one means 
of partly offsetting the adverse effects of tariff reductions 
on PNG industry. The government should therefore avoid 
intervening in the foreign exchange market as it did in 
1999, should the kina depreciate during the remainder of 
the tariff reform program, for to do so may compound the 
adjustment costs and threaten the reform program itself. 
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Box 4.5: Modeling the Supply Response of Devaluation of the 
Kina 
This box discussed four reputable studies that have shown 
substantial benefits to the PNG economy following the adoption of a 
more flexible exchange rate. These are: 
Study One (Woldekidan 1994) 
This modeled the short-run impact of a 10% devaluation of the kina 
under the assumptions of wage flexibility and restrictive monetary 
policy. The key findings were: 
-real GDP would increase by 2.5%; 
-real exports would increase by 5.9% and imports decrease by 5.6%; 
and 
-smallholder coffee output would increase by 7%, and smallholder 
palm oil by45%. 
Study Two (World Bank 1996) 
This study concluded that a 20% kina devaluation would increase 
average rural income by 7% and that of poor rural households by 
13-17%, due to export expansion and import substitution. 
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Box 4.5: Modeling the Supply Response of Devaluation of the 
Kina (continued) 
Study Three (Fallon, King and Zeitsch 1995) 
This modeled the short-run impact of a 20% kina devaluation while 
holding output in the smallholder sector constant and making 
‘elasticity pessimistic’ assumptions. It concluded that: 
-real GDP would increase by 1.6%; 
-real exports would increase by 1.9% and imports decline by 2.7%; 
and 
-forestry output would increase by 12.7%. 
Study Four (Duncan et al 1998) 
The study concluded that the output for key tree crops was 
responsive to prices and changes in the real kina exchange rate, 
including: 
• a 10% real depreciation is associated with a 24% expansion in 
coffee production and a 34% increase in copra; 
• the responsiveness of coffee and copra production to the 
exchange rate was indicative of significant under-utilisation of 
productive potential and a high level of pass-through of higher 
export prices to farmers (due to a competitive marketing chain 
for coffee); and 
• in contrast, cocoa production was found to be relatively 
unresponsive to changes in the real kina exchange rate because 
the heavily regulated marketing chain reduced the level of pass-
through of higher export prices to farmers. 
• Source: AusAID (1999). 
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The PNG Government has a vital role in providing good 
governance and a sound economic and political 
environment to ensure privately profitable business 
activities and investments are also socially profitable. This 
includes providing fundamental institutions and laws 
discussed elsewhere in this report, such as enforceable 
property rights, a well-functioning legal system and 
bankruptcy laws that protect creditors — actions that are 
all needed for a market economy to function efficiently. 
Underpinning this is the need for sound and stable 
macroeconomic policies.  
Thus, adopting market-friendly policies does not 
necessarily mean less government involvement. Rather it 
means governments should limit their interventions to 
ensuring the provision of essential public goods and 
offsetting the most problematic market failures and 
externalities. More specifically, the Government should: 
• take a vital, but often indirect, role in establishing 
beneficial institutions and necessary infrastructure; 
• create competitive conditions by making markets 
contestable (the credible threat of new entrants may be 
enough to ensure the incumbents behave 
competitively); 
• adopt productivity-enhancing policies, such as quality 
education, health and sound infrastructure, including in 
rural areas, and by pro-competitive microeconomic 
policy reforms; 
• ensure that property rights, including over natural 
resources such as timber, fish and minerals, are well 
established and enforced, as well as such returns being 
appropriatly taxed, for example, via measures such as 
resource rent taxes and stumpage fees designed to 
ensure sustainable management22; 
                                                          
22 Some reports suggest, for example, that PNG and the Solomon 
Islands governments have under-priced fishing and timber resources, 
and that the issuance of licences have been associated with corrupt 
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• achieve political and economic stability; and 
• ensure that the exchange rate truly reflects the nation’s 
economic fundamentals by letting it find its own level. 
Areas of future growth 
Predicting which specific productive activities will succeed 
following reforms is virtually impossible. New activities 
must evolve from the interaction of many markets. It is also 
often not clear what the effects of trade and investment 
liberalization will be on existing protected industries. 
While those that cannot compete with imports will contract 
and may close completely, some will certainly survive and 
may even prosper through rationalizing their operations, 
becoming more competitive, and possibly acquiring those 
that would otherwise close. 
The primary sector will continue for the foreseeable future 
to hold a key to the future economic development of PNG. 
Better (i.e. sustainable) economic exploitation of its 
agricultural and natural resource-based industries, of 
timber, minerals and fish, are fundamental to the 
economy’s success. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that these primary products should be fully 
processed by PNG. Resource-rich economies, such as PNG 
and the Solomon Islands, are often better off exporting raw 
or semi-processed materials for processing overseas23. 
Processing, like any activity, must be efficient if it is to add 
to national welfare (see Appendix 4). 
Since 85% of PNG’s people live in rural areas and 
agriculture is important in production and exports, it is 
central not only to national economic growth but also to 
poverty alleviation. The reforms suggested in this report 
will help to remove the disincentives currently facing 
                                                                                                                                                   
practices.  Administrative arrangements need to be transparent and 
free from political interference to reduce the risk of such practices. 
23 This is not unusual.  Successful primary-based economies all tend 
to export far greater quantities of unprocessed commodities for 
overseas processing than are processed at home. 
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farmers to invest in improving the quality of their farm 
land and to efficiently produce tree crops like cocoa, coffee, 
copra, cocoa and palm oil (Box 4.6). The government can 
play a key role by ensuring that there is sufficient funding 
for agricultural research and development and for the 
dissemination of R&D findings (Jarrett and Anderson 
1989). Equally, the government can inhibit growth by using 
protective industrialization measures such as those aimed 
at generating a domestic fishing industry or log processing, 
as practiced in PNG and other Pacific island economies 
(Box 4.7). 
 
Box 4.6: Agricultural Production in PNG 
Studies on PNG agriculture have consistently found that: 
-it is a high-cost producer of most of its agricultural 
products due to high labour, transportation, marketing and 
management costs as well as overheads; 
-smallholders are relatively more efficient than 
largeholders at producing export crops; and 
-palm oil production appears to be the most internationally 
competitive, although even that is difficult to judge as the 
government has been a joint venturer. 
Some other crops have had their competitiveness improved 
since the mid-1990s following the kina devaluations. 
However, commercial production of eggs, poultry, sugar, 
cereals, including rice, pork, and to a lesser extent beef 
remain non-competitive. Livestock industries have in the 
past been penalized by the high tariffs on imported feed 
designed to assist the domestic animal feed industry. 
Source: WTO (1999). 
 
The PNG economy is already heavily dependent on oil and 
minerals. The potential for further developing this sector is 
substantial provided PNG provides an ‘enabling’ and 
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stable environment to attract foreign investment and allow 
such large projects to develop profitably. For example, the 
propo-sal to construct a world-scale liguified natural gas 
(LNG) manufacturing plant in 2003-05 to develop the 
Hides gas field and export gas at premium prices to 
rapidly developing countries like Korea and China would 
enormously benefit the PNG economy. 
It would create some 27,000 jobs (a 10% increase), raise 
national income by as much as 10%, and boost, by as much 
as 25%, government revenue (Box 4.8). However, the 
feasibility of such a project relies heavily on the 
government adopting more market-friendly policies as 
well as improving economic governance and the basic 
infrastructure needed to facilitate private sector 
development. Such policies will also reduce the ‘enclave’ 
nature of the mining sector by encouraging foreign firms to 
have a greater presence in PNG, thereby contributing to 
the beneficial ‘flow-on’ effects from mining to the rest of 
the economy. 
Other petroleum projects are also under consideration 
which would also boost PNG development. The 
construction of a pipeline to supply gas to Queensland 
from the Kutuba and Pandora fields, is planned to 
commence by 2002, following a Memorandum of 
Understanding signed with the Queensland Government. 
Services already account for 40% of GDP in PNG. Some 
service industries could expand if reforms were put into 
place. Tourism is a good example, given PNG’s natural 
beauty, but it has stagnated because of the law and order 
problem and inadequate infrastructure. Between 1970 and 
1993, the average annual growth in tourism was -1%. It has 
been estimated that expenditure by international tourists 
equivalent to 15% of PNG’s GDP could be generated if 
these problems were overcome (Duncan and Lawson 
1997). 
 
… and services 
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Box 4.7: Economic Pitfalls of Using Trade Barriers to Achieve 
Resource and Environmental Objectives and Promote Domestic 
Processing 
It has been common practice in PNG and other Pacific island 
economies for governments to intervene using trade barriers to 
promote processing and industrialization. A variety of trade barriers 
are used for this purpose. The most common is to maintain an 
escalating tariff structure that provides higher tariff protection for 
more processed products. Despite some recent improvements, PNG 
and the Solomon Islands maintain an escalating tariff structure that 
is designed to encourage value added by providing very high 
effective rates of protection (ERP) to downstream processing. Coffee 
processing, for example, attracted an ERP of 30% in the early 1990s 
while food processing had ERPs ranging from 106% to 228% (Table 
4.1). 
Other trade barriers used to promote domestic processing of raw 
materials are export taxes and prohibitions, and domestication 
policies that promote increased domestic participation in the 
industry through investment and licensing controls. PNG and the 
Solomon Islands, for example, maintain export taxes on 
unprocessed logs and intend to prohibit log exports. Similarly, the 
principal objective of fishery policy in these and most other island 
economies is to ‘domesticate’ the industry through discriminatory 
investment and licensing policies aimed at encouraging local fishing 
fleets and downstream processing. PNG and other members of the 
Forum Fisheries Agency ban high seas transshipment and impose 
mandatory requirements on them to use designated ports and use of 
domestic facilities. Moreover, domestic fishing fleets receive 
preferential access to fishing licenses. 
However, such domestication policies may raise efficiency concerns 
if such activity is not economically viable. Imposing mandatory port 
requirements on foreign fishing fleets is effectively placing local 
content plans on them requiring them to source a share of their 
inputs domestically in return for access to fishing rights.  
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Box 4.7: Economic Pitfalls of Using Trade Barriers to Achieve 
Resource and Environmental Objectives and Promote Domestic 
Processing (continued) 
Current policies in PNG favour the high risk option of potentially 
larger but highly uncertain gains from ‘domestication’ of the tuna 
industry (which may be inefficient) over smaller but more certain 
benefits from collecting access license fees from foreign vessels. 
Imposing mandatory requirements on foreign operators that raise 
their costs risks inefficiently dissipating the rent premium paid on 
fishing licenses. If this happens, island economies could end up 
receiving lower access fees from foreign vessels. 
Similarly, the efficacy of using export taxes or prohibitions on round 
logs promote processing is questionable on economic grounds. 
Taxing or prohibiting exports of unprocessed logs assists 
downstream processing by diverting export sales on to the home 
market. The domestic price is thus reduced by the export restriction, 
providing an implicit subsidy to processors and penalizing raw 
material suppliers. Domestic prices would be expected to fall by the 
full amount of the export tax, or where the taxes are prohibitive or 
export of the logs banned, by a potentially larger amount. Because 
export restrictions lower input prices, they can provide substantial 
effective rates of assistance to value added by downstream 
processors. This is particular the case for processed wood products 
that also receive a high level of tariff protection. Indeed, if the 
implicit input subsidy and tariffs become large enough, the 
downstream processed activity may subtract, rather than add, value. 
Such inefficient processing would be economically undesirable and 
would risk frittering away the economy’s natural resources without 
any lasting benefit to the country. This is particularly the case for 
plywood and other laminated boards in PNG, which continue to be 
subject to high tariffs of currently 95% (down from 100%) while also 
benefiting from the export restriction on logs. This is not to argue 
against sound environmental policies for fishing or logging, but 
rather to argue for the use of more-efficient measures to achieve 
those (and perhaps tax revenue-raising) objectives. 
Source: WTO (1999). 
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Box 4.8: Mineral Development in PNG 
The LNG project proposed by the BP-Esso-Oil Search consortium 
would be the biggest resource development project ever undertaken 
in PNG. It involves K3.3 billion being spent on a gas field at Hides, 
pipelines to Kutubu and Wewak, a central processing facility at 
Tagari, and a large LNG plant and wharf at Wewak. It would have 
far-reaching direct and indirect benefits on the PNG economy, 
raising national income by some 5-10%. Jobs would be increased by 
25% and additional exports generated of up to K1.7 billion.  
However, PNG’s economic policies must be sufficiently flexible to 
enable such development since such a large resource project is likely 
to reduce or ‘crowd out’ the growth prospects of other industries, 
including the agriculture sector, through exchange rate effects — the 
so-called ‘Dutch disease.’ The project’s development will also 
require the PNG Government to ensure an expansion of skilled 
labour and to provide the necessary roads and other infrastructure 
needed for the project. A vital aspect will also be the certainty with 
which developers are provided mining rights by the government 
through agreements with landowners and stability of the taxation 
arrangements. Appropriate environmental regulations will also 
need to be determined and applied with certainty. 
The Dutch disease is a term coined by economists to describe a 
situation encountered by the Netherlands following development of 
new natural gas reserves in the North Sea. Development of these 
fields was associated with depressed performance of the 
manufacturing sector, and has since been found to occur in many 
other resource-rich countries, such as Britain, Norway, Australia, 
Mexico and PNG. 
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Box 4.8: Mineral Development in PNG (continued) 
The Dutch disease stems from the exchange rate effects on the rest of 
the economy of large mineral exports and inflows of foreign direct 
investment needed to develop substantial resource projects. These 
inflows appreciate the country’s exchange rate thereby reducing the 
international competitiveness of manufactured and other ‘traded’ 
goods (including agriculture), both in export markets and 
domestically against imports. Resources flow out of these sectors 
into the mineral sector and non-traded activities, such as services, 
and manufacturing contracts. The extent to which the mineral sector 
attracts labour and capital away from manufacturing by bidding up 
wages and interest rates will depend upon whether or not it is an 
‘enclave’ activity. 
Catching the Dutch disease is not necessarily a problem. However a 
relatively small industrial sector is likely to be a natural outcome of 
having a rich resource base. Thus, efforts to control the exchange 
rate or to promote industrialization through import protection are 
likely to be counterproductive. Resources must come from 
somewhere else in the economy if the mining sector is to expand as 
a ‘non-enclave’ activity. There is nothing inherently right or wrong 
about shifting resources from manufacturing into mining. A 
contracting manufacturing sector can be associated with strong 
growth in other sectors and should not therefore be seen as an 
undesirable outcome. 
Source: WTO (1999) and CIE (1997). 
5 
How can WTO help boost Pacific 
Island development? 
Good governance as well as widespread economic reforms, 
including trade and investment liberalization, are essential 
to PNG’s and the region’s long term economic prosperity. 
Past policies, based on selective protection and state 
intervention, have clearly not worked in terms of 
generating economic growth and sustainable development. 
To what extent can compliance with WTO commitments 
benefit PNG and other Pacific island governments to 
perform better, and what political costs are involved? 
Answering that question requires assessing the extent to 
which WTO membership can make it easier for 
governments to deliver domestic reforms. 
The fact that almost 140 countries are WTO members, and 
that the number is increasing rapidly with 30 developing 
and transition economies currently in the queue to join, are 
clear indications that most governments see it in their own 
interests to join the WTO.  
The WTO’s predecessor, the GATT, was formed in 1948 as 
a means of countering the spread of protectionism that 
threatened to sub-divide the world into trading blocs and 
to undermine world economic prosperity (see Appendix 3 
for details). Its long-term objective is a more open global 
trading system based on freer trade whereby disputes are 
settled multilaterally. 
The WTO is based on multilateral reductions in protection. 
This can be contrasted with APEC, for example, which 
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relies on members unilaterally lowering protection in a co-
ordinated but voluntary framework (see Chapter 6). 
Approaches to reform 
There are two possible approaches available to PNG and 
all governments to reforming trade and protection policies. 
They can introduce such policies unilaterally, in other 
words, on their own accord irrespective of external 
developments. Alternatively, they can negotiate such 
reductions multilaterally within the WTO by undertaking 
binding commitments not to apply non-tariff measures and 
to progressively reduce tariff levels. 
Since trade policy is set at home by governments 
responding to domestic political pressures, unilateral 
measures are the most effective means of implementing 
trade reforms. Thus, the PNG government could effectively 
go ahead and implement trade reforms without the WTO. 
Indeed, this is what PNG has done recently with the 
current tariff reform program. 
Having said that, however, the WTO can provide an 
effective means of complementing unilateral trade reforms. 
WTO membership provides an additional reason for 
governments to apply sound economic policy making. 
Governments are required to make binding policy 
commitments, which then provide a means of resisting 
domestic lobbying pressures for protection. By choosing to 
make international commitments with the WTO, a country 
can ‘lock in’ its unilateral reforms as a means of limiting 
future policy backsliding. It is also often easier for 
governments to sell such reforms at home when they can 
show that similar foreign producers are also being affected, 
and that such reforms will benefit exporters by securing 
greater market access to overseas markets. This is 
particularly important for countries like PNG that have 
weak economic governance and find it difficult to 
implement on their own accord sustainable trade reforms. 
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However, while members take on board a number of 
fundamental commitments on how to conduct trade policy 
when joining the WTO, several individual commitments, 
such as on tariff levels and services liberalization, are 
negotiated individually either as part of their accession or 
during consecutive rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations. Thus, the effectiveness of a member’s WTO 
commitments in promoting domestic reform will also 
depend on the strength of its obligations. Modest 
commitments on tariffs, for example, may appear to be a 
good negotiated outcome for a government from a 
domestic political viewpoint, but the downside for the 
economy is that it provides future governments greater 
scope to protect domestic industries, thereby undermining 
the very useful disciplinary role that that WTO 
membership can play.  
Mere membership of the WTO will not produce automatic 
results, however. Governments must still ‘do the hard 
yards’ at home in promoting economic reforms. The 
institutional setup at home, which determines the 
interaction between a member’s government and the WTO, 
has an important bearing on whether such membership 
can be effective in promoting domestic economic reforms.  
Trade departments are usually responsible for a country’s 
WTO membership and its rights and obligations. However, 
they themselves can become an obstacle to trade reforms 
by supporting protectionist policies that are seen to be 
holding onto their power base domestically, or a means of 
retaining ‘negotiating coin’ in future multilateral rounds24. 
Setting good trade policy requires an economy-wide 
perspective that distances itself from narrower sectoral 
interests. Therefore, placing trade and sectoral 
                                                          
24 It should be remembered that trade negotiations over tariffs are on 
‘bound’ duty rates and not actual applied rates.  (During the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, every government tabled a Schedule of tariff 
rates for each good traded, and they are then obliged not to raise the 
tariff on that good above the rate in their particular Schedule.) Thus, 
lowering applied levels need not undermine a member’s tariff 
negotiating position; on the contrary, it may even strengthen it. 
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responsibilities together within one Trade and Industry 
ministry, as is frequently the case and as was done recently 
in PNG, may raise concerns that trade policy will become 
subservient to narrow industry interests at the expense of 
broader national welfare. 
Benefits of WTO to PNG and other Pacific island 
economies 
Like all WTO members, PNG has agreed to implement its 
trade policies in accordance with WTO rules that have been 
negotiated by members. These rules amount to 
commitments or obligations by the membership. Thus, the 
WTO functions primarily as a rules-based system designed 
to make the global trading environment more predictable 
and liberal. Establishing ‘trading rules of the game’ 
facilitates international trade and helps safeguard the 
interests of all trading nations, whether small or large. 
Thus, the WTO is effectively the umpire of the multilateral 
trading system. 
The latest WTO agreements were negotiated during the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 
concluded in 1994. These strengthened existing disciplines 
on the use of trade measures, including tariff reductions, 
and introduced new substantive disciplines in agriculture, 
services, textiles and intellectual property rights. 
WTO can assist domestic policy reform 
The WTO is based on a number of fundamental general 
principles that are central to good trade and economic 
policy reform. Each WTO member is committed to 
ensuring that its trade policies meet these principles. In so 
doing, the multilateral trading system is strengthened and 
all members improve their own economic welfare when all 
adopt sound open market policies. Because individual 
policy reforms are being taken multilaterally by all 
members, the economic benefits accruing to each member 
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from its reforms are much greater than if each country 
acted alone.  
However, what might seem like the reverse of the above, 
that individual economies do not benefit from trade 
reforms if other countries do not also reform, is false. In 
fact most of the benefit from multilateral reform comes 
from reducing one’s own trade distortionary measures, so 
it follows that that large proportion of the gains will still be 
enjoyed if other countries do not at the same time change 
their policies. 
Trade barriers should be non-discriminatory 
The cornerstone of the GATT/WTO is that a country’s 
trade barriers should not discriminate between where the 
import is sourced. In other words, if PNG provides a lower 
tariff to imports from a certain country then this rate 
should apply to all of PNG’s trading partners. Ensuring 
that its trade measures and tariff reforms conform to this 
principle is consistent with PNG achieving maximum 
economic benefits from trade reforms. 
The problem with discriminatory liberalization that 
provides lower tariffs to imports from certain sources is 
that such preferential treatment may distort imports by 
PNG away from the most efficient world supplier. If such 
trade diversion predominates, national welfare will be 
reduced. What is needed to raise national welfare is trade 
creation, whereby domestic production is replaced by 
cheaper imports, rather than simply replacing general-
sourced imports with preferential imports. PNG’s tariff 
reform program is based on most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
liberalization, MFN meaning that whatever tariff applies to 
one trading partner’s exports must apply to all WTO 
members’ exports of that or ‘like’ products to PNG. 
The GATT does permit certain exceptions to MFN 
liberalization, especially for developing countries. The 
main one is to allow members to form among themselves 
discriminatory free trade areas (FTAs) or custom unions 
Individual 
countries gain 
from reforming 
even if others 
remain
protectionist
Most-favoured-
nation (MFN) 
treatment is 
essential for 
fairness
Trade creation 
improves
efficiency,
while trade 
diversion may 
not
MFN
exceptions are 
permitted
85How can WTO help boost Pacific Island development?
 104 
whereby members accord each other preferential market 
access. This permission reflects the recognition by the WTO 
that such arrangements may benefit members by being 
trade creating, or can provide the basis for future wider 
liberalization by participants. But to improve the likelihood 
of such benefits, the GATT in principle requires that such 
preferential arrangements among members meet certain 
conditions, namely, that they apply to ‘substantially all 
trade’, they provide full preferences, and that trade barriers 
are not raised against non-participants. While not 
foolproof, meeting these conditions increase the likelihood 
that such arrangements will be on balance trade creating. 
Regional FTA arrangements involving developing 
countries are not, however, required to meet these 
arrangements due to the existence of the so-called 
‘enabling clause’ within the WTO. 
PNG and other Pacific island economies are members of 
several such regional arrangements, including the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), the South Pacific 
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(SPARTECA), and the Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade 
and Commercial Relations Agreement (PACTRA). As well, 
a free trade area is currently being negotiated between 
(South Pacific) Forum Island Countries. Although not 
technically required by the WTO for arrangements 
involving developing countries because of the ‘enabling 
clause’, it is wise to make the product coverage of any such 
arrangement as wide as possible, to increase the likelihood 
that members will benefit from trade creation dominating 
trade diversion. However, the similarity of Pacific island 
economies means that such arrangements between them 
are likely to provide only negligible benefits relative to 
multilateral liberalization, and may in fact make some 
members, such as the Solomon Islands, worse off (Box 5.1). 
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Box 5.1: Proposed Preferential Free-Trade Area (FTA) Among 
Forum Island Countries 
Trade ministers recently endorsed in principle the formation of a WTO-
consistent free-trade area (FTA) among PNG and other FICs. This would 
initially cover goods, and exclude Australia and New Zealand, although the 
long-term integration with CER is to be examined. A draft framework is to be 
negotiated based on a negative list of exemptions so that it can operate for 
tariffs in 2001. 
The costs and benefits of establishing a preferential FTA among FICs were 
examined in a study commissioned by the South Pacific Forum Secretariat. 
Another study also looked at the impact of a larger free-trade area between 
FICs involving Australia and New Zealand. 
The economic benefits of a preferential FTA fundamentally depend upon 
whether it creates trade among members or simply diverts trade. While 
additional unassisted exports between partners will be beneficial, the case of 
increased imports is ambiguous. Trade diversion occurs when a preferential 
FTA leads to switching imports from third countries to partners, usually less 
efficient producers. Trade creation occurs when increased imports from 
member countries replace less efficient domestic production rather than 
displacing imports from third countries. While both will enhance regional trade 
among members, only when it is trade creating will there be genuine trade 
liberalization and welfare gains to members. Such gains will be illusory where 
trade diversion predominates, and may even reduce members’ welfare. 
Trade theory suggests that a preferential FTA among small countries with 
similar economic characteristics will have small or even negative net welfare 
effects. The empirical study by Scollay (1998) estimated small economic gains to 
most Forum island countries from an FTA among FICs, Cook Islands, Kiribati, 
Samoa and Tuvalu being made worse off. PNG was found to receive a tiny 
increase in GDP of 0.03%. It concluded that modest economic gains would 
accrue to all FICs only if the FTA was accompanied by an overall 25% MFN 
tariff cut. It thus confirmed the crucial importance to PNG and other FICs of 
non-preferential liberalization in securing economic benefits.  
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Box 5.1: Proposed Preferential Free-Trade Area (FTA) Among 
Forum Island Countries (continued) 
The inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the FTA among FICs would 
increase considerably the economic benefits to all FICs: greater liberalization, 
and hence trade creation, would be associated with increased imports from 
more efficient Australian and New Zealand sources. PNG’s GDP would 
increase by almost 1.5%, equivalent to an expected annual gain of K 78 million. 
Although economic gains to PNG are increased substantially with the inclusion 
of Australia and New Zealand, they remain less than those available to PNG 
from substantial MFN liberalization. 
It is often claimed that a FTA among FICs could provide a first step to wider 
trade liberalization, and encourage greater cohesion among members. 
However, the evidence is ambiguous. Foroutan (1998) urges caution in 
believing that regional trading pacts among developing countries lead to more 
liberal trading regimes. His analysis suggests that a FTA is neither a necessary 
nor sufficient condition for an open and liberal trading regime. Moreover, since 
a predominantly trade diverting FTA means that some members gain only at 
the expense of other partners, such arrangements may in fact undermine 
regional relations. Thus, any FTA would need to be strongly oriented towards 
further multilateral liberalization, supported by a set of well defined measures. 
It must also be remembered that the above studies may overstate the economic 
benefits from a FTA among FICs. This is because experience with negotiating 
FTAs demonstrates clearly that if pursued for their own sake they are likely to 
end up being very discriminatory, by either excluding key products, or even 
reducing third-party access through adopting convoluted rules-of-origin 
requirements or due to the differential effects of other non-tariff barriers. These 
results are likely to increase the chances of FTAs being trade diverting, and 
welfare reducing on balance. 
Care is needed to ensure that any FTA among PNG and other FICs is concluded 
in a way that promotes overall trade openness and does not frustrate MFN 
liberalization. If not, then it could be questionable whether the formation of 
such an FTA is worth the substantial administrative costs members would have 
to incur to service the agreement, or indeed would be making best use of the 
Forum Secretariat’s financial and other resources. 
Source: WTO (1999). 
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Empirical studies demonstrate that discriminatory regional 
arrangements provide at most ‘second best’ benefits to a 
country compared to MFN liberalization, and may even 
make some participants worse off. This is necessarily so 
when the trade liberalization under a FTA is with only a 
subset of countries, compared with a MFN liberalization 
which avoids the risk of trade diversion by applying any 
tariff cut equally to all potential providers. Wider 
liberalization by all participants should therefore always be 
an objective of any regional arrangement. Members should 
be encouraged to also reduce MFN trade barriers to the 
rest of the world. The narrower the product coverage 
negotiated — that is, the larger the negative list of products 
covered— the less the benefits (since the chances of the 
agreement being predominantly trade diverting are 
thereby increased). Negotiated outcomes from such 
arrangements are often narrower than intended. For 
example, there is evidence that the MSG Agreement 
involving PNG has generated few gains to members and is 
predominantly trade diverting, leading to the possibility of 
economic losses (Box 5.2). 
Regional free trade areas among developing countries have 
not been associated with more-liberal trading regimes, and 
they constitute neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for an open and liberal trade regime (Foroutan 
1998). If pursued for their own sake, such arrangements 
can end up excluding key (i.e., highly protected sensitive) 
products and be trade diversionary. Only where there has 
been a prior commitment to more liberal trade has such 
arrangements expanded trade. Thus, PNG and other 
members should not see the creation of regional free trade 
areas as an alternative to multilateral liberalization. 
Instead, it would be more appropriate to think of them as 
but a stepping stone to achieving that broader 
liberalization. The APEC model of ‘open regionalism’ 
could avoid these pitfalls, and provides a preferred means 
of encouraging regional trade (see Chapter 6).
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Box 5.2: The MSG Trade Agreement 
A recent study has estimated that the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG) Trade Agreement has been primarily trade 
diverting (Economic Insights 1999). Trade diversion has 
occurred in all main products traded under the MSG, namely 
fresh, chilled, and frozen beef; pasta and noodles; and cement. 
The only product experiencing trade creation was found to be 
coffee, while for canned meat and fish there was a mix of trade 
diversion and trade creation. This is because governments have 
negotiated the agreement to avoid providing tariff reductions 
on goods produced locally that may be threatened by 
concessional imports. 
On this basis, it was concluded that the Agreement has had a 
small impact on MSG economies, most likely reducing their 
combined GDP by 0.03%. The upper range was an increase in 
GDP of 0.02%. 
It is likely that Vanuatu and possibly Papua New Guinea would 
have gained most from the agreement at the expense of the 
Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands is estimated to have 
borne a high share of the costs imposed by trade diversion. 
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu on the other hand are 
estimated to have gained from an expansion in exports. These 
benefits are estimated to have outweighed the cost to these 
economies of trade diversion on other commodities. 
Source: WTO (1999).
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Trade restrictions should operate at the border 
Another cornerstone of the GATT is that trade barriers 
should operate at the border, such that internal regulations, 
taxes and quantitative measures should not favour 
domestic producers over importers. It is in the economic 
interests not only of its trading partners but also of the 
WTO member itself that domestic internal measures do not 
discriminate against imports by favouring domestic 
products. Otherwise, such measures, often non-
transparent, will become disguised forms of protection. It 
is important that PNG remove such impediments to 
imports and ensure that reductions in border protection are 
not compensated for or frustrated by discriminatory 
measures operating internally. Such measures are against 
the GATT’s Article III on national treatment obligations. 
This has the desired effect of preventing domestic taxes 
from also having a protective element. If domestic 
commodity taxes, such as sales, excise and value added 
taxes, are applied at a higher rate to imported than 
domestic goods, then the extent of this difference amounts 
to an additional tariff. Just as tariffs are an economically 
inefficient means of raising government revenue, so too are 
discriminatory commodity taxes an inefficient means of 
delivering protection. 
PNG’s program of funding its tariff reform program by 
introducing a 10% VAT and extending the coverage of 
excise duties to replace tariffs on so-called luxury items, 
such as up to 110% on motor vehicles which are now free 
of tariff, is consistent with these principles. Taxes, 
including VAT and excise duties, are used to raise revenue 
and therefore have been applied equally to domestic and 
imported goods. Tariffs are used to protect industries and 
these have been retained where such protection was 
deemed warranted by the Government. While both tariffs 
and domestic taxes raise domestic and imported prices, 
tariffs discriminate against imports, thereby assisting home 
producers by enabling domestic sales at a higher price. For 
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taxes, the additional price on both imports and the 
domestic product accrue to the government as revenue. 
The reformed tax structure should therefore enhance 
PNG’s economic efficiency. 
High excise taxes on inputs, especially fuels, can however 
be detrimental to the economy. For example, PNG recently 
increased excise duties on petrol, as a means of recouping 
revenue from road users for road repair. While this makes 
economic sense provided the tax rate correctly reflects 
these costs, fuels are a substantial input as well into off-
road uses. For example, village fishermen that use small 
‘banana boats’ to catch fresh fish for sale in local markets, 
such as in Lae, use petrol as an input but receive no excise 
relief. Thus, for these operations, the excise duties tax 
production and impose an additional cost impost on these 
activities. That cost impost is likely to be shared between 
fishermen and fish consumers in paying higher prices. The 
success of the Samoan alia fishery, which is also based on 
small boats, provides an example of how important such 
small fishing industries can be for island development (Box 
5.3). Moreover, the payment of excise duties on fuels by 
other off-road users, such as for commercial fishing, 
farming, mining and industrial purposes, is also taxing 
these activities. 
Similarly, the extension of excise taxes in PNG to luxury 
goods may also tax producers that use these goods as 
inputs. While for most goods this is not a problem since 
they are clearly consumer and not producer goods, a few 
goods can be both. The main example is motor cars. They 
are also an important input into many services and other 
productive activities. Since such users are not entitled to 
any relief of excise duties, high excise taxes on new and 
reconditioned cars are a substantial penalty on these 
activities. Moreover, although the tax does not apply to 
used cars, raising the price of new cars will also increase 
used-car prices, such that producers using cars as an input 
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cannot escape the penalty by purchasing second-hand 
vehicles25. 
 
Box 5.3: The Samoan Alia Fishing Industry 
One promising development in the pacific islands is the 
emergence of the Samoan alia fishery. Its growth 
demonstrates that fishing industries can develop with little 
or no support provided markets can be found. This 
industry is based on small vessels using long lines that 
operate daily from Apia. Initially, the industry targeted 
catching yellowfin and bigeye tuna for the Japanese and 
US sashimi markets, but for about five years has 
concentrated on albacore tuna to supply the Pago Pago 
cannery in American Samoa. Tuna is sold to marketers 
who blast freeze the tuna and ship it to the cannery in 
freezer containers. The size of the fleet is approaching 200 
vessels, employing an estimated crew of 700, with an 
estimated annual catch of over 2,000 tonnes. 
However, as much as 20per cent of the catch delivered to 
the cannery is rejected due to poor quality. The reasons for 
this high rejection rate need to be investigated. Another 
major concern is the safety of fishermen. Most boats carry 
only rudimentary safety equipment and many of the crew 
are untrained in deep-sea fishing. 
Source: Duncan, Cuthbertson and Bosworth (1999). 
 
                                                          
25 If such ‘luxury’ taxes are needed for the government to be seen to be getting tax revenue 
from wealthy households, perhaps exemptions for legitimate business users could be 
introduced. 
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Tariffs should be preferred to quantitative import 
restrictions  
Fundamental to the GATT is that if members insist on 
retaining import barriers, they should rely on tariffs rather 
than non-tariff measures to deliver that import protection. 
Thus, the GATT in principle proscribes against the use of 
quantitative trade restrictions and other measures 
restricting imports but allows countries to use tariffs as a 
legitimate exception to national treatment. Thus, PNG and 
other members are not prevented by the WTO from 
providing protection, but rather its rules aim at limiting 
such protection to tariff measures, since they are more 
transparent than quantitative trade barriers.  
The GATT prohibits the use of quantitative import and 
export restrictions such as quotas on trade volumes, 
including bans (subject to certain exceptions). Where they 
do apply as exceptions, members are required to 
administer them in a transparent and non-discriminatory 
manner.  
One of the key aspects of re-incorporating agriculture into 
the multilateral system by the negotiation of the 
Agreement on Agriculture during the Uruguay Round was 
to prohibit the use of non-tariff measures, including import 
quotas, variable import levies and discretionary import 
licensing. Such measures have since been converted to 
tariffs (the process being called tarrification). This reflects a 
recognition that non-tariff measures dominated agriculture 
protection and that there would be major advantages to the 
trading system and to individual members from replacing 
such non-transparent measures with tariffs. Members 
agreed to bind these rates and to reduce them on an 
unweighted basis over the implementation period, by an 
average of 36% for developed countries by 2000 and by 
24% for developing countries by 2004. 
The Uruguay Round also prohibited the use of so-called 
‘grey area’ measures, such as voluntary export restraints 
agreed to by exporting countries at the behest of 
governments of importing countries. Again, this was 
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motivated by the desire to remove these non-transparent 
and highly distorting and discriminatory measures. 
PNG and other Pacific island economies use tariffs as the 
main instrument of protection. PNG had already 
effectively tariffied non-tariff measures by the mid-1990s. 
Many of the higher areas of protection in PNG were 
initially provided in the form of import bans and other 
quantitative restrictions, but these were replaced by tariffs. 
In so far as PNG and other island economies wish to 
continue to rely on tariffs to protect industries, these 
should be lowered and, as much as is politically possible, 
made more uniform in order to improve economic 
efficiency. 
The GATT provides for members to bind by negotiation 
their tariffs on a line-by-line basis. By binding tariff rates, 
members commit to limiting tariff rates in future to a 
maximum rate set by the bound level. This rate can vary 
between tariff lines and applies to those lines nominated by 
the member. Most members, including PNG, have adopted 
‘ceiling’ bindings on many products whereby the bound 
rate was above the existing rate. Over time, members agree 
to increase the product coverage of the bindings and to 
reduce bound levels. During the Uruguay Round, the 
coverage of tariff bindings was increased considerably and 
members agreed to reduce average bound tariffs 
substantially. 
Since tariffs cannot be increased above bound rates (except 
by negotiating compensation for affected trading partners), 
by binding its tariffs PNG has increased certainty for 
traders and investors. However, the effectiveness of 
bindings at limiting policy backsliding depends upon the 
gap between existing applied rates and bound rates. 
If a government feels compelled to backslide, the existence 
of bindings may force it to resort to other measures, and 
those other measures may be even more distorting than 
those disallowed under WTO rules. However, this is not an 
argument for not binding or for binding at well above 
existing tariff levels, since such circumstances will rarely 
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occur. A maximum gap of 10% between applied and 
bound levels should offer governments plenty of scope to 
increase tariffs in future should the political need arise. 
PNG bound its entire tariff schedule during the Uruguay 
Round, mainly at ceiling rates of 45% for agricultural 
products and 40% for manufactured products. Some rates 
were bound at higher levels of mainly 55%, 75% and 100% 
for products such as sugar and certain vegetable oils. The 
existing tariff reform program and the reductions 
envisaged to a maximum rate of 40% by 2006 will satisfy its 
WTO commitments, although during the reform program 
tariffs on a few products will be above the bound level 
(WTO 1999). The Government of PNG should ensure in 
future that bound levels with the WTO are reduced in line 
with applied existing tariffs, and that no applied tariff 
exceeds its bindings. 
The Solomon Islands bound its entire tariff at ceiling rates 
well above existing levels, of up to 150%, but mainly at 
80%. Unlike PNG, the generally large gap between bound 
and actual levels in the Solomon Islands means that 
implementation of the negotiated reductions in bound 
tariffs is likely to have little direct effect on lowering 
applied tariffs. Thus, its commitments place less of a 
discipline on future tariff levels than do those for PNG.  
Fiji bound most of its agricultural tariffs, but only about 
two-fifths of its non-agricultural tariff lines. Most items 
bound were at a ceiling rate of 40%, which is generally well 
above applied rates. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs) confirmed that local-content and similar 
provisions violated national treatment and that 
arrangements limiting imports to the level of exports are 
inconsistent with GATT provisions prohibiting 
quantitative restrictions. Once again, these are outlawed 
and should be avoided by PNG and other Pacific island 
economies because such policies protect domestic 
industries and therefore distort resource-use efficiency.  
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Contingent protection should be used sparingly 
The GATT does allow numerous so-called ‘escape clauses’ 
or contingency provisions to enable members to increase 
tariffs above their bound levels in certain limited 
circumstances. However, because excessive use or abuse of 
these provisions would undermine the world trading 
system and provide little discipline on members using 
trade measures to protect domestic industries, efforts have 
been made to constrain their use by placing on them 
certain conditions. The Uruguay Round introduced tighter 
conditions and procedures on the use of these 
arrangements. Nevertheless, it is generally agreed among 
trade economists that their application is still too loose and 
that tighter disciplines are needed to constrain their use. 
They were intended to allow governments to provide 
short-term increases in temporary protection, rather than 
as a loophole in the system for invoking continual 
protection in excess of members' commitments.  
Subject to the conditions and procedures specified in the 
respective agreements, the GATT permits PNG and other 
Pacific island economies to temporarily raise tariffs above 
their bindings, or take some other action such as to impose 
import quotas, where it can be established that: 
• the country is experiencing temporary and severe 
balance of payments difficulties; 
• anti-dumping action will be against so-called ‘dumped’ 
imports that are being exported at prices below their 
normal value at home and are causing or threatening to 
cause ‘material’ injury to local industries in the 
importing country; and/or  
• safeguard action will be against imports that are causing 
or threatening to cause ‘serious’ injury to domestic 
industries. 
Anti-dumping action is allowed and can be applied by any 
member, including PNG and other Pacific island 
economies, provided certain conditions are met. Such 
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action must follow an objective and transparent 
investigation into whether the imports are being ‘dumped’ 
and are causing or threatening ‘material’ injury to domestic 
competing industries. PNG and some other Pacific island 
economies do have anti-dumping provisions in their 
customs regulations. In the case of PNG, for example, these 
provisions have only been used once so far. The case 
involved cement, where it was held that dumping was 
occurring and an anti-dumping levy recommended; but 
the government has not yet imposed such a levy. The PNG 
Government has recently changed the administrative 
arrangements for anti-dumping and singled greater use of 
such provisions against dumped products (WTO 1999). In 
doing so, it would be in PNG’s interests to change its 
arrangements to be fully compatible with the WTO 
requirements.  
However, it should be kept in mind that using such anti-
dumping action and other measures of contingent 
protection is optional in the WTO. While such trade 
remedies are available for coping with exceptional 
circumstances, their continued use to overcome a balance 
of payments problem or as an anti-dumping measure 
makes no economic sense. Similarly, continually using 
safeguard action is likely to be counterproductive for the 
economy concerned. 
If taking such action, the measures taken should be 
consistent with WTO provisions. That places some limits 
on their use and makes them transparent. However, since 
evidence suggests that the use of such arrangements are 
inadequately controlled by WTO disciplines, it would be in 
PNG‘s economic interests if it also took steps to ensure that 
such action did not undermine its liberalization efforts. 
Safeguard action against imports is always preferable 
economically to anti-dumping action, but it too can be 
abused and used excessively to provide protection. 
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Customs procedures should not restrict imports 
A basic thrust of the GATT/WTO rules concerning 
customs procedures is that they should be transparent and 
not an additional barrier to imports. Thus, the WTO 
Agreement on Customs Valuation specifies that the 
transaction value method should be used for customs 
valuation, and specifies alternative valuation methods to 
be followed when this is infeasible. This improves the 
transparency of these arrangements and prohibits the use 
of minimum import prices as a means of protecting 
domestic producers. Using such ‘inflated’ import prices by 
customs to assess duty may in practice become a de facto 
means of effectively raising tariff protection. Governments 
may continue to use pre-shipment inspection services but 
are required to implement the Agreement on Pre-shipment 
Inspection Services to ensure that such services facilitate 
and not restrict trade. To encourage compliance, 
developing countries were given until 2000 (and for some 
provisions until 2003) to meet their customs commitments. 
PNG is implementing the customs requirements of the 
WTO (and it joined the World Customs Organization in 
1998 too). It is clearly in the country’s own interests to 
ensure that custom clearance operations work smoothly 
and do not become an additional impediment to trade. 
Long delays in clearing imports through customs can be a 
major obstacle to development. They also can be a major 
source of corruption. PNG currently uses six customs 
valuation methods, the main one being the transaction 
value method, which requires that the import price not be 
influenced by the relationship between buyer and seller. 
This is the export price paid by the importer adjusted in 
accordance with the customs legislation. The other 
valuation methods permitted in the legislation are 
"deductive", "similar", "identical", "computed" calculations, 
and as a last resort the "fallback" measure. Where a 
customs valuation is in dispute, the goods can be cleared 
provisionally if the importer lodges either a bank 
guarantee or cash deposit as security. PNG does not set 
any minimum import or reference prices for customs 
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valuation. However, the fallback value method, the 
valuation method of last resort, applies certain set values 
(WTO 1999).  
The Solomon Islands intends to meet the requirements of 
the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement by 2002, and is 
currently using a valuation method for customs purposes 
consistent with the Brussels Definition of Value (WTO 
1998b). It is also considering the introduction of pre-
shipment inspection services. Fiji adopted the WTO’s 
valuation methods from 1997 when it replaced the Brussels 
Definition of Value, but it does not use pre-shipment 
inspection. 
Resolving trade disputes according to 
internationally-set rules 
By agreeing internationally on the WTO’s multilateral 
rules, such as the most-favoured-nation principle and 
national treatment, the GATT/WTO has established an 
important framework in which global trade can be 
facilitated and disputes resolved. Having these rules 
protects the interests of all WTO members, but in particular 
they safeguard the welfare of small and weak nations, such 
as PNG and other Pacific island economies, against 
possible trade discriminatory policy actions by large and 
powerful economies.  
Without such a rules-based multilateral system, small 
countries would have no option but to deal with large 
countries bilaterally. This would expose small countries to 
the possibility of one-sided outcomes against their own 
best interests. While a few large countries may have 
sufficient market power to influence their terms of trade by 
individually taxing imports and exports, trade theory 
shows that the rest of the world would be made worse off 
by these trade barriers. Moreover, if many countries 
followed this route, everybody could be made worse off.  
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Similarly, without such rules, it would be easy for large 
countries to enter bilateral trade agreements with each 
other with total disregard for the trade interests of small 
nations. Powerful nations could, for example, bilaterally 
agree to exclude exports from smaller countries in 
preference to each other’s exports. 
While it is often alleged that WTO membership by 
developing countries facilitates ‘exploitation’ of them by 
developed economies, the opposite is the case in reality. 
Developing countries risk greater exploitation by 
remaining outside the WTO. As a WTO member, 
developing countries receive the protection offered by the 
multilateral system. Developing countries, working 
individually or in cohort with other members that have 
similar interests, can effectively influence these rules and 
the operations of the WTO. The Cairns Group on 
agriculture is a good example of how a diverse group of 
countries with a common trade interest, in this case the 
liberalization of agricultural trade, can collectively 
influence WTO outcomes. 
True, there has been a lot of criticism recently from 
developing countries about the extent to which they are 
influencing outcomes at the WTO. Some of that criticism is 
well justified. However, the current situation is very much 
a consequence of the relatively passive role developing 
countries played in the Uruguay Round. Now that such a 
large number of them are WTO members, with more than 
30 others seeking to join, their scope for influencing WTO 
processes is steadily growing. The World Bank, and others 
such as the United Kingdom’s technical cooperation 
Minister, are pushing strongly in support of efforts to 
ensure that the next multilateral round is a ‘development 
round’ that gives much more weight than previous rounds 
to developing countries’ concerns. Certainly there are 
economies of size in participating, which makes it difficult 
for tiny economies such as those in the South Pacific to do 
as much as larger nations (Michalopoulos 1998). But there 
are also ways of overcoming such constraints, including 
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being represented as a regional grouping -- as ASEAN and 
the EU members tend to do. 
The WTO provides for an effective means of multilaterally 
resolving trade disputes in accordance with the 
internationally agreed rules. Members agree not to resolve 
disputes unilaterally, but rather to seek recourse through 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body and to abide by its 
rules and findings. The process therefore protects the 
interests of third countries not directly involved in the 
dispute. The emphasis is on resolution by negotiation and 
mediation but, failing this, the complaining country may 
take the case to a legal ruling by a panel. 
Panel decisions, which may be appealed once to the 
Appellate Body, are now effectively binding on all WTO 
members. Prior to the Uruguay Round, the process enabled 
losing parties to a panel to veto the adoption of its findings 
by the GATT membership, thereby stopping the outcome 
from becoming legally binding on contracting parties. That 
possibility has now been removed. 
Any WTO member can access the dispute settlement (DS) 
mechanism to challenge any other members’ trade policies. 
Thus, PNG could directly challenge the trade policies of 
the United States, for example, if it thought that the US had 
breached its WTO commitments. Similarly, any member of 
the WTO may nominate to be a co-complainant party to a 
dispute directly involving other members. A member may 
also choose as an interested by-stander to be a ‘third party’ 
to a dispute. This helps safeguard the interests of all 
potentially affected parties in such disputes. Although 
mounting such disputes may well exceed the financial and 
technical capacity of small states like PNG and other 
Pacific island economies, international institutions, 
including the WTO itself, are aware of that difficulty and 
are finding ways of improving access by all members to the 
dispute system26. Often the most effective option available 
for small states will be to take such action as a group, or in 
                                                          
26 An example is the formation of the recent Advisory Centre on WTO 
Law by the WTO and the World Bank. 
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conjunction with other better-equipped members who are 
similarly grieved by another member’s measures. Also, the 
resource demands of being a ‘third party’ to a dispute are 
minimal. 
Governments of small and poor developing economies of 
course have less financial capacity to mount a DS case 
before a WTO Panel than do those of larger economies. 
Even so, technical and financial assistance measures have 
been put in place for poorer WTO members to access legal 
support, and funds for those initiatives are being raised. As 
well, going into a case with several other similarly 
aggrieved members can spread the legal costs enough to 
make participation possible.  
This is not to say the DS procedures of the WTO are 
faultless. The European Union’s slowness in bringing its 
banana import regime into conformity with its WTO 
commitments is a clear example of how difficult it is for the 
WTO membership to force a reluctant large player to 
promptly abide by DS rulings. But such exceptions have 
been very rare so far in the six years since the WTO DS 
system was introduced. More than that, the system is being 
actively used by developing country members, especially 
taking into account the size of their trade flows (Mavroidis, 
Nordstrom and Horn 1999). 
Securing market access abroad 
Because all WTO members must abide by the rules, the 
WTO ensures that each member receives equal access to 
each other’s markets. This is enshrined in the most-
favoured-nation (MFN) principle. In other words, if a 
member extends a lower tariff to imports from a certain 
source, then it must extend the same tariff to all WTO 
members, subject to certain exemptions.  
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another
country’s 
rights
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This provides greater certainty and security for PNG and 
other Pacific island exporters. They know that 
governments of major export markets, such as the US, EU 
and Australia, cannot provide preferential access to 
competing exports from other members (again with a few 
exceptions such as under the EU-ACP Lome Convention 
and the generalized system of preferences).  
Since the key objective of the WTO is trade liberalization, 
members periodically negotiate multilaterally for the 
removal or relaxation of trade barriers, including tariffs. 
This was last done in the Uruguay Round, which is to be 
fully implemented by 2006. By agreeing to multilateral 
reductions in protection, members receive, in return for 
opening their own markets to imports, improved access to 
foreign markets for their exports — the so-called principle 
of reciprocity, upon which the WTO and the multilateral 
trading system is fundamentally based. Thus, WTO 
members benefit from improved non-discriminatory access 
to export markets.  
By exchanging market access, members can promote trade 
liberalization by changing the political equilibrium in 
trading nations. While liberalization may harm a country’s 
import-competing industries, its exporters will gain from 
improved market access abroad if all countries reduce tariff 
barriers simultaneously. The larger the number of 
countries and the coverage of sectors, the bigger are the 
potential gains from multilateral trade negotiations. 
Reductions in high MFN tariffs will especially benefit 
developing country exporters, such as PNG and other 
Pacific island economies, reliant on agricultural and other 
primary exports. Developed markets tend to maintain 
escalating tariff structures that apply higher tariffs to more-
processed products. Reducing the degree of tariff 
escalation abroad will therefore help developing countries 
to export more processed agricultural products. This will 
in turn encourage value-added processing in developing 
countries. 
This provides 
small nations 
greater
certainty over 
export markets 
Multilateral
liberalization 
also offers 
improved
access to 
foreign
markets
Multilateral
negotiations
can stimulate 
trade
liberalization… 
… and also 
reduce tariff 
escalation
abroad
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A major problem with international commodity markets is 
that they are heavily distorted by the farm protection 
measures maintained on certain agricultural products by 
major countries, especially under the Common Agriculture 
Policy of the EU and also the USA’s Farm Bill. By paying 
farmers large amounts of domestic support and export 
subsidies to enable surplus production to be sold on 
international markets, these policies distort world 
commodity markets and reduce world prices (Tyers and 
Anderson 1992). Following the Uruguay Round, 
multilateral disciplines were introduced for the first time 
on governments providing such assistance. Reforming 
these policies will benefit efficient agricultural-exporting 
countries by allowing world prices to rise towards 
undistorted levels, at least relative to what otherwise 
would be the case27. 
WTO members agreed in the Agriculture Agreement to 
reduce domestic support payments, as measured by the 
Total Aggregate Measure of Support, by on average 20% 
for developed countries and 13.3% for developing 
countries. Certain subsidies, such as for research and 
development, are exempted from these reductions if they 
fall into the so-called ‘green box’ of payments. 
Members also agreed to modestly reduce export subsidies, 
by on average 36% by value and 21% by volume for 
developed countries, and by 24% by value and 14% by 
volume for developing countries. 
In order to control the use of quarantine arrangements and 
in particular to limit the possibility that their increased use 
would frustrate efforts to reduce agricultural protection, 
                                                          
27 That proviso is important. The real price of primary products has 
been falling about 0.5% per year for the past century on average, so 
any price increase following trade liberalization would cause a one-
off increase in the international price level but the long-run downward 
trend would then continue — hopefully at a bit slower pace though, 
as newly industrializing countries will now not be able to follow the 
costly example of more advanced economies switching from taxing 
to subsidizing agriculture in the course of their economic 
development (Anderson 1995). 
Negotiations
also reduce 
distortions in 
international
commodity
markets
Domestic
agriculture
support
payments will 
be reduced … 
… along with 
export
subsidies
Disciplines
also now apply 
to quarantine 
regulations … 
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members negotiated the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement. This provides that while members are 
perfectly entitled to apply quarantine regulations to protect 
health and safety, they have to provide scientific 
justification based on an acceptable (rather than zero) 
degree of risk where their standards differ from 
international norms. Moreover, such regulations may not 
be used as disguised restrictions on trade.  
The SPS Agreement thus can be beneficial for developing 
countries that have found it difficult to penetrate excessive 
quarantine barriers to their food exports to other countries 
in the past. It was partly because of a fear that such barriers 
might be used more as WTO members bring down their 
traditional import barriers that the SPS Agreement was 
negotiated in the first place. Offsetting this beneficial effect, 
however, is the flipside of this new WTO right, namely, 
that developing countries have a new obligation to abide 
by the SPS rules themselves. In so far as PNG and other 
Pacific island economies have SPS import barriers, they 
will need to demonstrate that those measures have been 
applied in a consistent and least-trade-distorting way28. 
Given their relatively weaker administrative capacity, 
numerous poorer countries are finding implementation of 
this agreement difficult. PNG is apparently among them, 
as its National Agriculture Quarantine Inspection 
Authority (NAQIA) is struggling to meet this aspect of the 
nation’s WTO obligations. PNG does maintain stringent 
quarantine regulations on certain food imports, including 
import bans, which may well not be scientifically justified 
(WTO 1999). It would be in PNG’s own economic interests 
to review its quarantine regulations to ensure that they 
were scientifically justified and not being used as a de facto 
trade restriction.  
                                                          
28 It is widely reported among the business community in PNG that 
the quarantine regulations applied by NAQIA are a significant barrier 
to imports. Although the arrangements are unclear, it appears that 
PNG maintains blanket prohibitions on many vegetables and fruits 
that can be grown domestically, and it would seem highly unlikely 
that these could be justified on scientific grounds. Rather, they serve 
as a covert form of economic protectionism. 
… which may 
be a mixed 
blessing for 
developing 
countries 
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The region’s exports face considerable barriers in their 
main export markets, including EU, USA, Japan, Australia, 
New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia and China (ESCAP 
2000). The main barriers are found on agricultural exports 
which, apart from fish and logs plus oils and minerals from 
PNG, comprise most of the region’s exports. And many of 
those barriers involve quarantine regulations to protect 
human, animal or plant health, or food safety standards 
(Table 5.1).  
All WTO members are required to relax their SPS 
regulations where they are more stringent than 
international norms, unless those measures can be 
scientifically justified based on an acceptable degree of risk 
that is consistently applied. This means that PNG and 
other Pacific island economies could challenge within the 
WTO quarantine regulations any major export markets that 
were considered to be unnecessarily stringent and hurting 
their export interests.  
Given the vital importance of agriculture to the economic 
prosperity of PNG and other Pacific island economies, 
depressed world commodity prices resulting from 
distorted markets are likely to undermine their export 
interests. A good example is tropical oil products, such as 
copra, coconut and oil palm in which PNG, the Solomon 
Islands and other regional economies have a major export 
interest. 
These governments believe that competition from EU 
subsidised vegetable oils are hurting island economies by 
further lowering world prices for tropical edible oil 
products (WTO 1998, WTO 1999). If PNG and other Pacific 
island economies are going to successfully achieve their 
development potential, much of which initially must come 
from the agricultural sector, their prospects would be 
boosted considerably by the removal of price-depressing 
distortions in world commodity markets of interest. While 
the disciplines on agricultural subsidies currently in place 
are only modest, they provide at least some coverage by 
the WTO and thereby some constraint on the use of such 
Improved
market access 
for agricultural 
exports is 
materializing…
… via 
relaxation of 
quarantine 
regulations
abroad
… and reduced 
distortions to 
markets for 
commodities
of key export 
interest to the 
Pacific
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measures. The challenge confronting all WTO members is 
to strengthen the agricultural rules in future negotiations. 
Meeting that challenge will be of direct benefit to Pacific 
island states. 
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These governments believe that competition from EU 
subsidised vegetable oils are hurting island economies by 
further lowering world prices for tropical edible oil 
products (WTO 1998, WTO 1999). If PNG and other Pacific 
island economies are going to successfully achieve their 
development potential, much of which initially must come 
from the agricultural sector, their prospects would be 
boosted considerably by the removal of price-depressing 
distortions in world commodity markets of interest. While 
the disciplines on agricultural subsidies currently in place 
are only modest, they provide at least some coverage by 
the WTO and thereby some constraint on the use of such 
measures. The challenge confronting all WTO members is 
to strengthen the agricultural rules in future negotiations. 
Meeting that challenge will be of direct benefit to Pacific 
island states. 
Such products as fish and logs are important for PNG and 
several other Pacific island economies. However, 
unprocessed fish and logs are not covered by the WTO’s 
agricultural agreement, and so multilateral disciplines in 
these areas are weak. This may be a major problem in 
fishing, where it has been claimed that Pacific fishing 
vessels cannot compete with Asian and European fishing 
fleets which are heavily subsidized by governments 
(Grynberg 1998). It would be in the economic (and 
environmental) interests of the region, therefore, to have 
multilateral disciplines extended in the WTO to cover 
fishing so as to control such subsidies. Providing matching 
subsidies to their domestic fleets, even if financially 
possible, does not make economic sense for the Pacific 
islands, as these would only compound the economic costs 
that distorted foreign policies are imposing on island 
economies. 
Fish and logs 
are important 
resources, yet 
are subject to 
weak
multilateral
disciplines
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Keeping market access abroad in proper perspective 
While obtaining improved market access abroad is 
important for the export interests of PNG and other Pacific 
island economies, such gains must be kept in proper 
perspective. Improved access only provides an opportunity 
to increase export penetration to those markets. Whether 
that opportunity is realized depends entirely on whether 
the island economies are competitive world suppliers of 
such products. If not, then the benefits of improved MFN 
access to overseas markets will accrue instead to more 
competitive exporters. 
The capacity of Pacific island economies to compete 
internationally is determined to a considerable extent by 
policies at home. Export penetration in foreign markets 
ultimately depends upon being internationally 
competitive. If industries are not competitive, no amount 
of market access abroad will improve their trade and 
economic performance. The main factors inhibiting exports 
of Pacific island nations are their own policies. Import-
restrictive measures are one source, — since tariffs and 
other import barriers ultimately tax exports.29 Another 
source is  macro-economic imbalance, which raises interest 
rates, reduces capital formation and generally contributes 
to an inefficient economy. These policies, together with 
governance and institutional weaknesses as well as poor 
infrastructure, debilitate the functioning of the private 
sector. It is these severe ‘supply-side’ constraints that are 
the main obstacle to growth, rather than limitations on 
access to foreign markets. 
                                                          
29 See Clements and Sjaastad (1984) for an excellent explanation of 
this crucial but not-intuitively-obvious point. In this protective respect 
Pacific island economies are not unlike many other natural resource-
rich economies (see Anderson 1998), but that is no reason to 
continue with an anti-trade, anti-primary sector policy bias. 
Securing
improved
market access 
abroad is 
insufficient … 
… because 
international
competitive-
ness and 
efficiency also 
require sound 
policies at 
home
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Smaller countries like PNG and Pacific island economies 
would benefit from liberalizing their own markets for 
imports irrespective of whether or not other nations 
followed. Opening up domestic markets to cheaper 
imports makes those markets more competitive and 
enhances the nation’s productivity and economic efficiency 
by improving resource allocation and the efficiency of 
using imported intermediate inputs. The most effective 
means of overcoming foreign exchange shortages is to raise 
exports and attract capital inflow. Enhanced export and 
investment performance by small economies does not 
depend on achieving improved market access abroad, 
helpful though that may be. 
On-going multilateral tariff reductions will continue to 
place greater competitive pressures on all countries, 
including developing WTO members. Even if a developing 
country maintains its own trade barriers against imports, 
its exports will come under increasing competition in 
export markets for at least two reasons. One is that other 
developing countries supplying those same markets are 
becoming more competitive as they reform their own 
markets. The second reason is that Lome and other 
preferential tariff margins are being eroded by the MFN 
tariff cuts of developed countries. Thus, being able to raise 
the international competitiveness of their industries will be 
of increasing importance, and this will require substantial 
economic reforms at home, including trade liberalization. 
Providing special treatment for developing 
countries in WTO 
In addition to receiving the standard benefits above of 
WTO membership, developing and especially least-
developed country members also are entitled to special 
treatment in the WTO. This manifests itself in many ways 
throughout the agreements and operations of the WTO, 
but generally falls under the term ‘special and differential 
treatment’ (S&D) for developing country members. 
Benefits from 
trade
liberalization 
arise mainly 
from improved 
market access 
at home 
This will 
become
increasingly so 
as tariff 
preference
margins are 
reduced
WTO applies 
special and 
differential
treatment to 
DCs … 
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Under S&D, developing countries are generally required to 
make lower market access commitments and are allowed 
longer transitional periods to meet new obligations. For 
example, developing countries have ten years within 
which to implement progressively the requirements of the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, instead of six years as for 
developed economies. Similarly, developing countries 
were treated more leniently in commitments on tariff 
reductions30. In many areas, WTO requirements for 
developing, and especially least-developing, members are 
very minimal, ostensibly in order to reflect their stage of 
development. 
While such special treatment in the form of providing them 
with much longer transitional periods to implement WTO 
commitments may be needed for political reasons, the 
perceived economic benefits of also allowing them to 
negotiate much lower liberalization commitments may be 
largely illusory and short term at best. For reasons 
advanced elsewhere in this report, it is equally imperative 
that all countries, irrespective of their stage of 
development, reform for their own sake their policies at 
home so as to boost their productivity, exports and 
economic growth. Thus, developing countries that overly 
rely on access to such S&D treatment as a reason for not 
liberalizing their own economies are likely in the longer 
run to be undermining their own economic growth 
prospects. 
Thus, PNG and other Pacific island countries should be 
aware of the potential costs to their own economy of overly 
relying on special and differential treatment. Such 
treatment as excessively ‘watered down’ liberalization 
commitments involve the greatest costs, certainly 
compared to measures that provide them with longer 
transition periods. The new agreements negotiated during 
Uruguay Round acknowledged this by to some extent 
placing greater emphasis on providing S&D via longer 
transitional periods instead of reduced commitments. 
                                                          
30 See UNCTAD (1997, Annex 2) for a comprehensive listing of areas 
providing special treatment for developing countries. 
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Transparency and monitoring members’ trade 
policies 
Protectionist trade policies partly exist because of a lack of 
domestic transparency as to the effects of such policies. 
Because trade barriers benefit certain segments of the 
community while penalizing others, it is necessary that the 
effects of such measures be transparent so that the winners 
and losers of trade reforms or protection can be identified.  
Without such transparency, there is bound to be a bias in 
the system towards governments providing protection. 
The costs to special groups adversely affected by trade 
reforms will be visible and short term, while the winners 
will be diverse, less obvious and may have to wait a long 
time to reap benefits from phased reform. Thus, 
transparency is needed as a means of redressing this bias 
towards providing protection, and to enable an 
informative public dialogue to occur between all affected 
parties, including consumers. Governments have an 
important role in providing this transparency and 
information. Put simply, transparency is imperative for 
good policy making. 
Providing domestic industries with protection should be 
based on public and transparent criteria that take account 
of national welfare rather than narrow sectoral interests. 
Thus, governments should avoid making special deals 
behind closed doors with certain industries that are sure to 
be motivated by their vested interests. Domestic industries 
wanting assistance should be required to publicly justify 
why it is more worthy of government support than some 
other activity since, by definition, all forms of government 
support inevitably discriminate between activities. Thus, 
while it is important that governments consult widely with 
all community groups, governments in the end must make 
decisions on protection with national welfare in mind. 
Good trade 
policy is 
underpinned
by
transparency
Transparency 
helps redress 
systemic bias 
towards
granting
protection
Protection
should not be 
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Governments often feel that greater transparency of its 
own policies is disadvantageous because it provides other 
governments with ‘ammunition’ (information) with which 
to attack its own policies both bilaterally and 
multilaterally. Thus, many governments have a double 
standard to greater transparency: they demand greater 
transparency of other countries’ trade policies, but become 
defensive when it comes to themselves providing greater 
transparency. Governments are frequently also reluctant to 
increase transparency at home because it places greater 
disciplines on their own actions and exposes policies to 
public scrutiny. But doing so helps control corrupt 
practices by politicians and senior policymakers by 
ensuring that special deals between government and 
private sector participants are motivated by national 
welfare concerns and not by vested interests. For these 
reasons, even though many governments often see 
transparency as their enemy rather than an effective ally 
for good governance and policy making, the opposite is 
true. 
If a country’s policies are inconsistent with its multilateral 
commitments or run counter to national welfare objectives, 
then they need to be identified so that these policies can be 
amended. Of course, this touches heavily on political 
considerations. But at the end of the day, economic growth 
is the means by which governments advance national 
welfare, and exposing poor policies is part of the required 
strategy for mazimizing that growth.   
WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) 
Thanks to the Uruguay Round, the TPRM has provided the 
WTO with an effective means of enhancing transparency of 
members’ trade policies. Although concerned mainly with 
improving international transparency or understanding of 
members’ trade policies and their adherence to 
commitments and rules in order to improve the 
functioning of the multilateral system, it nevertheless can 
Transparency 
primarily
works in the 
government’s
favour
Transparency 
exposes poor 
policies
WTO can help 
alleviate the 
shortfall in 
national
transparency
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make a significant contribution to domestic transparency31. 
Members are to be reviewed continuously every two, four 
or six years, depending on their share of world trade32. 
In creating the TPRM, members recognized the inherent 
value of domestic transparency of government decision-
making on trade policy for both their own economies and 
the multilateral trading system. Members therefore agreed 
to encourage and promote greater transparency within 
their own systems on a voluntary basis, taking account of 
each member’s legal and political systems. 
Reviews are conducted by WTO members in the Trade 
Policy Review Body (effectively the WTO Council under 
another name). It is thus a peer review that is based on two 
reports, one by the member under review and the other 
and more detailed report prepared by the WTO Secretariat 
on its own responsibility. Both the reports together with 
the review meetings’ deliberations are published by the 
Secretariat in the interests of transparency. The reviews 
cover trade-related policies and hence are much broader in 
coverage than WTO matters, and include the members’ 
macro-economic setting as well as all aspects of structural 
policies, such as investment, exchange rates and 
privatization. However, the main focus is on trade policies. 
                                                          
31 The TPRM is not, however, a legal exercise and has no dispute 
settlement role.  It is not intended to serve as a basis for the 
enforcement of specific obligations or to impose new policy 
commitments on members.  It is primarily an economic review aimed 
at examining the impact on the economy of members’ trade-related 
policies. 
32 The top four trading entities within the WTO (EU, USA, Japan and 
Canada) are reviewed every two years; the next 16 most important 
world traders every four years; and all other members every six 
years, with the possibility of longer intervals for the poorest 
developing country members. 
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Pacific island economies are on a 6-year review cycle. The 
three current WTO members have been reviewed once: Fiji 
in 1997; Solomon Islands in 1998; and PNG in 1999. While 
these reviews supported and welcomed the trade 
liberalization efforts by respective governments, members 
expressed a number of reservations over key policy 
measures (Box 5.4). For example, the PNG review 
expressed concerns on matters such as PNG’s remaining 
relatively high tariffs; export policies; quarantine 
regulations; public sector corruption; and the deteriorating 
business climate, including the serious law and order 
problem.  
PNG has had an independent statutory body, the Industry 
Assistance Board (IAB), since 1985 to advise the 
government on industry assistance. However, the IAB has 
never effectively operated because of a lack of government 
support and institutional capacity. One of the most 
effective actions that could be taken would be for the 
government to resurrect this board so as to make it a more 
effective national transparent agency. This would facilitate 
the operations of the Consultative Implementation and 
Monitoring Council (CIMC) and should become the 
government’s principal source of independent advice on 
government assistance and regulations. The Board’s 
legislation requires it to apply an economy-wide or 
national welfare framework in reviewing such policies, and 
hence could help provide public scrutiny of policies. It 
could effectively identify the winners and losers from 
protection, and would make such decisions on providing 
support to privileged sectors more open and transparent. 
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Box 5.4: Trade Policy Reviews of Pacific Island Economies 
Three pacific island economies have been reviewed under the WTO 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism. The following provides a brief 
summary of the Chairperson’s Concluding Remarks for each of 
these meetings. 
Papua New Guinea 
WTO members emphasized the importance of improved economic 
management and government in enhancing PNG’s economic 
performance, and welcomed the Government’s renewed 
commitment to trade liberalization and further economic reforms 
aimed at improving the economy’s productivity. They welcomed 
the bold tax reform package from 1 July 1999, including the 
reduction in average tariffs from 20% to 9%, and efforts taken to 
restore fiscal discipline and macro-economic stability. PNG was 
encouraged to press ahead with the Structural Reform program with 
the collaboration of the World Bank and IMF, including 
privatization of state-owned enterprises and liberalization of foreign 
investment policies. However, members queried a number of areas, 
including: 
-notifications to the WTO; 
-high applied tariffs, a few of which appear to exceed bound rates, 
and some rate increases under the reform program; 
-tariffs and other policies designed to promote fisheries and food 
processing; 
-impact of regional trade initiatives; 
-export policies, including taxes on logs; 
-custom valuation procedures, especially the use of the fallback 
value method; 
-the impact of PNG standards and testing procedures on imports, as 
well as stringent quarantine restrictions and bans on animals, fruit 
and vegetables; 
-the lack of significant intellectual property legislation and 
enforcement; 
-limited GATS commitments in services; 
-the privatization process, especially of key utilities, such as 
electricity, telecommunications and transport sectors; 
 -distorting effects of continued price controls; 
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Box 5.4: Trade Policy Reviews of Pacific Island Economies (cont.) 
-participation in the Government Procurement Agreement;  
-competition policy; 
-public sector corruption; and 
-the deteriorating business climate, including the serious law and 
order problem. 
The Solomon Islands 
Members appreciated the difficulties faced by the Solomon Islands 
as a vulnerable non-diversified economy affected by external 
shocks. They welcomed the efforts by the Government to implement 
economic reforms, including tariff rationalization, and efforts to 
conform to WTO commitments. Members queried several areas, 
including:  
-remaining high and disparate tariffs, including the ‘temporary’ 
imposition of a 10% tariff surcharge in 1998 without time limits; 
-the effectiveness and desirability of using export taxes and other 
controls to encourage downstream processing of logs and fish; 
-effects of MFN liberalization on Lome and other preferences; 
-the adverse impact of export subsidies on oilseeds by other 
members;  
-support and membership of regional trading arrangements; and  
-the role on investment incentives and non-transparent foreign 
investment regulations. 
Fiji 
Members welcomed Fiji’s moves since 1989 to adopt more outward-
oriented policies, including the elimination of import quotas and 
tariff reductions. However, concerns were raised in several areas, 
including: 
-the slowing pace of tariff reform and import liberalization;  
-relative high and disparate tariffs on some products, such as fish, 
combined with  
-considerable duty escalation and use of specific duties; 
-support and membership of regional trading arrangements; 
-sanitary and phytosanitary regulations; and 
-importance of services, especially tourism 
Source: WTO (1997, 1998b and 1999). 
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Reform policies externally imposed on governments are 
less likely to be successful because they lack strong 
political or community support. This is probably a major 
reason why in the past the conditional reform programs of 
the World Bank and the IMF have occasionally stalled in 
PNG, the Solomon Islands and many other developing 
economies. Reform policies must be internally driven and 
have broad political and community support. A well 
functioning Industry Assistance Board could help build 
such support. 
WTO notification requirements 
Most WTO agreements require members to regularly 
provide, either bi-annually or annually, comprehensive 
notifications to the WTO of existing measures and of any 
changes. These notifications under various WTO 
committees are circulated to all members by the Secretariat 
and made public on its website33. They therefore provide 
an essential means by which members communicate to 
each other on their trade policies and measures. 
Notification requirements for PNG are summarized in 
Table 5.2. Some of these requirements involve the 
provision of trade regulations and measures for circulation 
to all members.  
Many agreements also require members to notify to the 
WTO enquiry points that overseas traders or officials can 
contact to obtain information on a country's trade policies 
and measures. These facilitate transparency and foreign 
understanding of a country’s trade policies and measures. 
In the process, they aid domestic transparency too. 
Compliance costs of WTO membership 
Having discussed the benefits to PNG and other Pacific 
island economies of WTO membership, it is important to 
examine whether there are any compliance costs.  
                                                          
33 See the WTO homepage at http://www.wto.org.
It would also 
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Loss of government sovereignty over policies 
It is often argued that a major cost of WTO membership is 
that governments lose sovereignty over making their own 
policies and that the WTO imposes policies on members 
which may not be in each members’ interests. This is often 
argued, for example, by those that are concerned with the 
perceived effects of freer trade and globalization on 
environmental protection. 
However, such concerns are largely misinformed. The 
WTO has no independent power. The WTO is in fact a 
secretariat only; it is the member governments that agree, 
for example, to negotiate the various multilateral trade 
agreements. Those agreements provide wide scope for 
Is national 
sovereignty
eroded by 
WTO
membership?
WTO assists 
governments
to follow 
sound
economic
policies
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members to exercise their own trade and other economic 
policies, as is illustrated by the very diverse and often 
protectionist policies maintained across the membership. 
Moreover, efforts to strengthen the multilateral disciplines 
and to broaden their coverage, while at the same time 
ensuring greater compliance from members, are best seen 
as helping all governments to follow sound policies that 
will maximize national welfare of each member and be 
mutually beneficial. 
Financial and other resource costs  
Complying and servicing the WTO requires non-trivial 
resource costs. This is especially so in relative terms for 
small developing economies, such as PNG and other 
Pacific island economies. One concern is that the WTO may 
distract Pacific island economies from pursuing unilateral 
reforms. However, as argued in this report, if used 
correctly WTO membership can reinforce unilateral 
reforms. The greater risk comes from regional trading 
initiatives, as they consume the limited bureaucratic 
capacities of Pacific island economies and distract attention 
away from unilateral and multilateral trade reforms. To 
some extent, disenchantment with the more-distant MFN 
system is always likely to spur greater interest in regional 
arrangements (hence the need to ensure that the 
multilateral system is working well). 
The direct cost of running the WTO, amounting to about 
SF130 million annually, is funded by members based on 
their size as traders. Industrialized economies therefore 
meet most of these costs. For example, the annual financial 
contribution of PNG and other Pacific island economies is 
relatively small (no more than SF50,000 annually).  
However, the indirect costs of servicing WTO membership 
are likely to be much higher. This requires sending officials 
to the WTO and maintaining some sort of representation in 
Geneva. It also requires a considerable number of officials 
in capital cities to work on servicing the multilateral 
WTO
membership
does have 
some costs 
Direct financial
costs are small 
…
… while 
indirect costs 
are larger … 
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requirements. Not surprisingly, therefore, PNG and other 
Pacific island economies so far have not been active 
participants in the GATT/WTO. One way to lower the cost 
of participating is to pool resources though. To that end, 
the (South Pacific) Forum Secretariat is examining the 
prospects of establishing a joint mission to the WTO in 
Geneva to represent Pacific island members. 
Meeting the notification and transparency costs of WTO 
membership can also be costly in terms of its use of direct 
and indirect resources. However, these costs are almost 
certainly going to be insignificant compared to the social 
benefits nationally of improved policy making and 
enhanced trading. Put starkly, active participation in the 
WTO and meeting its transparency and monitoring 
requirements probably could make the greatest 
contribution to facilitating trade. 
Adjustment costs of implementing WTO- (and 
APEC-) consistent policies 
The restructuring costs to the economy of implementing 
WTO- (and thereby also APEC-) consistent policies are 
often seen as the major compliance costs of such 
membership. Replacing inward-looking protectionist 
policies with open and outward-looking trade and 
investment policies obviously imposes some short-term 
adjustment costs on the economy. However, the costs to 
the economy of not making these changes and persisting 
with past protectionist policies are far greater. Structural 
adjustment is always occurring in any economy. Protection 
simply transfers the burden of adjustment onto efficient 
industries. Trade liberalization redresses this imbalance by 
placing the pressure of adjustment where it should be, 
namely on inefficient industries. 
Adjustment costs induced by policy reforms are therefore 
best viewed not as on-going costs of compliance with the 
WTO, but rather as one-off costs associated with 
unwinding past policy mistakes in order to gain from the 
longer-term benefits of trade liberalization and economic 
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growth. It must be remembered that while the adjustment 
costs are immediate they are only short term, while the 
benefits of reform continue to be received perpetually. 
Thus, compliance costs are not so much associated with 
WTO membership as with implementing sensible 
economic policies. To not do so imposes larger, albeit less 
visible, costs on efficient producers from having to cope 
with unsound policies.  
PNG trade policies generally comply with its WTO 
commitments. The tariff reform program will reduce tariffs 
to a maximum of 40% by 2006, thereby meeting its WTO 
tariff bindings. It had already removed non-tariff measures 
covered by the WTO and, with the possible exception of 
quarantine regulations, appears to have policies that 
broadly comply with WTO commitments —provided the 
reform program is implemented. PNG has therefore 
already taken the necessary steps to meet its key 
obligations. The same generally applies to Fiji and the 
Solomon Islands. 
However, while PNG and other Pacific island members of 
the WTO significantly expanded their commitments in the 
Uruguay Round, they remain relatively modest compared 
to the reform opportunities remaining in these countries. 
Thus, governments should not only look at meeting their 
WTO commitments, but also overtaking them unilaterally. 
For those Pacific island economies currently undergoing 
WTO accession, this process itself can provide an effective 
means of reforming economic policies and locking these in 
internationally through WTO membership. 
PNG, Fiji and the Solomon Islands generally undertook 
minimal commitments on services under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Virtually no 
liberalization commitments were made, although in a few 
sectors, such as certain banking services, PNG and the 
Solomon Islands did commit to continuing to maintain no 
limitations on market access and national treatment for 
services supplied cross-border, consumed abroad and by 
commercial presence (Tables 5.3 and 5.4). The main 
PNG trade 
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…
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liberalizing commitment was in telecommunications where 
PNG did commit to removing the current statutory 
monopoly held by Telikom PNG over basic 
communications from 2002. PNG also adopted the 
regulatory principles for telecommunications thereby 
committing to ensure that, from then on, foreign suppliers 
would be able to interconnect with the local network in a 
non-discriminatory manner. Many of these requirements 
are contained in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that 
established PANGTEL as the sole regulatory and licensing 
authority for telecommunications. 
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Table 5.3  Summary of sector-specific commitments by PNG under the 
WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
 
Modes of supply 
Cross-border 
supply 
Consumpti
on abroad 
Commercial 
presence 
Temporary 
presence of 
natural 
personsa 
Sector or subsector 
Market access (MA)/national treatment (NT) 
Tourism & Related Services 
Hotels & restaurants 
(including catering) 
None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA 
& NT 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
Transport Services 
Maritime, passenger & 
freight 
None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
Financial Services 
Banking & other 
financial services 
(excluding insurance); 
retail deposit 
acceptance, lending, 
financial leasing, 
guarantees & 
commitments & trading 
(including in money 
market instruments, 
foreign exchange & 
transferable securities 
None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
Construction & Related Engineering Services 
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Modes of supply 
Cross-border 
supply 
Consumpti
on abroad 
Commercial 
presence 
Temporary 
presence of 
natural 
personsa 
Sector or subsector 
Market access (MA)/national treatment (NT) 
General construction 
work for buildings 
Unbound (MA 
& NT) due to 
technical 
feasibility 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA); 
NT 
exception to 
prefer 
national 
firms for 
construction 
contracts 
under 
K 500,000. 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
General construction 
work for civil 
engineering 
Unbound (MA 
& NT) due to 
technical 
feasibility 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA); 
NT 
exception to 
prefer 
national 
firms for 
construction 
contracts 
under 
K 500,000 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitations 
Business Services 
Professional services 
- Legal services None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
- Accounting, auditing 
& bookkeeping 
services 
None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA 
& NT)  
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
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Modes of supply 
Cross-border 
supply 
Consumpti
on abroad 
Commercial 
presence 
Temporary 
presence of 
natural 
personsa 
Sector or subsector 
Market access (MA)/national treatment (NT) 
- Architectural services None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitations 
- Engineering services None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None ( MA 
& NT) 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
Computer & related 
services 
None (MA & 
NT) 
   
- Consultancy services 
on hardware 
installation 
None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
Other business services     
- management 
consulting 
None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
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Modes of supply 
Cross-border 
supply 
Consumpti
on abroad 
Commercial 
presence 
Temporary 
presence of 
natural 
personsa 
Sector or subsector 
Market access (MA)/national treatment (NT) 
Communication Services 
Telecommunication     
- voice telephone;  
packet-switched & 
circuit-switched data 
transmission;  telex; 
telegraph; facsimile;  
private-leased circuit 
services;  digital 
cellular;  paging; 
personal 
communication;  
trunked radio 
system;  & mobile 
data services 
None (NT);  
MA            only 
using              
Telikom PNG 
network – 
subscribes to 
regulatory 
principles 
None (NT); 
MA 
exception 
prohibiting 
alternative 
calling or 
call-back 
None (NT);  
MA 
exception 
that all 
services are 
subject to a 
five-year 
exclusivity 
(1997-2002) 
to Telikom 
PNG as 
monopoly 
service 
providerb 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
- courier services, 
excluding letters 
None (MA & 
NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
None (MA 
& NT) 
Unbound 
(MA & NT), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
 
a Horizontal limitation on commercial presence states that market access is 
subject to normal government approval of foreign investment (and from 
the Central Bank in the case of financial services) and may only lease land 
from the government;  national treatment requires foreign employees to 
provide on-the-job training to local employees.  For presence of people, 
market access and national treatment subject to limiting entry of managers 
and specialists to those of key importance where local employees are 
unavailable.  Entry is limited initially to three years. 
b The issuance of additional operating licences and their terms and 
conditions will be considered and announced at least two years prior to 
the end of the exclusivity period.  Telikom PNG is designated as signatory 
to the INTELSAT Operating Agreement.  Telikom PNG reserves the right 
to set up subsidiary companies in business ventures on particular services 
and telecommunications. 
Source: WTO (1999). 
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Table 5.4  Summary of sector -specific commitments by the Solomon 
Islands under GATS 
 
Sector or subsector Modes of supply 
 Cross-
border 
supply 
Consum
ption 
abroad 
Commercial 
presence 
Temporary 
presence 
of natural 
persons 
 Market access (ma)/national treatment (nt) 
TOURISM & 
RELATED SERVICES 
    
Hotels & restaurants 
(including catering) 
None (ma & 
nt) 
None 
(ma & 
nt) 
None (ma & 
nt), subject to 
horizontal 
limitation on 
ma 
Unbound 
(ma & nt), 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 
    
Banking & other 
financial services 
(excluding 
insurance) 
None (ma & 
nt) 
None 
(ma & 
nt) 
None (ma & 
nt), subject to 
horizontal 
limitation on 
ma 
Unbound, 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
All insurance & 
insurance-related 
services 
None (ma & 
nt) 
(None 
(ma & 
nt) 
None (ma & 
nt), subject to 
horizontal 
limitation on 
ma 
Unbound, 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
CONSTRUCTION & 
RELATED 
ENGINEERING 
SERVICES 
    
General construction 
work for buildings 
Unbound 
(ma & nt) 
due to 
technical 
feasibility 
None 
(ma & 
nt) 
None (ma & 
nt), subject to 
horizontal 
limitation on 
ma 
Unbound, 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
General construction 
work for civil 
engineering 
Unbound 
(ma & nt), 
except 
where 
None 
(ma & 
nt) 
None (ma & 
nt), subject to 
horizontal 
limitation on 
Unbound, 
subject to 
horizontal 
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resources 
and 
materials 
are 
unavailable 
locally 
ma limitations 
BUSINESS SERVICES     
Professional services     
- Legal services, 
home country law, 
including public 
international law 
None (ma & 
nt) 
None 
(ma & 
nt) 
None (ma & 
nt), except 
must be sole 
proprietorshi
p or 
partnership, 
and subject to 
horizontal 
limitation on 
ma 
Unbound, 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
- Accounting, 
auditing & 
bookkeeping 
services 
None (ma & 
nt) 
None 
(ma & 
nt) 
None (ma & 
nt), subject to 
horizontal 
limitation on 
ma 
Unbound, 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
- Architectural 
services 
None (ma & 
nt) 
None 
(ma & 
nt) 
None (ma & 
nt), subject to 
horizontal 
limitation on 
ma 
Unbound, 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitations 
- Engineering 
services 
None (ma & 
nt) 
None 
(ma & 
nt) 
None ( ma & 
nt), subject to 
horizontal 
limitation on 
ma 
Unbound, 
subject to 
horizontal 
limitation 
Note: Horizontal limitation states that measures are unbound on both market access 
and national treatment for temporary stay of natural persons, except for key 
staff with specialist skills not available locally where entry will be limited to 
two years initially, with any extension subject to immigration and labour laws.  
Foreign employees are also required to provide on-the-job training to local 
employees.  Horizontal limitations also apply to market-access commitments 
whereby commercial presence is subject to normal foreign investment, 
company registration and land ownership requirements. 
 ma= market access; nt= national treatment 
Source: WTO (1998).
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Under the new WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) members were 
required to implement certain WTO-consistent legislation 
and enforcement procedures within certain time periods. 
The transitional period ended in 2000 for developing 
countries and 2006 for least-developing members. In 
addition to providing a minimum patent protection period 
of 20 years, members were to have effective legislation 
protecting other forms of intellectual property, such as 
copyright, trademarks as well as industrial and layout 
designs. In addition, members undertook to ensure 
effective enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
including having adequate remedies and seizure powers 
by customs of counterfeit products. 
Pacific island economies, including PNG, Fiji and the 
Solomon Islands, generally have very weak intellectual 
property rights and little enforcement capacity. Thus, 
meeting these requirements will require major changes in 
legislation, in the courts and in customs operations. 
However, making such changes has been difficult in view 
of the countries’ technical capacities. 
PNG and Fiji should have been TRIPS-compliant from 1 
January 2000. However, the Solomon Islands, being 
regarded as a least-developed WTO member, has until 
2006. The three island economies currently in the process 
of acceding to the WTO would need to negotiate such 
transitional arrangements. Since Vanuatu and Samoa are 
classified as least-developed economies by the UN, they 
would be given until 2006 to meet their TRIPS obligations. 
However, this does not apply to Tonga, since it is not 
classified as a least-developed economy. 
Achieving TRIPS compliance by small developing 
economies may impose substantial additional costs on their 
consumers and may even reduce national welfare. This is 
because they are technology-importing countries and are 
likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. By stopping 
the production and importation of illegal goods infringing 
property rights, such as pirated music CDs, TRIPS 
… and 
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compliance will force consumers to buy the more 
expensive genuine article. However, against these costs 
must be set the benefits to such countries of strengthening 
protection of intellectual property. There is considerable 
empirical evidence that weak intellectual property 
protection in host countries is a major deterrent to foreign 
direct investment. Thus, TRIPS compliance may help 
stimulate foreign investment in developing countries, and 
their citizens would also benefit from the greater protection 
received abroad on any intellectual property developed by 
them (Maskus 2000).  
TRIPS was incorporated into the WTO during the Uruguay 
Round largely at the insistence large technology exporting 
countries, most notable the US. It thus became an 
important aspect of the negotiated package of WTO 
commitments that members accepted as a means of trading 
off particular trading interests. While many developing 
countries were initially opposed to the inclusion of 
intellectual property protection in the WTO, they agreed 
on the basis that this would best serve their overall 
interests by receiving in return benefits in other areas.  
For developing countries, the quid pro quo mainly came in 
the form of developed countries agreeing to phase-out over 
10 years import quotas permitted under the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA). This was seen to be particularly 
beneficial to developing countries that have a significant 
export interest in clothing and footwear, including Fiji. 
This is how the multilateral trade rounds are negotiated; 
they are broad in coverage to enable members sufficient 
leeway to trade off their different interests, thereby 
ensuring that even if certain commitments may not be in 
their own interests, benefits negotiated in return will 
produce a package of outcomes that will provide net 
benefits overall to each member.
… but TRIPS 
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The supplementary role of APEC 
APEC currently comprises 21 members, following the 
inclusion of Russia, Vietnam and Peru in 1999. PNG, the 
only Pacific island economy member, joined APEC in 1994. 
APEC’s initial objective on formation in 1989 of fostering 
economic cooperation within the Asia Pacific region was 
expanded to include trade and investment liberalization, 
following the adoption of the Bogor Declaration in 1994 
and the Osaka Action Agenda in 1995. This commits 
members to achieve free and open trade and investment by 
2010 in APEC developed economies, and by 2020 for 
developing country members. 
Unilateral MFN trade liberalization 
Such liberalization is to be achieved on a voluntary basis in 
accordance with Individual Action Plans (IAPs) submitted 
periodically by each APEC member. These plans should 
contain specific details of liberalization efforts. 
Differentiated timetables for achieving the liberalization 
goals are provided for, to be revised by members on a 
rolling basis through a progressive consultation process 
that is reflected in continuous and voluntary improvement 
of the plans.  
IAPs are not negotiated outcomes nor are they binding on 
individual members. They can be changed without 
negotiating compensation with other APEC economies, 
and there is no formal dispute settlement mechanism. Thus 
APEC commitments are more akin to undertakings. 
APEC
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Economies are free to vary such plans as they wish. PNG 
has submitted two IAPs, the first in 1996 and the second in 
1998. No new commitments were made in either of its 1996 
or 1998 IAPs (PECC 1999). PNG is currently preparing a 
revised IAP that is due to be finalized in 2000. 
APEC liberalization is to be comprehensive in that it covers 
manufacturing, agriculture and services. However, some 
APEC members, such as Japan and Korea that heavily 
protect their farmers, are uncomfortable with such 
comprehensiveness. Any efforts to reduce the product 
coverage of APEC liberalization would undermine its 
effectiveness and would go against the interests of PNG 
which is heavily dependent on agricultural exports. Thus, 
the PNG Government should strongly support the 
continued inclusion of agriculture. APEC undertakings 
cover both tariffs and non-tariff measures. 
A unique aspect of APEC is that trade and investment 
liberalization is to be non-discriminatory, based on the 
concept of so-called ‘open regionalism’. APEC members 
are to liberalize on an MFN basis such that non-APEC 
members will also receive equal access to APEC markets. 
This is in sharp contrast to a traditional free trade area or 
customs union whereby members extend tariff preferences 
to each other and thereby discriminate against countries 
not party to the agreement.  
Some APEC members, especially the US, have reservations 
about ‘open regionalism’ and would prefer a 
discriminatory agreement as a means of restricting the 
benefits of liberalization to APEC members. Otherwise, so 
it is claimed, non-APEC members would be able to ‘free 
ride’ on APEC liberalization by receiving the benefits of 
liberalized export markets without being required to 
provide improved access to their markets in return. 
However, such an argument misses two main points. First, 
it assumes that the economic benefits to APEC members 
come mainly from receiving improved access abroad for 
their exports. This is not the case. The benefits of 
liberalization accrue to each APEC economy 
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predominantly from opening its own markets to imports 
from the world’s most efficient suppliers. Thus, there is 
really no ‘free rider’ problem. These benefits accrue from 
having access to the cheapest imports rather than from 
obtaining improved market access overseas. And second, 
in addition to the positive effect of close proximity, the 
strong complementarity in trade among the APEC 
countries is such that most of the imports resulting from 
APEC members opening their economies come from other 
APEC economies anyway. PNG should therefore support 
APEC continuing to be an open, outward-looking regional 
arrangement rather than the alternative of an inward-
focused discriminatory trading bloc. 
As mentioned earlier in this report, Forum leaders have 
endorsed the creation of a discriminatory free trade area 
between themselves, to start in 2001. However, an 
alternative and economically superior approach would 
have been to adopt the APEC model of open regionalism. 
While this has been rejected to date, the essence of open 
regionalism could still be encapsulated in the FTA if 
certain principles were met. 
The key principles that the Forum’s FTA should have if it is 
to boost welfare and facilitate the Pacific island economies’ 
trade multilaterally are: 
• full liberalization of trade between parties; 
• homogeneous rules of origin across members so as to 
improve transparency and facilitate external 
liberalization; 
• openness to new members on conditions similar to 
those available to existing members, with clearly 
established and transparent procedures for negotiating 
accession; and 
• no increase in external barriers on formation or 
subsequently, and readiness to negotiate external 
barrier reductions thereafter (Snape, Adams and 
Morgan 1993). 
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Full liberalization of trade between parties is consistent 
with the APEC comprehensive product coverage approach. 
Complete internal liberalization will make it easier at a 
later date to liberalize with the rest of the world. The more 
goods are exempted from liberalization between partners, 
the more exceptions will be sought externally. Product-by-
product liberalization in regional arrangements has tended 
to boost trade neither with outsiders nor among the 
members (Wonnacott and Lutz 1989). Thus, the PNG and 
other signatories to the FTA should resist the temptation of 
negotiating to exclude their least-competitive products 
from liberalization under the agreement. 
While the FTA is to be initially formed between FICs, it is 
important that the decision also calls for an examination of 
appropriate measures to provide for the application of the 
FTA to, for example, Australia and New Zealand. In fact 
the possible longer-term integration of the FTA into the 
Closer Economic Relations agreement between the latter 
two countries is already being studied. The expansion of 
the FTA to include non-Pacific island economies should be 
encouraged by PNG and other members to ensure that it 
will deliver maximum gains to them by facilitating wider 
multilateral liberalization. That would also ensure that all 
members benefit and not just certain members as is likely 
to be the case under the current FTA. 
APEC’s trade and investment liberalization objectives to 
some extent go beyond those of the WTO, something 
which the Forum Secretariat might also consider. APEC 
has adopted ‘free and open trade, including services, and 
investment’ as the rule, and has set target dates of either 
2010 or 2020 for achieving these goals. No such goals or 
target dates explicitly exist in the WTO. Moreover, APEC’s 
‘open regionalism’ concept and comprehensive product 
coverage go further than the WTO requirements, which 
allow for regional FTAs as an exception to MFN treatment 
provided they apply to ‘substantially all trade’ and do not 
raise barriers to third countries. However, APEC’s 
weakness is that such commitments, including the 
liberalization targets, are non-binding on members. 
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Unlike the WTO, which embraces multilateral trade 
liberalization, APEC is based on unilateral reforms. 
Members have endorsed the common liberalization targets, 
but have full autonomy over the reform path pursued to 
meet these common goals. The approach to trade and 
investment liberalization is therefore one of ‘concerted 
unilateralism’ whereby members continue ‘to do their own 
thing’ but in a framework of co-operation and common 
objectives that will hopefully facilitate greater trade 
liberalization by all APEC members. Much of the APEC 
agenda focuses on encouraging members to voluntarily 
enhance their WTO commitments in both goods and 
services. 
In order to facilitate accelerated trade liberalization, APEC 
economies adopted in 1997 the so-called Early Voluntary 
Sector Liberalization (EVSL) initiative. This aimed at 
advancing trade liberalization in certain nominated sectors. 
Members agreed on 15 sectors, of which nine were to be 
fast-tracked for liberalization. PNG participated in these 
negotiations and supported other members in the 
nomination of several sectors for early liberalization, 
including food, chemicals, and transport equipment. 
However, the initiative floundered somewhat as several 
members expressed concerns that it was contrary to the 
spirit of voluntarism on which APEC was founded. 
Consequently, APEC economies decided in 1998 to transfer 
such initiatives to reduce tariffs in these sectors to the 
WTO. APEC continues to advance liberalization of non-
tariff measures in these sectors, but has made little 
progress to date. 
The success of APEC depends critically on maintaining a 
strong WTO. APEC members, most of whom (including 
PNG) also belong to the WTO, have acknowledged that 
APEC is to be fully compatible with members’ multilateral 
commitments and see APEC primarily as a forum for 
further advancing unilateral trade reforms within the Asia 
Pacific region. Thus, any developments that weaken the 
WTO are likely to have an adverse impact on APEC’s 
success. Belonging to both the WTO and APEC offers the 
APEC
encompasses
unilateral
liberalization 
APEC adopted 
an ‘early 
voluntary
sector
liberalization’ 
initiative 
PNG benefits 
from double 
membership of 
WTO and 
APEC
143The supplementary role of APEC
 
 
109 
PNG Government the opportunity to effectively use both 
to advance its unilateral trade reforms. The WTO provides 
an effective means of ‘locking in’ such voluntary reforms 
undertaken within the APEC context by adding them to 
PNG’s binding multilateral commitments. However, to 
date most APEC members’ IAPs do not reflect the real 
progress many APEC economies have made toward 
achieving the Bogor goals (PECC 1999). PNG should be 
encouraged therefore to include in its updated IAP due this 
year the current tariff reduction program. 
APEC economies are to ensure full and effective 
implementation of their Uruguay Round outcomes within 
the agreed time frame in a manner fully consistent with the 
letter and the spirit of the WTO. Moreover, the goal is that 
each APEC economy will, on a voluntary basis, accelerate 
the implementation of Uruguay Round outcomes and 
deepen and broaden these. Virtually all those APEC 
economies that are members of the WTO have made 
explicit commitments in their IAPs to implement their UR 
obligations (PECC 1999). However, few, if any, APEC 
members, including PNG, have made commitments that 
exceed their WTO obligations. 
Investment Liberalization 
APEC’s Investment Principles are aimed at facilitating 
unilateral foreign investment reforms within the region to 
meet the Bogor goal of free and open investment by the 
specified target dates by members progressively providing 
for MFN and national treatment as well as ensuring 
transparency. This contrasts with the WTO, which has no 
investment agreement, although foreign investment in 
services is now explicitly covered by the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)34. However, APEC 
                                                          
34 By covering commercial presence as one of the four modes of 
internationally supplying services, WTO members that negotiated 
bound commitments under GATS for scheduled services had to 
specify limitations to national treatment and market access provided 
by their foreign investment regulations.  Most members in practice 
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albeit again 
non-binding 
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investment principles are voluntary and non-binding on 
members. 
By deregulating its investment regime in 1996, PNG is 
currently phasing out its list of activities reserved for 
domestic investors, starting with construction and 
manufacturing. It intends implementing the Business 
Information Facilitation Center as part of the ‘One Stop 
Shop’ Concept. The Government has also commenced the 
development of a register for foreign investor approvals in 
conjunction with other related government agencies to 
facilitate investment. Helpful though these initiatives are, 
more is needed to attract FDI in a world where this aspect 
of globalization is accelerating elsewhere. 
APEC’s non-binding investment principles are themselves 
modest, and could be strengthened in a number of areas 
such as requiring limits on the use of investment 
incentives. They include a number of key properties that 
foreign investment regimes should meet if they are to be 
efficient and conducive to economic development. These 
are: 
• Transparency -- all laws, regulations, etc. should be 
publicly available; 
• Non-discrimination between source countries; 
• National treatment – foreign investors should be treated 
no differently than domestic investors; 
• Investment incentives – health, safety and 
environmental regulations should not be relaxed as an 
incentive to encourage foreign investment; 
• Performance requirements – countries should minimize 
the use of performance requirements that distort or limit 
the expansion of trade and investment; 
                                                                                                                                                   
also provided for a horizontal commitment in their GATS’ schedules, 
specifying that commercial presence on services was subject to their 
foreign investment laws and regulations. 
PNG’s
investment
commitments
in APEC are 
modest, but an 
important start 
APEC’s
investment
principles
make good 
economic
sense
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• Expropriation and compensation – there should be no 
expropriation of foreign investments, except for a public 
purpose, and then only with adequate compensation; 
• Repatriation and convertibility – the transfer of funds 
related to foreign investment (profits, dividends, 
royalties, etc.) should be facilitated and in convertible 
currencies; 
• Settlement of disputes – disputes arising in connection 
with foreign investment should be settled promptly 
through consultation and negotiation between the 
parties or through arbitration procedures acceptable to 
both parties; 
• Entry and sojourn of personal – the temporary entry and 
sojourn of key foreign technical and managerial 
personnel connected with foreign investment should be 
permitted and encouraged, subject to relevant laws and 
regulations; 
• Avoidance of double taxation; 
• Behaviour of foreign investors should be consistent with 
the host country’s laws and regulations; and 
• Regulatory and institutional barriers to the outflow of 
investment should be minimized. 
Rules and regulations affecting foreign investment have 
traditionally been a major problem in Pacific island 
economies. They have been unnecessarily complex, 
discretionary and non-transparent, and often impose high 
transaction costs on investors. Policy statements on foreign 
investment often have been incomplete and ambiguous, 
and rules and regulations frequently are applied 
inconsistently across investors. By contrast, if APEC 
investment principles were adopted, the environment 
would be markedly improved. 
Room for 
much
improvement
in the Pacific 
region’s
investment
policies … 
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Non-APEC Pacific island economies could, as with trade, 
also adopt APEC’s investment principles. Indeed FICs 
have collectively endorsed the pursuit of open, liberal and 
transparent investment policies consistent with the APEC 
non-binding investment principles. With this in mind, 
Forum governments have instituted a process whereby the 
Forum Secretariat would assess progress among members 
in bringing national investment policies into line with 
APEC principles.  
The Forum's initiative has also involved an assessment by 
individual governments and by the Foreign Investment 
Advisory Service (FIAS) as to the consistency of their own 
investment legislation with APEC principles35. FIAS 
reported in 1998 that the countries’ self-evaluations of their 
investment regime showed a high level of compliance and 
commitment to APEC principles, but warned that these 
assessments should be treated cautiously. It was likely that 
the implications of APEC principles were not fully 
understood by officials and that policy may be incorrectly 
equated with application. Moreover, regular separate 
assessments of the transparency of such regulations have 
also found weaknesses. In the case of PNG, FIAS found 
considerable departures from the APEC principles, 
including transparency shortcomings (Tables 6.1). 
FIAS has identified several principles as the main ones 
lacking from the investment regimes of FICs, including 
PNG, the Solomon Islands and Fiji as well as the other 
island economies. Repatriation and convertibility as well as 
temporary entry and sojourn of personnel are two areas 
where the administrative requirements set are often more 
onerous than the policy statements would imply. 
Simplification and increased transparency of the processes 
would therefore reduce transaction costs faced by 
investors.
                                                          
35 FIAS is a joint service of the World bank and the International 
Finance Corporation. 
… as has been
recognized in 
the region's 
island
economies
Self-
assessment of 
investment
regime is 
dubious
Investment
regimes have 
plenty of scope 
for
improvement
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Many of the inadequacies in PNG’s investment regime are 
recognized in the Government’s National Investment 
Policy, released in June 1998. The legislative provisions are 
being reviewed and amendments proposed to the 1992 
Investment Promotion Act, which established the 
Investment Promotion Authority. Legislation is to be 
amended to re-focus the Authority’s role to promote, 
rather than control, FDI. The new national investment 
policy is designed to provide transparency, equal 
treatment, and consistency for investors. It proposes: 
• strengthening the Authority’s investment support 
functions by establishing a one-stop shop to process 
investors more efficiently; 
• modifying the Investment Promotion Act to shift from a 
case-by-case approval process for foreign investments to 
a simpler system of registration of businesses, with ex 
post monitoring of investments; and  
• reviewing investment procedures under specific sectoral 
legislation and making the procedures and 
requirements consistent with a more liberal approach to 
foreign investment. 
Outside the mining sector, PNG has had a disappointing 
record in attracting foreign investment (Table 6.2). 
Approvals usually substantially exceed actual levels. This 
indicates that other factors discourage investors, such as 
the difficult economic climate as well as policy and 
political uncertainties that exist in PNG. There may also be 
considerable obstacles to implementing foreign investment, 
such as problems in gaining approval from local 
community groups and obtaining secure land rights. 
Mining investment, including especially in oil and mineral 
exploration, also has dropped sharply in recent years. 
Some positive 
developments
in PNG could 
be accelerated 
PNG’s record 
on foreign 
investment is 
not great 
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PNG’s National Investment Policy calls for the review of 
all fiscal and non-fiscal incentives and the development of 
a comprehensive and transparent framework for providing 
investment incentives. Investment incentives are to be 
rationalized under the tax and customs laws. The objective 
is to formulate a uniform and consistent set of investment 
incentives that can be administered openly by the 
Authority. The new arrangements are designed to remove 
case-by-case ministerial discretion in the use of investment 
incentives in order to avoid intense lobbying and past 
misuse.
The planned 
rationalization
of investment 
incentives is 
consistent with 
APEC
principles
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Table 6.2: Foreign investment approvals in PNG, 1995-98 
• (K million and per cent) 
Sector/Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sector     
 Agriculture 464 152 7 1 
 Forestry 398 148 407 40 
 Mining 1,345 399 501 359 
 Manufacturing 17 67 232 7 
 Construction 43 131 282 16 
 Transport & 
communication 
85 853 72 33 
 Other 104 169 302 82 
 
Total 2,456 1,919 1,803 538 
 
Country (%)a     
 Australia 21 21 21 17 
 Malaysia 18 18 18 9 
 North America 18 18 18 17 
 China 3 3 3 46 
 Japan 0.3 0.3 0.3 5 
 Other Asian crisis 
economies 
3 3 3 2 
 Other 37 37 37 4 
 
a Figures for 1995-97 are three-year averages.
Source: WTO (1999). 
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Other APEC Undertakings 
These areas include standards and conformance; customs 
procedures; intellectual property rights; and rules of origin. 
In these cases, APEC undertakings mainly reinforce WTO 
commitments and thus, for countries such as PNG that are 
also WTO members, provide few, if any, additional 
commitments as such, other than the general one of 
accelerating their implementation where possible (Table 
6.3). For example, APEC’s commitments on technical 
standards require members to have transparent standards 
and conformity assessment procedures that are aligned 
with international norms in accordance with the WTO 
Technical barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Agreements36. Similarly, APEC members are committed to 
implementing the requirements of the WTO Agreements 
on TRIPS, on rules of origin, on customs valuation, and on 
services liberalization. 
PNG as a non-member of the WTO plurilateral Agreement 
on Government Procurement is not subject to any 
multilateral commitments on government procurement to 
other WTO members. However, APEC’s undertakings on 
government procurement are relevant. These require PNG 
to develop a common understanding on government 
procurement policies and systems, and to liberalize its 
government procurement market in accordance with the 
principles and objectives of the Bogor Declaration, as well 
as to contribute in the process to the evolution of work on 
government procurement in other multilateral fora. An 
important aspect of this is to enhance the transparency of 
its government procurement methods. 
                                                          
36 APEC members are also encouraged to enter mutual recognition 
agreements on standards and conformity testing with APEC 
economies as provided for in WTO agreements. 
Other APEC 
undertakings 
mainly ‘back 
up’ WTO 
disciplines
But APEC 
places
additional 
undertakings 
on PNG in 
government
procurement 
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Governments often use public procurement practices to 
discriminate in favour of domestic suppliers. This can be 
done explicitly by providing local suppliers with a 
specified price preference or implicitly by having non-
transparent and cumbersome procedures that make it more 
difficult for foreign suppliers to participate in the 
procurement process. Such arrangements are highly 
questionable on efficiency grounds, and risk not only using 
scare government funds inappropriately but also 
protecting domestic suppliers against more competitive 
foreign suppliers. Thus, as a potential form of protection 
they risk promoting inefficient industries at home that 
cannot compete without government support. They also 
provide opportunities for corruption. 
Government
procurement 
can become 
another means 
of protecting 
domestic 
industries
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APEC undertakings on government procurement are 
modest compared to the WTO plurilateral commitments. 
WTO arrangements are designed to improve the 
transparency of members’ government procurement 
processes to limit the degree of discrimination against 
foreign suppliers. Unlike APEC undertakings, they require 
WTO members not to maintain price preferences in favour 
of domestic suppliers. For the sake of its economy PNG 
should therefore use its APEC involvement to ensure that 
government procurement arrangements do not, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, discriminate against more 
efficient foreign suppliers. Then it should re-consider its 
policy of not joining the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement. The Solomon Islands and Fiji also would 
benefit from doing likewise. 
APEC members have also undertaken to enhance the 
competitive environment in the Asia Pacific region by 
introducing or maintaining effective and adequate 
competition policy and/or laws with associated 
enforcement policies. These are to be transparent so as to 
maximize the efficient operation of markets, and the 
competition among producers and traders, to the benefit of 
consumers. The WTO has no equivalent provisions 
concerning competition policy yet, but the desirability of 
doing so is currently being examined by WTO members.  
At present there is no national competition policy or 
specific competition legislation in PNG. The only laws 
protecting consumers from unfair trade practices are the 
Consumer Protection Act and the Price Control Act. 
However, the Government intends, over the longer term, 
to introduce a business practices act and a national 
competition policy. There is no specific competition law in 
Fiji or the Solomon Islands either. 
However, implementing effective competition legislation 
and its enforcement is particularly resource-intensive and 
carries with it certain risks. There is no clear consensus 
among economists as to the best form for such policies to 
take. While the need for legislation prohibiting predatory 
APEC
undertakings 
on government 
procurement 
are modest 
Competition
policy is being 
addressed in 
APEC, ahead 
of WTO 
PNG intends 
implementing a 
national
competition
policy
Competition
policy would 
be difficult to 
introduce well 
…
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pricing behaviour is widely accepted (although there are 
few documented cases of this actually happening), 
considerable disagreement exists as to the role competition 
policies should play in preventing anti-competitive 
behaviour.  
What is almost universally accepted is that open trade and 
import competition is the best means available for 
promoting competitive domestic markets for tradable 
products, particularly for developing countries with 
limited administrative capacity. In cases of non-traded 
services, the best competition policy is to deregulate and 
open up investment so that foreign-service suppliers can 
enter the domestic market as competitors.  
… so open 
trade is the 
best
competition
policy for now 
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Choosing the way forward
PNG and the smaller Pacific island economies are at a 
major crossroads as we enter the third millennium. In the 
past decade or so the world has changed in very 
fundamental ways. The changes affect all economies, but 
especially those with policy regimes least suited to this 
fundamentally new environment. The creation of APEC in 
1989, and more so the coming into being of the World 
Trade Organization in 1995 following the Uruguay Round, 
have contributed to the new environment. But they are less 
a cause of those fundamental changes than a response to 
them. It is the information technology revolution that is the 
main driver of this new wave of globalization. The abilities 
of national economies to adjust and take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by that phenomenon have differed 
greatly, but not so much because of different levels of 
economic development. Rather, it has been correlated with 
differences in the degree of openness of their economies, 
together with having appropriate institutions for good 
governance such as law and order and well-defined and 
enforced property rights.  
The WTO agreements and the APEC process are crucial 
international institutional creations aimed at helping 
national governments respond to the forces of 
globalization. Key members are responding, and as a 
consequence globalization has accelerated — making it all 
the more imperative for other countries to adjust their 
policy regimes. 
Pacific island 
economies are 
at the 
crossroads as 
globalization
accelerates
The responses 
by other 
countries raise 
the stakes for 
Pacific island 
economies
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A very positive feature of this phenomenon is that 
countries with good economic governance will be 
rewarded more in the future than they would have been in 
the past for their sensible policy stance. But the converse is 
also true. That is, countries with poor economic governance 
will be penalized more in the future than they would have 
been in the past. The most obvious manifestation of that 
penalty is the way in which foreign investments will be 
withdrawn and not replaced. A less obvious but probably 
more important manifestation will be a reduced ability of 
domestic firms to compete internationally, both at home 
and abroad.  
Thus Pacific island countries face a stark choice: either they 
embrace globalization by adjusting their policy regimes to 
this new world, or their economies are destined to grow 
even slower. And they will grow slower not only relative 
to the rest of the world, but also in absolute terms as they 
fall further behind the technology leaders (given that 
technology transfer is closely related to openness of goods, 
services and capital markets). 
For PNG, Fiji and the Solomon Islands, their WTO 
membership has the potential to assist their governments 
adjust their policy regimes in appropriate ways. So too 
does the WTO accession process for those less-populous 
island economies that have already applied (Samoa, Tonga 
and Vanuatu). And by becoming a WTO Observer, the 
Forum Secretariat can assist the other Pacific island 
economies in learning the basic rules of good economic 
governance as it relates to trade, the essence of what GATT 
rules are about. The APEC process provides a 
supplementary avenue for learning about good 
governance. As an APEC member, PNG can acquire that 
directly; but FICs can get it indirectly through their close 
association not only with PNG but also with their other 
neighbours who are members. 
Globalization 
rewards good 
governance,
but penalizes 
poor
governance
The choice is 
therefore stark 
WTO (and 
APEC)
membership
can assist 
policy reform 
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The challenge for Pacific island governments and their 
citizens is before them. On the one hand, if they choose not 
to open up and reform their economies, their relatively 
poor economic growth and poverty alleviation 
performance of the past 25 years is likely not just to 
continue but to worsen. On the other hand, if they choose 
to embrace reform, the payoff will be even higher now than 
it would have been without this new wave of globalization. 
The payoff is greater now both because Pacific island 
economies are further behind than they were even just a 
few years ago, and because the opportunities for 
leapfrogging via technology transfer are so much greater 
now thanks to the information revolution. 
Embracing that challenge will not be easy politically or 
socially. Vested interests in the current protectionist trade 
regimes will fight to retain their privileged positions. 
Others will resent having to adjust to new ways of doing 
things. Most who would gain from reform are only 
vaguely aware of what could be in store for them, or not 
aware at all of the opportunities that could be before them. 
Hence, politicians with a short horizon will be reluctant to 
risk their positions by taking the lead. 
Yet the ‘status quo’ option will become increasingly costly 
as globalization proceeds in the rest of the world. So how 
can Pacific island economies begin to respond? 
The most important priority for governments is to accept 
— and persuade their constituencies to accept — that trade, 
investment and other economic reforms are badly needed 
if private sector development and growth is to occur, since 
it is only by improving productivity that living standards 
can rise over the long term. Governments must be deeply 
committed to the process, and because that commitment 
has to be sustained it must be driven from a domestic base. 
While WTO (and APEC) membership can help reform-
minded governments to implement market-opening 
measures, membership alone is insufficient for meaningful 
and sustainable reform. 
Payoffs from 
reform are 
even higher 
now
Resistance to 
reform is still 
strong… 
... but to not 
reform would 
be very costly 
Pacific island 
governments
must build a 
constituency
for reform 
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At least four simultaneous domestic ingredients are needed 
at the outset if reform is to sustained: comprehensive 
awareness-raising campaigns; careful design of the reform 
program including the phasing of the implementation of 
each policy change; focused, socially productive 
adjustment assistance programs; and well-targeted 
technical and financial aid from abroad to help achieve the 
first three actions. 
Communities, particularly in rural areas where the net 
benefits would be greatest, need to become much more 
acutely aware of the gains that could come their way if 
WTO-consistent market reforms were adopted. They also 
need to be aware that the gains would come gradually 
rather than all at once, whereas the costs of adjustment as 
reforms are implemented — even though they are one-off 
— will have to be borne up front. In the case of grossly 
distorted economies, the adjustment period could stretch 
out over a decade or more. If that is not understood at the 
outset, the risk is that disappointed expectations could lead 
to pressures for policy reversals. In extreme cases that 
could be worse than doing nothing, because it would 
involve double adjustment costs and no gains.  
Prioritizing the reforms so they are appropriately 
sequenced and implemented at a pace that does not 
overwhelm the capacity of the legislature and the public 
administrators is obviously sensible. A key to keeping the 
costs of adjustment for the private sector manageable is to 
phase in the bigger reform programs over a pre-
determined period that is announced at the outset. 
Thinking through the new policies before announcing 
them is crucial though, since subsequent changes to the 
new policies — or even just to the timing of the 
implementation phases — will reduce the credibility of the 
process and thereby discourage investors. 
Even though the benefits from market liberalization will far 
outweigh the up-front adjustment costs, the latter are both 
immediate and hit concentrated groups (e.g., those 
involved in industries that cannot compete when their 
Four domestic 
ingredients are 
needed:
(i) raise 
awareness of 
opportunities,
but also of the 
up-front
adjustment
costs
(ii) sequence 
the reforms 
and phase the 
implement-
ation of the 
bigger ones 
(iii) assist 
people’s
adjustment … 
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protection from imports is reduced). Where reform-
resistant interest groups are powerful politically, reform 
may only be possible if those affected are given an explicit 
adjustment incentive. In such cases, a special adjustment 
scheme may be needed, such as has been applied recently 
in Australia as part of the dairy market reforms. Such a 
scheme might be necessary in the extreme case of sugar 
reform in PNG’s Ramu Valley. 
More generally, the best way the government can facilitate 
adjustment — which because of economic growth and 
globalization is happening to a considerable extent even 
when national policies are unchanged — is to equip people 
with the necessary skills for meeting the challenges and 
seizing the opportunities that change brings. All the 
international evidence points to better basic education 
being the key provider of such skills. Hence, some of the 
tax dividend from the faster economic growth that will 
result from reform could be used to improve the quantity 
and quality of primary and secondary education.  
Obviously, training programs for administrators and for 
trainers of administrators could enhance the capacity of the 
public service to facilitate adjustment to the reforms. One 
direct way of doing that at the outset is to provide trade 
and industry policy courses for bureaucrats and policy 
analysts. Both short courses in-country, and anything from 
one- to four-semester postgraduate programs in more 
advanced economies, have proved to be highly effective 
forms of capacity building for numerous developing 
countries in recent years following the Uruguay Round.  
No Pacific island economy need confront these challenges 
alone. On the contrary, they can support each other by 
sharing ideas on how to design and implement reforms. 
Technical help is also available from the WTO Secretariat 
and member countries (provided to would-be as well as 
current WTO members) and from the World Bank and 
UNCTAD, financed by bilateral or multilateral aid flows. 
Such assistance is also available though the APEC process 
— for PNG at least — and from the South Pacific Forum 
… via better 
basic
education in 
the long term 
…
… and training 
programs for 
administrators
in the short- to 
medium-term
(iv) secure 
appropriate
technical and 
financial aid
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Secretariat. The necessary knowledge and goodwill exist in 
the international community to support the many aspects 
involved in comprehensive reform, should Pacific island 
countries choose to make them a long-term priority. Some 
countries, including PNG, have already taken some steps 
in the right direction.  
The opportunity to embrace the reform process more 
comprehensively, and the rewards from doing so, have 
never been greater than they are now. It remains for 
leaders of Pacific islands to seize that opportunity. 
 
The
opportunity is 
there for 
leaders to 
embrace
  
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Interviews held as part of the study 
Date & time Contact 
6 June 2000  
0800 Mr Alan Mclay 
President 
Lae Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
1000 Mr Wong Y Meng 
Chief Executive officer 
International Food Corporation 
1430 Mr Kerry McDonough 
Managing Director 
Chemcare Pharmacy 
1545 Mr Mark low 
Managing director 
Niugini Tablebirds 
7 June 2000  
 Mr Michael Quenby            Mr Steve Vaux 
General Manager                 Agricultural Manager 
Ramu Sugar Limited            Ramu Sugar Limited 
 Site inspection and group meeting with 
stakeholders from Ramu Sugar Limited and 
community representatives 
8 June 2000  
0800 Mr Wayne Golding 
President 
Manufacturer’s Council of PNG 
1000 Dr Ben Imbun 
Department of Economics & Business Studies 
University of PNG 
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1100 Dr Agogo Mawuli 
National Research Institute 
Date & time Contact 
1300 Mr Veali Vagi 
Prime Minister’s Department 
1400 Mr Thomas Abe 
Department of Trade & Industry 
1500 Mr Evoa Lalatute 
Secretary 
Department of Foreign Affairs 
9 June 2000  
         Public Seminar on WTO and APEC 
12 June 2000  
0800 Mr Mike Manning 
Director 
Institute of National Affairs 
0900 Mr Vincent Bull 
Managing Director 
BHP (PNG) Ltd 
1000 Mr Rob Rudy 
Economic Advisor 
Internal Revenue Commission 
1130 Mr Simon Peter 
Corporate Secretary 
Investment Promotion Authority 
12 June 2000  
1330 Mr Wilson Kamit 
Governor 
Bank of PNG 
1445 Dr Sam Lahis 
Project Coordinator 
Department of Agriculture & Livestock 
1630 Mr David Conn 
President 
POM Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
Appendix 2 
Public Seminar on WTO & APEC 
Granville Motel 
9th June 2000 
 
Session 1 Chairman 
9.00-9.30 Introduction to WTO and APEC-Dr Samson 
Polume 
9.30-9.45 Discussion and comments 
9.45-10-15 The Government View-Michael Maue, Secretary, 
DTI 
 
Session 2 Chairman: Samson Polume 
10.15-10.30 Morning tea 
10.30-11.00 Investment Promotion-Simon Peter, IPA  
11.00-11-15 Discussion and comment 
11.15-11.45 NGO Point of View- Lessons form Seattle- 
Lester Seri, Conservation Melanesia 
11.45-12.0 Discussion 
 
Session 3 Chairman  
1.15-1.45 Union Point of View-John Paska 
1.45-2.00 Discussion and comment 
2.00-2.30 Manufacturers’ Point of View-Manufacturers’ 
Council 
2.30-2.45 Discussion and comment 
 
Session 4 Chairman: Mike Manning 
2.45-3.00 Afternoon tea 
3.00-3.30 Agricultural Point of View-RIC 
3.30-3.45 Discussion and comment 
3.45-4.15 Summary-Malcolm Bosworth, Consultant 
4.15-5.00 General discussion and comment 
  
 
Appendix 3 
What WTO accession and membership 
involve 
Participation in WTO will constitute the cornerstone for 
PNG trade policy development in the 21st century, as it will 
for those larger Pacific Island economies that have recently 
joined WTO (Fiji and Solomon Islands) or are in the 
process of joining (Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu). In return 
for the rights and opportunities that membership of these 
clubs brings, there are also some obligations and challenges 
that must be faced. Governments sign on to those 
obligations presumably because they believe the benefits 
will outweigh the costs, even though some of the 
obligations offer political challenges in the short term. In 
particular, the process of negotiating accession to WTO 
consolidates and makes it more difficult to reverse a 
country’s economic reforms.  
Benefits and obligations of WTO membership 
To become a WTO member is to join a club. Like all clubs, 
the WTO bestows benefits on members but there are some 
costs; it offers rights but with them come obligations; it 
provides new opportunities but also some challenges. 
Evidently the net benefits are overwhelmingly positive, 
given that more than 120 developing countries will be 
members within five years. But like all worthy clubs, there 
are rules to be followed, entry conditions to be met and 
formal accession procedures to follow. Occasionally the 
rules and obligations upset political sensitivities because 
some groups within a country may lose a privilege (e.g., 
protection from import competition), but almost invariably 
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those rules boost the overall economy of each WTO 
member. The general benefits that come from the freer 
trade that those rules encourage include the following: 
• better allocation of national resources towards 
industries with the strongest comparative advantage; 
• enhanced learning and newer technologies from 
interacting more with the rest of the world; 
• greater flexibility, via trade, for dealing with shock such 
as natural disasters;  
• less wasteful rent-seeking lobbying activities by groups 
seeking government assistance and protection; and 
• reduced poverty.  
Three specific benefits of WTO membership are greater 
and more-secure market access abroad for a country’s 
exports, access to a dispute resolution mechanism, and 
greater discipline at home in sound economic policy 
making. 
On the first of these, WTO rules, and particularly GATT 
Articles I and III, ensure that a member’s exporters are 
entitled to non-discriminatory treatment by other WTO 
members in terms of access to their markets. This involves 
two aspects. One is ‘most-favoured-nation’ (MFN) status, 
or the same market access as other WTO members, to any 
particular member’s markets for most goods. The key 
exceptions at present involve farm products and textiles 
and clothing, which are subject to separate agreements 
involving some quantitative import restrictions still. But 
even with these goods, it may be possible for better 
(including faster-expanding) access to be negotiated 
bilaterally as part of acceding to the WTO. In general 
(again there are exceptions) an import tariff is the only 
measure that can be used to restrict market access. 
Moreover, that access is guaranteed through upper limits 
on those tariffs (called ‘bindings’). Typically, members 
have made commitments not just to cap them but also to 
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phase down over time many of those bound tariff rates, so 
their trading partner members can expect to enjoy an 
expansion over time in guaranteed access to such markets. 
The other non-discriminatory aspect is ‘national treatment’, 
which means that a country must treat foreign suppliers no 
less favourably than domestic suppliers. 
Secondly, if a member feels another member is not playing 
by the rules, the WTO has a dispute settlement mechanism 
for resolving the issue. Thanks to the Uruguay Round, that 
mechanism is now much stronger, faster, impartial, and 
binding than was the case under the GATT prior to 1995. 
As a result, members are less inclined to bend or break 
WTO rules and, if they do, other members have a 
reasonable chance of bringing them back into line and/or 
being compensated. Again this brings much greater 
security of access to markets for WTO members as 
compared with non-members. 
And thirdly, because WTO rules also apply to one’s own 
policies, membership brings discipline to economic 
policymaking at home as well. This can be a major 
advantage for a government keen to provide sound 
economic governance but subject to interest-group 
pleading for special protectionist favours. 
More specifically, members are required to tariffy their 
non-tariff import restrictions, bind them, and perhaps even 
agree to a phasing down in some of those bound rates over 
time (which reduces the risk of policy reversals); to free up 
trade in services over time, again with specific 
commitments recorded in its Schedules; to strengthen and 
enforce its intellectual property rights legislation; to reduce 
state support for or direction of other (especially trading) 
enterprises; to limit any domestic support for agricultural 
industries; and to enforce WTO rules uniformly and 
predictably. Typically, WTO members are more 
demanding in all these respects on acceding countries than 
on existing members, although perhaps less so for least-
developed countries. 
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All trade and trade-related policy measures must be 
notified to the WTO Secretariat. This adds to domestic 
policy transparency, making it more difficult for interest 
groups to be protected without detection. Numerous WTO 
Agreements require a member to have a single enquiry 
point where WTO members can seek information on 
policies covered by those agreements (e.g., TBT, SPS, TRIPs 
and GATS). Members are also required to inform the WTO 
Secretariat each year if any significant policy changes 
occur, to provide statistical information annually in a set 
format, and to undertake with the Secretariat, probably 
every six years, a comprehensive review of the member’s 
trade and trade-related policies and practices. 
There are other notification requirements as well. For 
example, all state trading enterprises must be notified to 
the WTO’s Council on Goods, even those enterprises not 
engaged in international trade. Any trade restrictions 
imposed or changed for balance-of-payments reasons, or 
for sanitary or phytosanitary reasons, must be reported to 
the WTO. Technical standards different from accepted 
international standards, and conformity assessment 
procedures, also have to be notified. So too do any trade-
related investment measures and import licensing 
procedures that are not in conformity with Uruguay 
Round agreements, as do all subsidy programs and all 
GATT-inconsistent voluntary export restraints. 
Clearly these notification and review requirements are 
non-trivial for the national government of a small 
developing economy, and require considerable cooperation 
and coordination among the relevant agencies of the 
various levels of government. Furthermore, an enquiry 
point must be created and maintained such that other 
WTO members can readily find up-to-date information 
about trade and trade-related policies. New trade practices 
and procedures must be codified into laws and regulations 
and recorded in an official journal to which other WTO 
members can have ready access. 
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An example of a problematic area relates to import 
licencing rules. All rules and procedures for obtaining 
import licences must be published, procedures must be 
simple and prompt, the licences in principle should be 
administered through a ‘one-stop shop’ (or at most two), 
applicants have the right to ask for an explanation of non-
approval and to appeal the decision, and a great deal of 
statistical information must be made available. 
The steps to WTO accession 
There is a series of steps required before a country can 
accede to the WTO. In the course of taking these steps, a 
country gradually amends its policies and institutions in 
readiness to abide by WTO rules and accept the obligations 
of membership. 
The first step (although it is not obligatory) is to request 
Observer status so that national government officials can 
begin learning from the inside as to how the WTO 
institution works. When ready, the country submits a letter 
of application that triggers the establishment of a Working 
Party to examine the applicant’s trade policies and 
practices, to organise accession negotiations, and to 
prepare the Protocol of Accession. 
The next big step towards WTO accession is to prepare a 
Memorandum on the country’s foreign trade regime. For a 
country in which policy transparency is not the norm, this 
is a major undertaking. Background information on the 
economy and domestic economic policies, detailed 
statistics on the country’s foreign trade and investment, an 
outline of its legislative and bureaucratic frameworks for 
making and enforcing policies affecting foreign trade, and 
a copy of all the laws and regulations are required. In 
addition, the Memorandum must detail every current and 
agreed future policy measure affecting trade in goods, 
foreign investment policy and regulations, the trade-
related intellectual property regime, the trade-related 
services regime, and any bilateral or plurilateral trade or 
economic integration agreements to which the country is a 
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signatory. And a comprehensive tariff schedule in the 
detailed harmonized system nomenclature must be 
attached. 
This Memorandum is circulated to all WTO members who 
are invited to submit in writing any questions of 
clarification. Once the country has compiled its answers to 
these questions, they are submitted to the Working Party, 
which triggers a series of review sessions. The frequency 
and length of meetings and the overall time this step takes 
depend heavily on the speed and comprehensiveness of 
the accedent’s responses to the initial and follow-up 
questions: this step in principle could be completed in just 
a few months, but in practice (as in China’s case) it could 
take several years. 
Once the examination of the country’s foreign trade regime 
is sufficiently advanced, members initiate bilateral market 
access negotiations on goods and services and on the other 
terms to be agreed. Even then, further fact-finding work on 
the trade regime may continue in parallel with those 
negotiations. Negotiations also proceed on a multilateral 
basis through the Working Party, during which three draft 
schedules of commitments have to be prepared. They relate 
to: tariffs (to be reduced and bound or subjected to ceiling 
bindings) and other measures affecting trade in goods; 
market access, domestic support and export subsidies 
affecting agricultural trade (which again have to be 
bound); and services trade commitments. They may 
specify phase-in periods and allow temporary maintenance 
of current practices for a limited period.  
In practice these market access commitments are 
negotiated with one or more of the WTO members who are 
principal suppliers, but they are extended on an 
unconditional MFN basis to all WTO members. The 
commitments may extend beyond the scope of the 
Uruguay Round agreements (e.g., privatization). In this 
process the acceding country cannot seek ‘concessions’ 
from members, but on accession it will have the guarantee 
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of MFN access to all members’ markets (something which 
it may have been denied previously). 
Once the negotiations on the three schedules of 
commitments are concluded, the Working Party will 
submit its report together with a draft Decision and 
Protocol of Accession to the General Council or Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO. Acceptance requires two-thirds of 
WTO members to approve it.  
Special and differential treatment for developing 
and least-developed countries 
In addition to receiving the standard WTO membership 
benefits such as MFN and national treatment, the right to 
some of the low-tariff rate quota access to others’ 
agricultural markets, the possibility of accelerated growth 
in access to US and EU markets for textiles and clothing, 
and access to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, those 
WTO members that are developing countries, and in 
particular least-developed economies including those in 
transition from central planning, also receive some special 
(although typically temporary) treatment in the WTO. This 
crops up in many places in the WTO agreements. 
However, this is not a set of rights automatically given in 
full to an acceding country. On the contrary, each of those 
items must be negotiated, and in practice many developing 
and transition countries (most notably China) find it 
difficult to secure much in the way of special and 
differential treatment even as developing countries let 
alone as least-developed. 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 4 
Determinants of structural change in a 
developing economy 
One of the most striking features of economic development 
is the relative decline of the primary sector in growing 
economies. Also typical, particularly of densely populated 
countries, is a decline in their agricultural comparative 
advantage as industrialization proceeds. Whether that 
leads to declines in food self-sufficiency and the value of 
net imports of agricultural products are moot points: it 
depends in part on policy trends, which happen often to 
gradually change from disfavouring to favouring 
agriculture relative to other tradable sectors over the long 
term. This Appendix seeks to explain these trends.  
Why the primary sector declines relatively as an 
economy grows 
A primitive economy with few trading opportunities 
necessarily has to devote most of its resources to the 
provision of food. Agriculture’s shares of national output 
and employment therefore start at high levels. As 
economic development proceeds, however, agriculture’s 
shares of GDP and employment typically fall. This has 
commonly been attributed to two phenomena: the slow 
rise in the demand for food as compared with other goods 
and services as incomes rise (that is, relatively low price 
and income elasticities of demand); and the more rapid 
development (at least historically – see Martin and Mitra 
1998) of new technologies for primary sectors, relative to 
those for other sectors, which leads to expanding food 
supplies per hectare and per worker. Some of those new 
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technologies can be imported by a late-developing 
economy from those more-advanced economies that were 
similarly endowed in earlier decades with a scarcity (or 
abundance) of land per worker, and then adapted 
relatively easily to local conditions. Together those forces 
suggest we should expect a decline in agriculture’s terms 
of trade in international markets, and more so the stronger 
is productivity growth in agriculture compared with other 
sectors.  
In practise that decline in the terms of trade for primary 
product exporters is exacerbated by the gradual policy 
change, from taxing to subsidising agriculture, that so 
often accompanies the economic development of nations 
(Anderson 1994, 1995a). The weight of empirical evidence 
seems consistent with that expectation, in that agricultural 
prices appear to have declined considerably relative to 
industrial product prices during the past century, even 
after adjusting prices of (particularly non-farm) products 
for changes in quality (Grilli and Yang 1988). 
But what about in an open agrarian economy that can trade 
all of its products internationally at those terms of trade? If 
such an economy opened itself fully to international trade, 
the importance of agriculture would increase and the 
country would export agricultural produce and with the 
foreign exchange proceeds would import other products. If 
productivity growth and/or factor accumulation occurred 
in this open economy and the international terms of trade 
remained unchanged, agriculture’s share of national 
product would rise or fall depending on whether that 
productivity growth was biased toward farm or non-farm 
production. If that growth was sectorally unbiased, 
agriculture’s share would remain unchanged. However, if 
economic growth is occurring abroad and so altering 
relative prices internationally, the agricultural sector of a 
small open economy would decline unless the economy’s 
own growth is biased towards agriculture sufficiently for 
the quantity changes to more than offset the adverse 
change in the terms of trade that result from global 
economic growth.  
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The above assumes all products are tradable 
internationally. In reality, however, a large part of a 
developing economy involves the production and 
consumption of nontradable goods and services. These are 
items for which the costs of overcoming barriers to trading 
internationally -- especially transport costs -- are 
prohibitively expensive. The price of nontradables is 
determined by domestic demand and supply conditions 
because, unlike tradables, in equilibrium the quantity of 
nontradables demanded has to equal the quantity supplied 
domestically. Since the vast majority of nontradables are 
services, and since the income elasticity of demand for 
services tends to be well above unity, the demand for 
nontradables as a group is likely to be income elastic. 
To see how taking into account the existence of 
nontradables alters the above conclusions, think of the two 
tradable sectors as comprising one super-sector of 
tradables and the rest of the economy as comprising 
nontradables whose demand is income elastic (which 
means the demand for tradables as a group must be 
income inelastic for their weighted average to sum to 
unity). Then if both sectors enjoyed equally rapid 
productivity growth, the demand conditions would ensure 
that the GDP share of tradables declines with economic 
growth. And if, for the reasons mentioned above, 
agriculture’s importance is likely to decline within the 
tradables super-sector, it is even more likely to decline in 
relative importance in the total economy. Thus even for an 
open economy with an exceptionally dynamic farm sector, 
retaining resources in agriculture over the long term is 
unlikely; in fact, they will tend to be retained only in 
economies that are accumulating/importing non-farm 
resources relatively slowly and/or are suffering very slow 
productivity growth in their non-agricultural sectors, 
ceteris paribus (Anderson 1987). 
The above reasoning is sufficient also for explaining the 
decline in agriculture’s share of employment unless labour 
productivity is much slower in agriculture than in other 
sectors. Official data imply that agriculture’s share of 
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employment has not been declining as rapidly as the GDP 
share in growing economies.37 The latter should not be 
seen as a sign of relative deterioration in labour 
productivity in the agricultural sector, however, as more 
care is needed in measuring farm labour input. Specifically, 
the proportion of farm household labour time spent in non-
farm activities needs to be counted as agricultural only as 
much as the output is attributed to the agricultural sector. 
Typically in practice the recording of output is changed 
faster than the recording of employment and so the decline 
in agriculture’s share of employment tends to be 
understated more in national accounts than the decline in 
the GDP share.  
This decline in agriculture’s GDP share results partly 
because post-farm gate activities, such as taking produce to 
market, get commercialized and taken over by specialists 
in the service sector. In such cases the farmers receive a 
lower price, in return for which their households spend 
less time going to market. Another contributing factor is 
that previous manual farm jobs such as spreading manure 
and weeding crops disappear as farm chemicals become 
more profitable, available and affordable with higher-
yielding crop varieties, the seeds for which also have to be 
purchased in the case of hybrid varieties. As a result, value 
added by the farm household's own labour, land and 
capital, as a share of the gross value of agricultural output, 
falls over time as purchased intermediate inputs become 
more important. In fact, Anderson (1987, Table 2.1) 
provides evidence showing that the value-added share 
typically falls much more for agriculture than for the 
industrial sector. This increasing use of purchased 
intermediate inputs and off-farm services by farmers adds 
to the relative decline of the farm sector per se in overall 
GDP and employment.  
                                                          
37 For low-income countries the share of agriculture in GDP fell from 
34 to 25 per cent between 1980 and 1995, while the share of the 
labour force in agriculture as measured declined only slightly (from 
73 to 69 per cent between 1980 and 1990 – World Bank 1997a). 
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One might also expect agriculture’s share of exports to 
decline with economic growth, although with less certainty 
than for agriculture’s shares of GDP and employment. To 
see this, consider again an open economy in a world in 
which the international price of agricultural relative to 
other goods is declining over time because of economic 
growth abroad. If this open economy is growing and if its 
output growth is insufficiently biased towards the non-
farm sectors to match the non-farm bias in domestic 
demand growth, agriculture’s share of exports may not 
decline: excess supply may grow more rapidly for farm 
than for non-farm products. But if this economy is not 
growing or its growth is concentrated in non-farm sectors, 
agriculture’s share of its exports would decline, in part at 
least because of the decline in the relative price of farm 
products internationally. 
Why agricultural self sufficiency may or may not 
decline with growth 
What determines whether a country is a net agricultural 
exporter or importer at a point in time? And how will that 
position change over time? A nation's self sufficiency in 
farm products depends largely on its relative factor 
endowments compared with the rest of the world’s (the 
key determinant of agricultural comparative advantage) as 
well as on government policies at home and abroad. 
Leaving the latter aside for the moment, how can we 
conceptualize the impact of the former on a country’s trade 
composition?  
The role of relative factor endowments 
Perhaps the most appropriate simple model for explaining 
comparative advantage in a growth setting is that 
developed by Krueger (1977) and explored further by 
Deardorff (1984a). It is a model of two tradable sectors each 
using intersectorally mobile labour plus one specific factor 
(natural resource capital or produced capital). Assuming 
labour exhibits diminishing marginal product in each 
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sector (and assuming for the moment that there are no 
services or nontradables, and no policy distortions), then at 
a given set of international prices the real wage is 
determined by the overall per worker endowment of both 
forms of capital. The commodity composition of a 
country's trade -- that is, the extent to which a country is a 
net exporter of primary or industrial products -- is 
determined by its endowment of natural resource capital 
(farmland, forests, fisheries and minerals) relative to 
industrial capital compared with that ratio for the rest of the 
world. Within the primary sector, the more abundant a 
country’s per worker endowment of forests and minerals 
compared with arable land and industrial capital, the 
stronger will be its comparative advantage in primary 
products other than food crops. That is important for 
understanding changes in comparative advantage over 
time. For example, a minerals or energy raw materials 
discovery, or an increase in the international price of 
minerals or energy, would strengthen the country’s 
comparative advantage in mining and weaken its 
comparative advantage in farm and other goods, ceteris 
paribus. It would also encourage mobile resources to move 
into the production of nontradables as their demand 
strengthened and prices rose, further reducing farm and 
industrial production.38 On the other hand, net 
deforestation simultaneously depletes the stock of trees 
and natural forest land and increases the potential area of 
land for agriculture, thereby eventually strengthening the 
country’s comparative advantage in agriculture as a whole, 
ceteris paribus.  
Of course domestic or foreign savings can be invested to 
enhance the stock and/or improve the quality not only of 
industrial capital but also of labour or natural resources, in 
addition to providing capital specific to the nontradables 
                                                          
38  (Corden 1984). In fact the increased demand for nontradables 
(and other products) would begin as soon as expectations about 
future income prospects rose, which could be well before the export 
boom shows up in the trade statistics in the case where the exports 
are preceded by FDI inflows for investments with a long lead time 
(Corden 1982). 
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sector. Any such increase in the net stock of produced 
capital per worker will put upward pressure on real wages. 
That will encourage, in all sectors, the use of more labour-
saving techniques and the development and/or 
importation of new technologies that are less labour 
intensive. Which type of capital would expand fastest in a 
free-market setting depends on their expected rates of 
return. The more densely populated, natural resource-poor 
a country, the greater the likelihood that the highest payoff 
would be in expanding its capital stocks for non-primary 
sectors. At early stages of development of such a country 
with a relatively small stock of natural resources per 
worker, wages would be very low and the country would 
have a comparative cost advantage in unskilled labour-
intensive, standard-technology manufactures. Then as the 
stock of industrial capital grows, there would be a gradual 
move toward exporting more capital- and skill-intensive 
manufactures. Natural resource-abundant countries, on the 
other hand, would enter manufacturing at a later stage of 
development. Such countries are likely to have remained 
more than fully self sufficient in agricultural products for 
longer (although less so the greater their comparative 
advantage in minerals or other primary products, ceteris 
paribus), and their first industrial exports would be 
comparatively capital intensive. 39 
                                                          
39 Notwithstanding its popular media coverage, the theory of 
‘competitive’ advantage espowsed by Porter (1990) does not 
supersede this theory of comparative advantage based on relative 
factor endowments. Warr (1994) explains why, noting that the 
confusion arises because while both are concerned with international 
competitiveness in a global context, the former applies to firms within 
an industry or sector (which focus on their private costs and benefits 
alone) whereas the latter is concerned with the competitiveness of 
industries and sectors from a national viewpoint, taking account of all 
(including social) costs and benefits. The theory of comparative 
advantage in its simplest form is based on numerous assumptions 
which, as critics never tire to point out, are unrealistic. However, the 
basic thrust of the theory survives when these assumptions are 
relaxed and the theory is made dynamic, and strong empirical 
support from a wide range of countries can be found for the theory. 
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What determines the extent to which a country’s 
agricultural exports will be unprocessed rather than 
processed products, low quality rather than high quality, 
and non-perishable rather than perishable? The capital 
intensity of production of the latter will play some part, but 
most of the explanation will have to do with the 
cost/speed of in-country transportation and 
communications, with packing, grading and storage 
facilities, with sea and air port facilities, and with the 
volume of domestic urban sales of processed, high-quality 
and perishable products. The latter sales volume is 
important because it provides the derived demands for 
processing and distribution services which, when 
sufficiently large, allow economies of scale to lower the 
price at which the more sophisticated products can be 
made available for export). 
The role of policies affecting agricultural incentives 
The above expectations about agricultural self-sufficiency 
drawn from the theory of comparative advantage are based 
on the assumption of no interference in markets by 
governments. But in fact most countries intervene in 
markets and alter incentives facing producers and 
consumers.  
From a national viewpoint, four levels of intervention can 
be distinguished. One is intervention abroad that alters a 
country’s terms of trade. Another is intervention at the 
national macro level to encourage savings and investment: 
the provision of price stability (i.e., low inflation), 
responsible fiscal policies, the optimal regulation of an 
open financial market, law and order including for the 
establishment and protection of property rights, the 
optimal provision and geographic distribution of public 
goods such as infrastructure, and the offsetting of 
externalities (which again could involve sectoral or 
geographic biases). The third level of intervention has to do 
with the biasing of prices in favour of non-tradables via an 
overvalued currency (or, less commonly, in favour of 
tradables via undervaluing the nation’s currency). And the 
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fourth level of intervention has to do with altering output 
and input prices within the grouping of tradables sectors 
so that some tradables sectors enjoy more effective 
assistance from the government than others.40 
The fact that sub-optimal intervention is rampant would 
make it difficult to qualify the above conclusions from 
comparative cost theory, were it not for the fact that 
governments intervene in a fairly consistent fashion. Five 
empirical features of intervention are worth mentioning. 
First, policies in high-income countries tend to overprice 
farm relative to nonfarm products while policies in lower-
income countries tend to underprice them. Second, the 
degree of overpricing (underpricing) is highly positively 
correlated with the degree of agricultural comparative 
disadvantage (advantage). Third, over time countries tend 
to gradually change their policy induced distortion pattern 
away from negatively to positively assisting farmers and 
from effectively subsidizing to hurting food consumers. 
Fourth, much of the disincentive to agriculture in 
developing countries comes not from direct underpricing 
but indirectly via manufacturing protection and 
overvaluation of the nation’s currency. And fifth, most 
national governments have an urban bias in their provision 
of public infrastructure (transport, communications, etc.) 
and human capital (education, health, information 
production and dissemination, etc.) which decreases but 
rarely reverses with economic development, especially 
when the quality of those investments is properly 
accounted for. These transitions tend to occur at a faster 
rate the faster an economy is growing and, in the case of 
relative price distortions, to reach the point of intersectoral 
policy neutrality at an earlier stage of economic 
development the weaker a country's agricultural 
comparative advantage (Anderson 1995a).  
                                                          
40 As Corden (1994, Ch, 15) makes clear, these levels are useful in 
sorting out the different uses people make of the term “international 
competitiveness”, which could apply to all sectors, to just the 
grouping of sectors producing tradables, or to just one or a subset of 
those tradables sectors. 
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According to one recent set of estimates, the net effect on 
international prices of temperate foods of this relative 
overpricing in rich countries is almost exactly offset by the 
underpricing of those products in poorer countries (Tyers 
and Anderson 1992, Ch. 6). But that is less likely to be the 
case for edible oils, and it would certainly not be the case 
for beverages and other tropical products not produced in 
high-income countries: in both of these latter cases, the 
underpricing domestically in developing countries 
dominates, causing international prices for these products 
to be higher than they would be under global free trade.  
Three important consequences follow from these facts. One 
is that countries are trading less in farm products than 
would be the case without intervention: countries with a 
comparative advantage in farming tend to be exporting 
less, and those with a comparative disadvantage in 
farming tend to be importing less (and may even be 
depressing international prices further by using export 
subsidies to dispose of protection-induced surpluses, as in 
Western Europe). Another is that the relative price of 
agricultural products in international markets has been 
under even greater pressure to decline in the course of 
global economic growth than suggested in the discussion 
above, as more and more upper middle-income developing 
countries gradually move away from taxing to subsidizing 
farmers. And the third consequence of these facts is that it 
has left ample scope to reform policies affecting farmer and 
consumer incentives, the effects of which will depend 
heavily on the pace and nature of multilateral, regional and 
unilateral reforms in the various commodity markets. It is 
conceivable, for example, that an increase in net farm 
imports by high-income countries following the Uruguay 
Round and its successor could coincide with an increase in 
net exports of agricultural products from developing 
countries undertaking unilateral reforms. That would have 
offsetting effects on international farm prices but 
reinforcing effects on quantities traded as both sets of 
countries better exploit their respective comparative 
advantages. And it is expected that the discipline placed on 
developing and transition economies (including those 
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subsequently acceding to the WTO) by the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture not to raise farm producer or 
export subsidies will, in the long run at least as bound 
agricultural tariffs are lowered, reduce the likelihood that 
agricultural disincentives are replaced by protectionist 
policies in the future. 
The role of policies affecting manufactures 
The trade policy bias in favour of import-substituting 
industrialization, discussed above, has a similar effect on 
unskilled labour-intensive manufacturing in a newly 
industrializing economy as it does on agriculture. Limiting 
imports through protectionism reduces the demand for 
foreign currency and thereby causes the real exchange rate 
to appreciate. That effectively holds back the development 
of all industries otherwise able to export,41 including those 
light ones in which a poor country’s manufacturing 
comparative advantage will first emerge. They are the very 
industries most likely to benefit from relocating or 
establishing in rural areas to take advantage of lower 
wages and other costs of production there. Hence not only 
agriculture but also rural industrialization is hampered by 
all-too-common protectionist import-substituting 
industrial policies.  
The role of rural infrastructure investments 
Needless to say, the move from subsistence-only farm 
production to having a marketable surplus of food, and the 
emergence of cash cropping, depend on the provision of 
rural roads, radio, post and telecoms to lower the cost of 
transport, information and communication for rural 
people. Constructing those infrastructures and maintaining 
them provide off-farm work for farm households, but more 
importantly those infrastructures spawn additional new 
service-sector jobs in rural areas and elsewhere for 
transporting, grading, processing, packing, and 
                                                          
41 For more on how protection against imports effectively taxes 
exports, see Clements and Sjaastad (1984). 
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distributing the marketed farm products. The opening up 
or extending of rural roads and communications also 
expand the effective demand for purchased farm inputs 
such as improved seed varieties, chemical ferrtilizers, 
pesticides, farm machinery, and fuel. 
Rural roads, electricity and telecommunications also make 
rural industrialization more profitable for unskilled labour-
intensive industries not connected to primary sectors. True, 
those roads also make it easier for rural workers to drift to 
urban areas, which would close the urban-rural wage gap 
somewhat. But many workers will stay put because for 
much of the year they are fully occupied in seasonal farm 
work. The more that rural industrialization is successful, 
the more the country’s comparative advantage would 
move away from the primary sectors. The new jobs created 
by those off-farm activities have been shown to contribute 
substantially not only to economic growth but also to 
reducing absolute poverty and rural-income inequality in 
many modernising agrarian economies. They also slow the 
growth of urban pollution and congestion.  
All of this suggests a high social rate of return to 
investments in rural infrastructure, and more so the less 
government price and trade policies discriminate between 
primary and manufacturing sectors. The returns would be 
higher the freer the economy is of government 
interventions. This is because in the presence of protection 
manufacturers sell mainly to domestic consumers and buy 
inputs from other producers. Those linkages encourage a 
concentration of manufacturing in the cities. By contrast, in 
an open economy most sales of domestically produced 
manufactures are exports and many inputs are imported, 
so together with higher urban property prices those factors 
can eventually encourage rural industrialization (Krugman 
1998). This new theory of economic geography suggests a 
government can slow or reverse the growth of large urban 
cities by freeing trade and boosting rural infrastructure. 
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Empirical evidence 
Time series evidence provides strong empirical support for 
the comparative advantage theory outlined above, 
notwithstanding policy distortions. The time series 
evidence for Asia’s less developed economies is clear from 
the middle columns of Table A4.1. The first four columns 
of that table summarize the relative resource endowments 
and economic growth rates of Asia’s economies. Leaving 
aside the centrally planned economies of Indo-China and 
North Korea, three groups of developing economies are 
identifiable: the NIEs of South Korea and Taiwan, the large 
ASEAN economies plus China, and the South Asian 
economies. The first are extremely densely populated, very 
rapidly growing and with high incomes; the second are 
moderately densely populated, rapidly growing (the 
Philippines only in the 1990s) and with moderate incomes; 
and the third are very densely populated, slowly growing 
prior to the 1990s and with low incomes. Theory would 
lead us to expect the first group to have a weak and rapidly 
declining comparative advantage in agriculture, the second 
to have a stronger agricultural comparative advantage at 
the same per capita income but one that is nonetheless 
declining, and the third to have an in-between and only 
slowly declining comparative advantage in farm products. 
The final four columns of Table A4.1 support that theory. 
They show the trends in two indicators of agricultural 
trade specialization. One is the so-called 'revealed' 
comparative advantage index, defined as agriculture's 
share of a country's merchandise exports relative to 
agriculture's share of global merchandise exports. The 
other is agricultural exports minus imports as a ratio of 
agricultural exports plus imports. The latter therefore takes 
a value between minus and plus one, and is zero when a 
country is 100 per cent self sufficient in farm products.  
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Appendix 5 
List of trade policy terms 
Binding 
commitments 
(services) 
Binding (sometimes bound) commitments are a 
legal obligation not to make market access 
conditions more restrictive than described in a 
country's schedule of commitments. They are 
enforceable and may only be breached through 
negotiation with affected trading partners. A 
country breaching a binding may have to offer 
compensation. 
Bindings 
(goods) 
A binding (also called concession) is a legal 
obligation not to raise tariffs on particular 
products above the specified rate agreed in 
GATT negotiations and incorporated in a 
country's schedule of concessions. Bindings are 
enforceable through the GATT. Their purpose is 
to provide greater commercial certainty through 
a ceiling which cannot be breached. 
Commercial 
presence 
Any type of business or professional 
establishment within the territory of a GATS 
member for the purpose of supplying a service. 
This includes juridical persons, branches and 
representative offices. 
Copyright The exclusive right to do certain things with an 
original work, including the right to reproduce, 
publish, perform the work in public and to make 
adaptations of it. 
Council for 
Trade in 
Goods 
The body administering 13 agreements covering 
trade in goods. The most important of these is 
the GATT. 
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Council for 
Trade in 
Services 
The body administering the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services.  
Council for 
TRIPS 
The body administering the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights. Its role is to monitor the operation of the 
agreement and members' compliance with it. 
Countervail-
ing measures 
Special duties imposed on imports to offset the 
benefits of subsidies to producers or exporters in 
the exporting country. GATT Article VI and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures set out the rules for imposing such 
measures. 
Dispute 
settlement 
Resolution of conflict, usually through a 
compromise between opposing claims, 
sometimes through an intermediary. Procedures 
for dispute resolution are set out in articles XXII 
and XXIII of the GATT, articles XXII and XXIII of 
the GATS and article 64 of TRIPS. All of these 
agreements follow the unified procedures set 
out by the WTO. 
Export quotas Restrictions or ceilings imposed by an exporting 
country on the value or volume of certain 
products. They are designed to protect domestic 
producers and consumers from temporary 
shortages of these products or to improve their 
prices on world markets. 
Financial 
services 
Banking, general insurance, life insurance, funds 
management, securities trading and advisory 
services related to these activities. 
Free trade area A group of two or more countries that have 
eliminated tariff and most non-tariff barriers 
affecting trade among themselves. Participating 
countries may continue to apply their own 
tariffs on external goods, or they may agree on a 
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common external tariff. 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
General 
Council 
This is a body composed of all WTO members. It 
has general authority to supervise the various 
agreements under the jurisdiction of the WTO. 
Geneva 
Convention 
Protects a producer of phonograms against the 
making of duplicates without his or her consent. 
The convention currently has 52 members. 
Horizontal 
commitments 
Horizontal commitments apply to all services 
trade covered in a schedule of commitments. 
Generally, they relate to investment, formation 
of corporate structures, land acquisition, the 
movement of personnel, etc. 
Import quotas Restrictions or ceilings imposed by an importing 
country on the value or volume of certain 
products. They are designed to protect domestic 
producers from the effects of lower-priced 
imported products. 
Industrial 
property 
Mainly deals with inventions, trade marks and 
industrial designs, but also the repression of 
unfair competition. 
Intellectual 
property 
The rights of creators in the industrial, scientific, 
technological, musical and artistic fields. Rights 
relate to patents, trademarks, industrial designs, 
layout designs of integrated circuits, copyright, 
geographical indications and confidential 
information (trade secrets). 
Juridical 
person 
A legal entity, such as a corporation, trust, 
partnership, joint venture, sole proprietorship,  
association, etc., formed for the purpose of 
supplying a service. 
MFN (goods) Most-favoured-nation treatment: all GATT 
contracting parties grant each other treatment as 
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favourable as they give to any other country in 
the application and administration of customs 
regulations, tariffs and related charges. 
MFN 
(intellectual 
property) 
Most-favoured-nation treatment: the obligation 
to treat intellectual property right holders from 
all TRIPS members in the same way, subject to 
some exceptions under article 4 of TRIPS. 
MFN 
(services) 
Most-favoured-nation treatment: the obligation 
to treat service providers from all GATS member 
countries and their services equally. MFN does 
not imply a qualitative standard.  
MFN 
exemptions 
(services) 
In services trade, permission granted to a 
member country not to apply MFN treatment in 
a given sector. MFN exemptions are for a 
maximum of 10 years, and they have to be 
reviewed after 5 years. 
Modes of 
delivery for 
services 
Services can be delivered in four ways: 
1. cross-border supply, where the producer 
remains in one territory and the consumer in 
another; 
2. consumption abroad, where the consumer 
travels from one country to the country of the 
service producer to obtain the service; 
3. commercial presence, where services are 
provided through establishment in the other 
country; and 
4. presence of natural persons, where the producer 
travels from one country to another to produce 
or deliver a service. 
Multilateral 
trade 
negotiations 
Multilateral trade negotiations (also known as 
rounds) aim to reach mutually beneficial 
agreements reducing barriers to world trade. 
Eight such rounds have been held under GATT 
auspices since 1947. Each round has consisted of 
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long bargaining sessions. 
National 
treatment 
(goods) 
Non-discrimination in domestic regulations and 
requirements, including taxation, between like 
domestic and imported goods. 
National 
treatment 
(intellectual 
property) 
A member of TRIPS must accord to the nationals 
of other members treatment no less favourable 
that it accords to its own nationals, but there 
may be some exceptions to this because of rights 
under the Paris, Berne or Rome Conventions and 
the Treaty on Integrated Circuits. 
National 
treatment 
(services) 
The obligation to guarantee foreign service 
provides and their services equivalent treatment 
to domestic service providers. 
Natural 
persons 
Persons who are citizens or permanent residents 
of a GATS member country. If they are service 
suppliers, they have rights under the GATS. 
Negative 
listings 
Used in the schedules of commitments under the 
GATS. Negative listing means that all service 
activities are covered by all provisions of the 
GATS unless they are listed as subject to some 
limitations on market access and national 
treatment. The advantage of this method is that 
all new services are automatically covered. 
Developed countries have used this method for 
the financial services commitments. 
Non-tariff 
measures 
Government measures other than tariffs that 
restrict imports. Examples include quantitative 
restrictions, import licensing, voluntary restraint 
arrangements and variable levies. For the 
purposes of the Uruguay Round, non-tariff 
measures also included domestic support 
arrangements that distort or impede trade, such 
as price support programs and production 
subsidies. 
Patent The right given to inventors to exclude others 
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for a specified period from making, using or 
selling a new, useful, non-obvious invention. 
Patent 
Cooperation 
Treaty 
Provides for the filing of an international patent 
application in member states. Has the same 
effect in member states as filing an application 
with a national patent office. 
Positive 
listings 
Countries may inscribe their commitments 
under the GATS in the form of positive listings. 
In this way, only listed activities are subject to all 
GATS disciplines. The disadvantage is that all 
services have to be listed even if there are no 
market access or national treatment limitations. 
Most countries activities have made their listings 
in this form. 
Quantitative 
restrictions 
Limits or quotas on the amounts of particular 
commodities that can be imported or exported 
during a given period. They are usually 
measured by volume, but sometimes by value. 
Reciprocity The practice by which governments extend 
similar concessions to each other, as when one 
government lowers tariffs or other barriers 
impeding imports in exchange for equivalent 
concessions from a trading partner. This is also 
known as a balance of concessions. Concessions 
made as a result of reciprocal bargaining must 
be extended on an MFN-basis to all GATT or 
GATS members. 
Retaliation Action taken by a country to restrain imports 
from a country that has increased a tariff or 
imposed other measures adversely affecting its 
exports. 
Schedules of 
commitments 
Schedules of commitment are a key requirement 
and component under the GATS. They perform 
a function similar to the tariff schedules for 
goods under the GATT. Schedules allow service 
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exporters to examine the extent to which they 
have guaranteed access to markets. 
Sectoral 
commitments 
Entries covering specific service sectors or sub-
sectors in the schedules of commitments. 
Examples are accountancy, freight-forwarding 
or life insurance. A sectoral commitment attracts 
a higher level of GATS rights and obligations. A 
commitment may not be made more restrictive 
for at least three years. 
Special and 
differential 
treatment 
The concept that exports of developing countries 
should be given preferential access to markets of 
developed countries, and that developing 
countries participating in trade negotiations 
need not reciprocate fully the concessions they 
receive. 
Tariff A duty (or tax) levied on goods going from 
customs area to another. Tariffs raise the price of 
imported goods and make them less competitive 
in the market of the importing country. 
Tariff quota 
 
The application of a reduced tariff rate for a 
specified quantity of imported goods. 
Trademarks Words, names, symbols, devices or 
combinations of these, used by manufacturers 
and merchants to identify their goods and to 
distinguish them from others. 
Unbound 
commitments 
Unbound commitments give the listing country 
complete flexibility to change its trading regime 
in the affected activity without the need to offer 
compensation. Unbound commitments are 
therefore much less valuable than bound 
commitments. 
Source: Goode (1998). 
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